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SUMMARY: A three-judge district court struck down the 
statutory retirement system for Mass. state police on the ground 
that the 50-year-old mandatory retirement age lacked a rational 
basis and therefore violated the Fourteenth Amendment. - - (HlHu~~ \) 
c 
two 
FACTS: Murgia was a Lt. Co~onel in the state police 
and was required to retire at age SO pursuant to Mass. Gen. 
Laws ch.32, §26(3) which states that members of the state police: 
[S]hall be retired by the state board of 
retirement upon his attaining age fifty or 
upon the expiration of such twenty years, 
whichever last occurs. 
Since under state law no male may enlist in the state police 
after age 30, the mandatory retirement age is SO. It is not 
disputed that Murgia was in excellent physical condition, as 
measured by annual medical examinations which were required 
to be taken. 
The USDC recognized that police work is arduous and that 
there is a "general relationship between advancing age and 
decreasing physical ability", but emphasized that "the relation 
between chronological age and functional age varies greatly 
from one individual to the next." The court accepted the 
State's argument that an arbitrary standard is necessary in 
those situations where individual determination s are impractical 
(e.g., voting, jury service, selective service age), but rejected 
administrative convenience in the circumstances of this case --
since each officer was being medically examined each year any~vay . 
The court turned to a different test of reasonableness: "is 
there, for example, a greater risk at the higher age that the 
test, or, more exactly, the prognosis based upon testing , will 
be less reliable?" 
Looking at the record, the USDC noted that, unlike Air Line 
Pilots Ass 'n v. Quesada , 276 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1960), there 
• ,> 
three 
are no studies of any kind which were conducted to support 
a conclusion that by age 50, in spite of medical testing, a 
critical area had been reached. Indeed, the only statistics 
of actual experience showed no greater incidence of non-injury 
disability in the group age 45-49 than for the 40-44 age group. 
The court therefore concluded that mandatory retirement at age 
50 -- where individualized medical screening is not only avail-
able but already required -- lacked any factual basis. The 
court rejected out-of-hand two stock justifications for early 
retirement: morale among young officers and the facilitation 
of rapid promotion. In its opinion published May 31, 1974, 
the USDC declared the Massachusetts statutory retirement scheme 
void and indicated that injunctive relief would be awarded 
after further hearing. 
On December 12, 1974, the court handed down a second 
opinion in which it considered the measure of relief. The 
USDC enjoined the operation of the statute and ordered Hurgia 
reinstated as a Lt. Colonel of state police. The court refused 
to appoint him to a particular job since it did "not propose to 
organize the State Police." Under the authority of Edelman v. 
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), the court refused to award back pay 
and attorney's fees. Murgia argued that attorney's fees should 
be awarded since they could be considered "incidents of the 
hearing ... which attach to the regular jurisdiction" of the 
court like court costs. The court noted that attorney's fees 
are awarded sometimes on a private attorney general theory, b1.1t 
concluded: 
•, \ ~ 
( 
Each of these objectives reflects independent 
policy considerations unrelated to the enforce-
ment of injunctions, and in no sense can be 
termed "integral" to such relief. 
four 
The court noted that there were no special burdens on plaintiff 
(e.g., not a class action) and denied counsel fees. The USDC 
did hold that the State was chargeable for regular court costs. 
CONTENTIONS: In No. 74-1044, the State argues that the 
USDC erred and that the mandatory retirement statute does bear 
some rational relationship to legitimate state purposes. It 
urges that: 
The retirement statute ... has the positive 
objective of promoting the physical capability 
of the state police. Intersecting the lines 
of increasing age and decreasing physical 
capability at age fifty is a rational acco-
modation well within the legislative power 
to make. 
The State challenges the USDC's analogy of this case to Cleve-
land Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), since a 
fundamental right (procreation) was being infringed in that 
case. Further, the State argues that morale and promotion 
o~portunities are legitimate considerations and that steps may 
be taken to avoid "staf gnatim of promotion and disincentive 
to service." Schlesinger v. Ballard, 95 S.Ct. 672 (1975). 
Murgia has filed a motion to affirm, which adheres to 
the USDC's approach. He emphasizes that a mandatory retirement 
age of 50 is by nature different from retirement at more usual 
ages (60-70) and does not fall "within the range where fairness 
or a rational relation to a state purpose exists." An amicus 
brief has been filed by the State Police Association of Mass. 
• I • • 
which, interestingly enough, supports the State s posltlon, 
. ' 
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not Murgia's. [M~Pe,~As.s~~,a..~+~ ~~l 
In No. 74-1120, Murgia complains of the denial of attorney's 
fees. He argues that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the 
awarding of such fees, see Sims v. Amos, 340 F.Supp. 691 (H.D. 
Ala. 1972), aff'd, 409 U.S. 942 (1972)(reapportionment case). 
Murgia urges that the Court should note probable jurisdiction 
if it grants cert in Jordan v. Gilligan, No. 74-403; Taylor v. 
Perini, No. 74-506; and other cases raising this claim. Hurgia 
argues that this case is a proper situation for awarding fees 
since he comes within the private attorney general doctrine. 
The State has filed a motion to affirm in which it argues 
that attorney's fees were properly denied.. It points out that 
the USDC indicated that it would not award fees as a matter of 
discretion, even if the Eleventh Amendment argument failed, 
since plaintiff had no special burdens. 
DISCUSSION: Especially in light of the Court's su1nmary 
'1 
affirmance of Weisbrod v. Lynn, No. 74-594 (February 24, 1975), 
and earlier dismissal (DWSFQ) of Hcilvaine v. Pennsylvania, 415 
U.S. 986 (1974)(Blaclunun, J., would have noted prob. juris.), 
it appears that the Court should take this case up on the merits. 
l 
The USDC took a very "active" vie\v of the rational relationship 
test, requiring more than mere surmise and possibility from the 
State. These "tests" under the Fourteenth Amendment are always 
spongy. It might be wise to wait for a few more lower court s 
to consider the constitutiona l basis of age discrimina tion, but 




affirmances going different directions. A summary reversal 
hardly seems appropriate, even if the Court desires to go that 
way, since there is no obvious authority to hang the reversal 
on. 
Regarding the attorney's fees issue, this looks like another 
to hold for Alyeska Pipeline. 
There are motions to affirm. 
5/ 7/75 Hannay USDC opns in 
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BOBTAIL BENCH MEMORANDUM 
Mr. Justice Powell DATE: December 8, 1975 
Chris Whitman 
No. 74-1044 Massachusetts Board of Retirement 
v. Murgia 
I would reverse. 
Age is not a suspect classification. Nor is the 
expectation of continued employment here a fundamental right 
(in fact there is no expectation at all since the retirement 
age has been set at 50 for years). Under these circumstances 
the "rational relationship" test applies. The three-judge 
district court, applying that test, found no rational 
relationship. I disagree. 
The district court's decision does not purport to hold 
that a 50-year retirement line would in itself lack a rational 
basis where, as here, the job is arduous and physically demanding, 
requiring top physical condition. It admits (and respondent 
concedes) that the state's interest in a top-shape work force 
is legitimate and that age is rationally related to declining 
physical condition. The district court's decision is based 
instead on the fact that periodic individual physicials are 
given to the policemen. The argument goes: Since the state 
has detailed information on the physical well-being of each 
policeman it has no interest in employing a generalized 
presumption that would eliminate some men that it knows are 
2. 
in good condition. 
There are several problems with this analysis. First, 
there is no guarantee that the physicals are always sufficient 
to detect declining physical strength. Second, it is rational 
for the state to establish a certain age beyond which decline 
in physical condition below a minimum level of acceptability 
becomes more likely, and to institute a supplementary series 
of periodic exams to insure that no one falls dramatically 
below that level of acceptability before reaching the cut-off 
age. This system not only insure a relatively fit force but 
avoids the emotional upset and uncertainty that would be created 
by a system that relied completely on individual examinations. 
Third, state interests other than the maintenance of a strong 
physicially strong force are served by the flat retirement 
age. , · One of these, pointed out by 
appellants, is that a fixed age facilitates the planning of 
pension and retirement programs. More important, a relatively 
early retirement age allows for the constant infusion of young 
personnel and for rapid promotions. The morale value of such 
a system - and the sense it provides of a young and innovative 
force - can be a legitimate state goal. The district court 
discounted this interest because of the off-setting decline 
in the morale of those older men who must retire. I don't 
think that it can be so easily dismissed. The older men 
have pensions and have the experience and training to go on 
to other, less demanding, lines of work. In any case, it 
j. 
is not irrational (though it may sound ruthless) for the state 
to decide that the morale of the younger men is more significant 
in shaping the direction of the department and that overall 
efficiency is better served by quick promotion of the young 
than by extended service by older men at the top of the heap. 
Chris 
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January 28, 1976 
Re: No. 74-1044 - Massachusetts Board of 
Retirement v. Murgia 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 




JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
,®u:pumt {!j:Oltrlllf t!rt ~tb .®ta.tts 
-Mlpngflttt. ~. Qj:. 20~)!.~ / 
January 28, 1976 
Re: No . 74-1044 - Massachusetts Board of Retirement 
v. Murgia 
Dear Bill: 
I anticipate circulating a separate opinion concurring 
only in the result in this case. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAM BERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
.;§u.pumt ~on.rt of lqt ~~lt .:%$faits 
~rurlfingian, ~. <lJ. 2!Tc?J!.~ 
January 28, 1976 
No. 74-1044, Mass. Board v. Murgia 
Dear Bill, 
As I indicated to you orally, I contem-
plate writing a brief concurring opinion in this 
case. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
t 
~uvrcmt <qmtrl of tqt 'Jftnittb ~ J 
1t'Taj,)ltingtcn, g:l. <q. 20?JI·~ 
' 
CH A M BLR S OF" 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
January 30, 1976 
· Re: No. 74-1044 - Massachusetts Board of Retirement 
v. Murgia 
Dear Bill: 
Since I fear that I will not get my separate opinion 
in the above case circulated for a couple of weeks, I thought 
I would sketch for your benefit (?) w~at I have in mind 
addre ssing. I agree entirely with the result you reach, 
and I also fully agree that this is a case .for "minimum 
scrutiny" in that it does not involve a "suspect classifica-
tion" or "fundamental right". My difficulty, which is 
probably less with your opinion than with the language from 
other opinions which it quotes, is that it seems to state 
quite a different and more expansive test for this kind of 
review than was stated in Bill Douglas' opinion in 
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 u.s. 483. 
I assume that, being the skilled craftsman you are, 
you have consciously opted for a standard of review which will 
give the courts more l eeway in striking down state legislation 
of this sqrt, or at least that you feel that. the Court has 
opted for it on previous occasions. If I am wrong, and am 
actually making a semantical mountain out of a molehill, let 
me know and it may be that I will write something quite 
different, or perhaps not write anything at all. 
- 2 -
On page 8 of your draft, you said that the inquiry 
is whether the classification is "reasonable, not arbitrary, 
and ••• rest[s] upon some ground of difference having a 
fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation." 
I After citing cases, you say that "the substance of such inquiry is essentially whether the classification is reasonably related to a legitimate state objective." On page 10, you 
say that our inquiry "ceases with a determination that the 
age fifty classification rationally relates to the furtherance 
of the state's announced objective." 
Although one can argue about the meaning of each word, 
it seems to me by the time that you require the rational 
relationship to be to the state's "announced" objective, 
a~d th~t you require the classificatiqn to have not 
merely a r 'elation, but "a fair and substant.ial relation" · 
to the object, the courts are given much more authority 
than I would have thought th~ Fourteenth Amendment 
entitled them to in the area where concededly only "minimum 
rutiny" applies. While it is difficult to articulate in 
general terms, I think the test your opinion enunciates is 
quite a different one than that of Williamson v. Lee Optical, 
or the McGowan v. Maryland language that "a statutory discrimina-
tion will not be set aside in any of any state of facts 
reasonably may be conceived to justify it." 366 U.S. 420, 426. 
I presume there will always be differences among us 
as to what sort of a classification demands "strict scrutiny", 
and perhaps unresolved questions as to whethe~ there may be 
an intermediate level of scrutiny between "strict" and 
"rational basis", a sort of scrutiny that some say was applied 
in the Chief's famous opinion in Reed v. Reed and in Lewis' 
opinion in Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. I think 
what I will say in my separate opinion boils down to the idea 
that once it is conceded that none of these factors are 
I 
J 
- 3 / 
involved, the standard ought to be simply stated and ought 
to virtually foreclose judicial invalidation except in the 
rare, rare case where the legislature has all but run 
amok and acted in a patently arbitrary manner. 
Sincerely, 
~-
Mr. Justice Brennan 
. ' 
To: Justice Powell Date: Feb. 2, 1976 
From: Chris Whitman 
Re: Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia -- No. 74-1044 
I see difficulties in two paragraphs of Justice Brennan's -
opinion. My difficulties stem from my hesitancy concerning 
the stress laid upon representation in the legislature as an 
............ ----- ~ 
indicia of a suspect classification see the paragraph on pgs. 
6-7. It may x be true that the Court can XHiaxxxxxxE and does 
relax its scrutiny as the legislative process responds to xxx 
certain problems -- although I am not sure that that is a wise 
~ approach. But the fact that much legislation concerning 
'(~ racial discrimination has been enacted does not make XR race 
any less a "suspect classification•; in fact, the legislation 
has been taken as an indication of the importance of closely 
scrutinizing racial BXXEXXMXRX classifications that come before 
(teenagers, children) 
the EBHXX Court. And the fact that young people/are not well 
represented in the legislature does not make classifications 
~HxxaiRXRgxxs turning on youth suspect. Rather, the Court 
seems to be concerned whether there has been a history of 
and unacceptable 
arbitrary/treatment of a given group due to sterotypes that our _ ........ ~ 
system will not tolerate (my rather hasty and gross overgeneraliza-
tion). 
After emphasizing the importance of iHgx representation 
in the legislature in determining what is a suspect classification, 
Justice Brennan then distinguishes sex from age on the basis 
of such representation. (P. 9-10) This indicates that sex 
a "suspect classification" -- a result that we surely need 
-2-
reach here -- and suggests that as women xx gain msxHxpx greater 
representation in the legislature, discrimination on the basis 
of sex will be xx less closely scrutinized. This 
is unnecessary. There 
case, like this one, turned on the question of whether the 
classification was "arbitrary" or "rationally related to the 
state objective." In fact, Justice Brennan, on page 11, 
aieei:Rg:w:is'Res ~ OQ iKRJiili.JIHtiB¥ e'ka&a luu;ii I applies the 
RKK~ Reed standard and finds that the classification here meets it. 
A more minor point -- I was surprised that the opinion 
handles the question of the impact of periodic exams so 
cursorily, since that was the crux of the decision below. 
I do think that the use of exams does not xR£ destroy the 
rationality of the EHxx££x cut-off point (see my memo), but 
I frankly just don't understand the point made in this 
regard by x footnote 13, on page 11. 
Chris 
- 4 -
{WJB, PS, BRW, TM, HAB, LFP), the Court went so far as to find that 
one of the Government interests advanced in support of the classifi-
cation involved there was illegitimate, after first having held that 
11 [u]nder traditional equal protection analysis, a legislative classi-
fication must be sustained if the classification is rationally related 
to a le~itimate government interest ... JQ., at 533. The requirement 
was sim1larly recognized in Potter's Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 
78, 84 {PS, WEB, BRW, HAB): 11 If the goals sought are leg1timate and 
classification adopted is rationally related to the achievement of 
those goals, then the action of Congress is not so arbitrary as to 
violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment ... Likewise, in 
McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 270 {LFP, WEB, WJB, PS, BRW, HAB, 
WHR), we held that the Court "[inquires] only whether the chall~nged 
distinction rationally furthers some legitimate articulated purpose ... 
A legitimate interest was also required in San Antonio Inde endent 
School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40, 55 LFP, WEB, PS, HAB, WHR), 
and was required as recently as your Weinberger v. Salfi, supra, at 772, 777, 
where you said that 11 Congress may not invidiously d1scriminate ... on 
the basis of criteria which bear no rational relation to a legitimate 
legislative goal, .. and that the classification must solve a problem 
which the Government 11 legitimatel.Y desired to avoid ... Finally, Potter's 
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 (PS, WEB, BRW, HAB, LFP, WHR), and 
Jiminez v. Weinberger, supra, at 636, took care to emphasize that state 
interests i nvolved were 11 legitimate ... 
In sum, I think equal protection analysis in our modern cases, where 
no 11 Suspect classification .. or 11 fundamental right .. is involved, has ad-
hered since 1920 when Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia was decided, to the 
test that a classification 11must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must 
rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and reasonable relation 
to [a legitimate] object of the legislation .... 11 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
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February 9, 1976 
RE: No. 74-1044 Massachusetts Board, etc. v. Murgia 
Dear Bi 11: 
Your comments on my proposed Murgia op1n1on, and Potter's concur-
ring opinion in the case suggest, I think, that in the absence of a 
"suspect classification" or involvement of a "fundamental right", the 
applicable test is necessarily one of "minimum scrutiny" as defined 
in Wi 11 iamson v. Lee Optical and McGowan v. Maryland: · "a statutory 
discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably 
may be conceived to justify it." In my view, our QEinions have de-
velo~ed a more flexible rule, and Murgia reflects, I suggest, not a I I 
rewr1ting of tne law, but the more flexible test that has evolved. VJ 
Absent the need for strict scrutiny, have we not employed tests in 
a variety of cases, making it clear that minimum scrutiny in the Lee 
Optical definition is not always the result when suspect classes and 
fundamental rights are absent? See Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 
498; Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628; Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 
361; James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128; Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety 
Co., 406 U.S. 164; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438; Reed v. Reed, 
404 U.S. 71. The proposed Murgia opinion suiTITlarizes the fJexi!Ue 
~t of these and all our cases where strict scrutiny has not been ap-
;:, . -: 2,j; for it l eaves the determina tion of the requisite rel ations hip 
between means and end to the nature of each case presented. In vi ew 
of the political clout of the aged, only a rational relation between 
the classification and the State's purpose was required to sustain 
the classification in Murgia. The test as applied to the age 50 
classification, therefore, doesn't differ from that employed in other 
cases of minimum scrutiny. 
') I do not think the Murgia opinion opts for a standard of review 
which will give the courts more leeway in striking down state legis-
lation than we have already given them. After all, Murgia sustains 
- 2 -
a classification based on a criterion (age) in many respects quite 
akin to sex. If Murgia is not a fair treatment of our equal pro-
tection analysis as our cases have evolved it, w~2re left with only ~ 
the rigid two-tier approach which I had thought all of us found un-
acceptable. If only either mere rationality or strict scrutiny are 
the available tests, then we will have to acknowledge we can no 
longer defend the results of Jiminez, James, Weber, Eisenstadt and 
Reed. Also, since the doctrine of irrebuttable presumptions seems 
to have been permanently interred, we should, as well, be prepared 
to confess we were wrong in the results we reached in Cleveland Board 
of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632; USDA v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508; 
Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441; Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 635. 
The following cases, I think, support my conviction that not only is 
Murgia no departure from prior law, but that the 11 line-up 11 in each of them 
is cogent evidence that eight of us (John was not involved in any way) 
have been party to opinions expressing that general view. Potter objects 
to describing the inquiry as 11 Whether the classification is reasonably 
related to a 1 egitimate state objective, .. and you express concern with 
describing the inquiry as whether the classification is .. reasonable, not 
arbitrary and . . . rests upon some ground of difference having a fair 
I 
and substantial relation to the object of the legislation... Yet 11 fair 
and substantial .. relation between classification and purpose is the test 
stated in the following cases: Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14 (HAB, 
WEB, WOO, WJB, PS, BRW, TM, LFP); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 374 
(WJB, unanimous); Kahn v. Shevin, 4l6 U.S. 351, 355 (WOO, WEB, PS, HAB, 
LFP, WHR); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 (WJB, WOO, PS, TM); 
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (WEB, WOO, WJB, PS, BRW, TM, HAB, LFP,WHR); 
RQY5ter GUanO Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415. Similarly, Weber v. 
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., supra (LFP, WEB, WOO, WJB, PS, BRW, TM}, 
stated that, at a minimum, equal protection requires a rational relation-
ship to a legitimate state purpose, and recognized a range of inquiry 
between that minimum and strict scrutiny by further observing that a 
....... ,,. .. c.J. c:;cr t ·' Yly" wc.s required when sensitive rights were approached. 
Aaalti~nally, weoer he~a tnat the classification involved bore no 
11 Significant relationship 11 to the State's purposes and that the classi-
fication was 11 illogical and unjust... Id., at 175. Finally, in Jiminez 
v. Weinberger, supra, at 636 (WEB, WOD~WJB, PS, BRW, TM, HAB, LFP), we 
invalidated the classification challenged there as not .. reasonably re-
lated" to the Government's interest. 
To be sure, all these~cases fa!l into the twiliaht zone of etu}l 
prQtection; they are, nevertheTeS$7 part of the warp and woof o equal 






us to revise the contours of the appropriate inquiry where strict 
scrutiny is inappropriate. Indeed, even McGowan and its progeny 
support inquiries not really different from Murgia's. In McGowan, 
366 U.S., at 428, the Court felt it appropriate to inquire into 
"reasonableness" and to conclude that there was "no indication of 
the unreasonableness .. of, but rather a .. reasonable basis .. for, the 
classifications involved there. Similarly, in Dandridge v. Williams, 
397 U.S. 471, 485 {PS, WEB, BRW, Black, Harlan), a majority of us held 
that "in the area of economics and social welfare," a classification 
does not offend the Constitution if it has ' some 11 reasonable basis." 
Finally, as recently as Weinber er v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 776-777 
(WHR, WEB, PS, BRW, HAB, LFP , a majority of us held that classifi-
cations would be upheld 11 SO long as they comport with the standards 
of legislative reasonableness enunciated in cases like Dandridge v. 
Williams and Richardson v. Belcher ... If it was permissible for 
"standards of legislative reasonableness .. in Salfi to include the 
rationality of Dandridge and Belcher, how is Murgia's analysis dif-
ferent? 
You also express concern with Murgia's statement that our inquiry 
11 ceases with a determi nation that the age fifty classification 
rationa l ly relates to the state's announced objective", questioning 
particularly whether this means that the state's purpose must be not 
only legitimate but tha t it must be articulated. I suspect you and 
I might answer t hat question dif ferently but Murgia doesn't attempt 
to answer it. Rather the opinion merely observes that the state has 
articulated a purpose here, not that it was required to do so. By 
contrast, it is debatable whether the New Orleans City Council articu-
lated a purpose for the "grandfather .. clause in the ordinance involved 
in Dukes, and it may be that we should use that case as the vehicle 
for deciding the issue. 
On the question of 11 legitimate 11 , s·tate purpose, of particular con-
cern to Potter, I can only say that our prior equal protection de-
cisions )virtually w·i·''1'Jut exception, support tt.c requi rement of at 
I east a ·1 egi timate state i m:erest. 11 The tests t o determine t he 
validity of state statutes under the Equal Protection Clause have 
been variously expressed, but this Court requires, at a minimum, that 
a statutory classification bear some rational relationship to a legiti-
mate state purpose ... Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., supra, at 
172. 11 The essential i nquiry in all the .•. cases is ... inevitably 
a dual one: What legitimate state· interest does the classification 
promote? What fundamental personal rights might the classification 
endanger? .. .!.Q_., at 173. Indeed, in USDA v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 
' . 
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CHAMBERS OF 
~tqtrtutt Qfttttrl o-f tqt ~tb .:§taftg 
-asqmg~ 1Q. Qf. 2ll~'!~ 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST February 11, 1976 
No. 74-1044 - Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, concurring in the judgment. 
Although I completely agree with the result reached by the 
Court in this case, and with parts of its analysis in reaching that 
result, I have sufficient reservations about other parts that I con-
cur only in the judgment. I think the test announced by the Court 
represents a significant departure from its previous equal protec-
tion decisions, and is one which could portend mischief throughout 
state and federal judicial systems. 
It is important to place the Court's analysis in perspective. 
The Court convincingly demonstrates, and I entirely agree, that 
there is at issue here neither any fundamental right, slip op. at 
5-6, nor any classification directed towards a "suspect class, " Id. , 
*I 
at 6-7. I therefore agree with the Court that there is nothing in 
I do not, however, agree with the intimations in the Court's 
proposed opinion that identification of such classes is somehow de-
rived from judicial perceptions of their effectiveness in the political 
arena. Slip op. at 9-10. But as no one suggests that any such a 
"class" is implicated here, I leave my misgivings about such sugges-
tions for some more appropriate occasion, 
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this case justifying the use of what it describes as "strict scrutiny" 
to review the enactment of the. Massachusetts legislature. 
Nor is there anything in this case, so far as I can determine, 
that would suggest the use of any so-called "intermediate level of 
scrutiny.'' Whatever may be the merits of such a standard of con-
stitutional inquiry in some cases, there is no suggestion that any 
such hybrid test is called for here. 
This case, then, is agreed by all to be governed by the least 
exacting standard of judicial review. My difficulty is with the Court's 
formulation of that standard. It states, slip op., at 8, that the 
"inquiry appropriate" here is "whether the classification is 1 reason-
able, not arbitrary, and ••• rest[s] upon some ground of difference 
having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation. '" 
It immediately thereafter paraphrases this quotation to frame the 
inquiry as "essentially whether the classification is reasonably re-
lated to a legitimate objective." 
When this formulation is compared with what the Court has 
previously approved as the test of "minimum rationality", there 
appear to be several significant differences. While to some these 
may seem to be a matter of semantics, I am troubled lest these 
signal, however inadvertently, a retreat from the hard-won battle 
7 
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for judicial deference to legislative e~actment in this field of 
economic and social regulation. 
I have always understood the standard of review appropriat e 
under the Equal Protection Clause to be that set out in McGowan v . 
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). In summarizing the standards under 
which equal protection challenges are examined by the Court, Mr. 
Chief Justice Warren recognized that although no precise formula 
had been developed 
"the Court has held that the F ·ourteenth Amendment 
permits the States a wide scope of discretion in 
enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens 
differently than others. The constitutional safe-
guard is offended only if the classification rests on 
grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the 
State's objective. State legislatures are presumed 
to have acted within their constitutional power 
despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result 
in some inequality. A statutory discrimination will 
not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may 
be conceived to justify it." 366 U.S., at 425-426 
(citations omitted). 
When this formulation is compared to that advanced by the Court today, 
I become doubtful that the two are intended to be identical; more im-
portantly, I doubt they will be understood as identical by those who 
read and interpret our opinions. 
I am not sure that there is any meaningful difference between 
a "fair" relation to the State's objective and a "reasonable" one, both 
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of which phrases are used in the Court's opinion. And I could agree 
that either seems to echo McGowan's recognition, with which I fully 
agree, that a classification which is "wholly irrelevant" to that objec-
tive contravenes the Fourteenth Amendment. I am not so sure of the 
result, however, when the word "substantial" is added to the tes t , as 
the Court does here. "Substantial," for me at least, implies a require-
ment having some additional teeth in it beyond that of mere rationality, 
a situation which I think is strenuously to be avoided if we are to remain 
true to McGowan and the history of constitutional adjudication which it 
summarizes. I think it would be downright pernicious if we were to 
give the impression that in a case challenging a state statute where 
everyone agrees that the minimum standard of constitutional review is 
appropriate, courts are to apply their own view of whether the statute 
"substantially" promotes the State's interests; striking down the statute 
if they disagree with the State's assessment of the need for its statute. 
The next portion of the Court's test which gives me pause is its 
repeated reference to the necessity of there being a "legitimate state 
interest" towards the achievement of which the statute in question must 
be either "reasonably" or "fairly and substantially" related. 
Certainly more than one of our cases has described the standard 
in question in terms of whether the statutory scheme "rationally furthers 
some legitimate, articulated state purpose . " See San Antonio 
·~ ' 
_. 
School District v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 17. If the phrase 
"legitimate state interest" is merely a shorthand for an interest 
within the scope of the State's "police power", and it is understood 
that this reserved power is bounded only by constitutional guarant ees, 
the phrase is unexceptionable. But if the Court means that entir ely 
apart from a state statute's trenching upon constitutional guarantees, 
and entirely apart from such a statute's being directed at a "suspect 
class", the Court must determine by some apparently unknown calculus 
whether the State's goal in enacting the statute is "legitimate", I dis-
agree and do not read our prior decisions using such phrasing to 
support such a result. Rodriquez, for example, cited with approval 
the Court likewise stated: 
"It is not the province of this Court to create 
substantive constitutional rights in the name of 
guaranteeing equal protection of the laws. Thus, 
the key to discovering whether education is 
'fundamental' is not to be found in comparison 
with the relative societal significance of educa-
tion as opposed to subsistence or housing. Nor 
is it to be found by weighing whether education 
is as important as the right to travel. Rather, 
the answer lies in assessing whether there is a 
right to education explicitly or implicitly 
guaranteed by the Constitution. " 411 U.S. , at 
33-34. 
I joined the Court's opinion in Rodriquez, an opinion which 
expressly refused to expand the notion of "rights" requiring "strict 
- 6 -
scrutiny" beyond interests derived from the Constitution itself. 
' 
Surely that decision was not ir:~:tended to embrace the identical twin 
of the expansive doctrine urged by the appellees in that case by 
according substantive constitutional meaning to the word ''legitimate. " 
Yet as I read the Court's proposed opinion in this case, what 
was in Rodriquez merely a recognition that the State was presumed 
to act constitutionally has become a test having its own independent 
significance. The opinion suggests, slip op. pp. 8-9, that a State 
must demonstrate to the Court's satisfaction the "legitimacy" of its 
interest before the Court need even consider whether the means 
chosen by the state is "reasonably related" to that interest. While 
understood in one way, this approach may be valid, it seems to me 
to run the risk of confusing two concepts which are better kept 
separate. 
No one doubts, for example, that a state statute which has as 
its purpose discrimination against blacks is violative of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. It might be said that the State's interest in such legisla-
tion is simply not "legitimate" in constitutional terms. If such a 
violation of the Constitution is demonstrated, that ends the matter and 
there is no occasion to consider whether the means which it chose to 
pursue that goal are either rationally related or wholly irrelevant to it. 
- 7 -
But in a case such as ours, where it is conceded that no 
"suspect classification" is involved, and no substantive constitu-
tional right infringed, I fear that the Court's treatment of the phrase 
"legitimate state interest" may confuse. Even if we do not do so, 
other courts may attempt to give content to each word and phrase 
of the test. 
Insofar as those courts, or for that matter, this Court, write 
opinions fully disclosing their analysis and justifying the results 
they reach, any errors in interpretation of what is a "legitimate state 
interest" will be subject to review either by higher courts, or in the 
case of this Court to the customary elucidations between majority 
and minority opinions in this Court. But even if the adjective "legitimate" 
is not intended to have any added constitutional content or to possess 
independent force, I fear it may nonetheless have a mischievous 
tendency to obscure the decisional process in equal protection cases. 
If courts are obligated to hypothesize purposes which the legislature 
may have had in mind, as I believe McDonald and McGowan instruct, 
there may well be a tendency to shy away from advancing or carefully 
examining a purpose which the Court may upon casual reflection think 
is somewhat dubious, on the unstated assumption that such a purpose 
is not ''legitimate". There will likewise be the same tendency on the 




grounds. The result in such cases will not be a square holding, 
supported by principled reasoning, that particular state purposes 
are not legitimate. It will instead be an almost subconscious or 
subliminal refusal to hypothesize purposes thought "dubious", even 
though upon more mature examination such justifications for a 
statute would be found to be entirely "legitimate". The real decision-
making will then be reflected, not in the written opinion of the Court, 
but in an often casual and intuitive rejection without discussion of 
some possible purpose, which may indeed have been the real purpose 
of the legislature, on the incorrect assumption that such purpose was 
not "legitimate" and therefore need not be hypothesized or discussed 
in the opinion. 
This problem is greatly compounded in my view, by the portion 
of the Court's standard of review which seems to me to have the least 
support in our cases and to be the farthest from my understanding of 
the proper application of the Equal Protection Clause, At at least 
two points it is asserted that the question is whether the Massachusetts 
statute is satisfactorily related "to the State's announced purpose." 
Slip op. at 9, see id. at 10. I fail to see the source of this require-
ment, As can be seen from the quote from McGowan set out earlier, 
the scope of review only fifteen years ago was understood to require 




reasonably may be conceived to justify it. 11 This same view of the 
operation of the Equal Protection Clause was reiterated more ex-
pansively by Mr. Chief Justice Warren in McDonald v. Board of 
Election, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969): 
"Legislatures are presumed to have acted 
constitutionally even if source materials 
normally resorted to for ascertaining their 
grounds for action are otherwise silent, and 
their statutory classifications will be set 
aside only if no grounds can be conceived to 
justify them. 11 (citing McGowan, et al. ) . 
I have always thought the restrictions placed upon reviewing courts 
by our decisions and er:nbodied in two excerpts above were the product 
not only of very salutary recognition of the extremely serious business 
of invalidating state statutes under the Constitution, but also had a 
great deal to do with the relationships between courts and legislatures 
in general, and federal courts and state legislatures in particular. 
There is, of course, nothing in the Constitution which requires 
the States to set out a 11 purpos e 11 or 11 obj ective 11 of any legislation, and 
in my experience few do so, at least as a matter of course. Like the 
Congress, some state legislatures do seem to have begun the practice 
of occasionally appending preambles to their bills which purport to 
announce the reasons why the bill was enacted and the 11 evils 11 which 
it was hoped to cure. But this is still very much the exception rather 
than the rule, and most reviewing courts have nothing to guide them 
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as to the ''purpose" of a challenged statute other than the words of 
the statute its elf. It is partly for this reason, as I have understood 
it, that the clear mandate of this Court has consistently been that 
reviewing judges are to assiduously apply themselves to hypothesizing 
a statutory purpose consistent with both the statute's language and 
with the Constitution. It is only if they cannot do so --only "if [no] 
set of facts can be conceived to justify [the statute]" --that it is 
permissible for them to interfere with the expressed will of the 
electorate by invalidating the statute. 
Instead of this requirement, the Court's opinion seems to 
suggest that courts need look only to the State's announced "purpose" 
in evaluating the rationality of a challenged statute. But how can this 
be accomplished if the legislature has been "silent" regarding its 
purpose, i. e. it has enacted only the words of the statute leaving it to 
others to divine its purpose from those words? 
The only other source of an "announced purpose" for legisla-
tion challenged under the Equal Protection Clause is the pres entation 
made in court by the advocate upon whom is thrust the responsibility 
of defending the constitutionality of such legislation, Legislation 
challenged under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment may have been enacted by a State, by a county, or by one of 
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Even in this Court, where one might expect to find only the most 
highly skilled attorneys practic::ing, the quality of advocacy in defense 
of enactments challenged on grounds of equal protection varies from 
the able and well prepared to the far less able and totally unprepared. 
And if this is true here, it must occur with even greater frequency 
in the lower courts. I am thus extremely chary of entrusting the 
constitutional validity of a state legislative enactment entirely to the 
quality of those who may be litigating on the State's behalf. Certainly 
those advocates may add substantially to a court's understanding of 
the problem and its perception of what is at stake from the State's 
point of view. But if they fail to do so, I cannot believe that it neces-
sarily follows that the State's otherwise valid legislative classification 
must be declared unconstitutional. It seems to me the height of 
irresponsibility to permit a court to declare invalid a state statute 
because it does not seem relevant to the "purpose" discovered by the 
lawyer representing the state before it, although the court could with 
very little effort ascertain another purpose embodied in the legislation 
which fully supports its constitutionality. 
The quotation around which the Court weaves much of its thesis 
of judicial review in this case is from Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 
361, an opinion of two Terms ago which I readily joined. But I did 
not understand that opinion to lay down any restriction of the State to 
,. 
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some "announced purpose", contrary to the language in McDonald 
quoted supra at 3. In Johnson, the Court simply said, in its discus-
sion of legislative purpose: 
"Unlike many state and federal statutes that 
come before us, Congress in this statute has 
responsibly revealed its express legislative 
objectives in § 1651 of the Act and no other 
objective is claimed .••• 11 415 U.S. 361, 
376. 
Nor did I think at that time that the inclusion in Johnson of the 
11fair and substantial relation•• language from Royster Guano Co. v. 
Virginht, 25 3 U.S. 412 ( 1920), was intended as a subtle and wholly 
unannounced repudiation of McGowan. 
Since the Court today, however, seems to ascribe so much 
significance to the particular manner in which the 11test 11 was stated 
in Johnson, I cannot subscribe to any intimation in today• s opinion 
that the settled rules of McDonald and McGowan have been or should 
be abandoned. 
As noted earlier the quotation in Johnson is from Royster 
Guano, 253 U.S., at 415, as quoted in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 
7.6 (1971). Reed, in turn, and Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 
406 U.S. 164 ( 1972), are repeatedly cited by the Court to support its 
discussion of the standard of constitutional review. Presumably then 
these decisions are indicative of what is intended by the language 
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"fair and substantial relationship" in the instant application of that 
phrase. My reading of those c.ases convinces me that none embodies 
a test of constitutional review which is appropriate on the facts n ow 
before us. 
In Royster Guano the Court struck down a state statute whi ch 
taxed all income of local corporations doing business within the St ate, 
whether derived from outside the State or from within it, while 
exempting entirely any income derived from outside the State by local 
corporations which did no business within the State. Stating that it 
could conceive of no justification for thus exempting the out-of- state 
income of one of these two classes of corporations, the Court held 
that it was "obvious that the ground of difference upon which the dis-
crimination is rested has no fair or substantial relation to the proper 
object sought to be accomplished by the legislation. 11 253 U.S., at 416. 
Justice Brandeis, joined by Justice Holmes, dissented. In that 
opinion Justice Brandeis persuasively demonstrates a perfectly rational 
explanation for the choice made by the Virginia legislature, and in 
doing so reveals Royster Guano for what it is -- an artifact from an 
era where unrestrained judicial interference with legislative decision-
making was the rule, rather than the exception. I had thought that era 
well behind us, repudiated by a line of decisions in this Court culminat-
ing in McGowan. By its use of the language from Royster Guano in a 
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case where the least rigorous test of constitutional review is said to 
be applied I fear the Court's OJ?inion portends the resurrection of an 
approach from days gone by. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 
348 u.s. 483, 488 (1955). 
Reed seems to me similarly inapposite to this case. There 
the Court, relying on the Royster Guano formulation of the standard 
imposed by the Equal Protection Clause, struck down an Idaho statute 
which gave a preference to men over women in the selection of an 
administrator of a decedent's estate. In doing so, the Court rejected 
what four members who joined the decision were later to characterize 
as an "apparently rational explanation of the [Idaho] statutory scheme." 
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 6 77, 683 ( 1973) (opinion of Brennan, 
J. ). The apparent reason for doing so, at least in the view of that 
plurality, was the fact that the classification in Reed was "sex-based," 
a factor thought to justify more rigorous judicial scrutiny. But as 
discussed earlier, everyone agrees that in this case there is nothing 
to call for such inquiry. The Court seems to recognize precisely this 
difference between Reed and the instant case in its discussion on pp. 
and I am somewhat at a loss as to why it goes on to 
repeatedly cite Reed, and thereby to concomitantly rely upon Royster 





The problem is compound ed by the Court's citation of Weber. 
There the Court invalidated a Louisiana workmen's compensation 
1i scheme which denied equal recovery to dependent unacknowledged 
illegitima tes. In its opinion the Court articulated a test somewhat 
more in keeping with my understanding of minimal judicial review. 
But its result has been generally understood to be derived from the 
Court's concern that illegitimates were deserving of some extra 
measure of judicial protection. See, ~· , Wilkinson, The Supr eme ....--
Court, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of Consti-
tutional Equality, 61 Va. L. Rev. 945, 991 (1975), Note, Illegitimacy 
andEqualProtection, 49N.Y.U. L. Rev. 479,484-489 (1974), Note, 
Illegitimate Children and Constitutional Review, 1 Pepperdine L. Rev. 
266, 279 (1974). And the Court today so characterizes the rationale 
of Weber, slip at 10. In doing so it also distinguishes the situation 
of appellee Murgia. To my mind it follows from this distinction, with 
which I fully agree, that the judicial scrutiny afforded the statute 
discriminating against illegitimates in Weber is inappropriate here. 
I am at a loss to understand how the Court can conclude otherwise. 
We read to little purpose the history of this Court's half 
century of adjudication ending in 1940 if we do not view with the 
gravest apprehension any broadening of the extent of judicial over-
sight in cases where concededly no more than minimum scrutiny is 
•' 
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required. The fact that the Court's proposed opinion concludes by 
sustaining the constitutionality of the Massachusetts law in question 
in this case does not dininish the cause for apprehension. As a 
supremely knowledgeable commentator said of the "old Court": 
" ••. It approved or disapproved each law, 
grudgingly giving consent to any departure 
from laissez faire, or to any serious inter-
ference with the power of property and 
employers. I do not mean to say that it 
never did give consent •.. but this only 
emphasizes the fact that the Court, and not 
the legislature, became the final judge of 
what might be law •.• ". Robert H. Jackson, 
"The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy", p. 70. 
I cannot believe that the Court should wish to retreat, either 
consciously or inadvertently, a single step back towards doctrines 
which were once the law of this Court, but which have been so long 
discredited that it can now fairly be said that the judgment of history 
is solidly against them. 
·. 
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February 11, 1976 
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 
Dear Bill: 
No. 74-1044 Massachusetts Board of 
Retirement v. Murgia 
I agree with the result and most of your analysis in 
the opinion you have circulated for the Court. 
My difficulty relates to the comparison between "age-
based classifications'' and "sex-based classifications", 
addressed most specifically in the paragraph beginning on 
page 9. Although you conclude that older people as a group 
have not been "the subject of conspicuous discrimination" 
to the same extent as women, I would prefer not to make this 
comparison. As you will recall, I do not agree that the 
feminine sex is a "suspect class" for purposes of equal 
protection analysis, and doubt that I could be persuaded 
otherwise. 
I do not think your op~n~on would be weakened if all 
of the paragraph mentioned were deleted except for the two 
sentences that follow the citation of Weber. If, however, 
you prefer to leave this in the opinion, I will write a 
brief concurrence. 
I may add that I am not entirely happy with "two-tier" 
equal protection. In view of prior precedents, I followed 
it in my opinions for the Court in Rodriguez and Griffiths 
(among others). I fully endorse the concept of "str~ct 
scrutiny" in certain circumstances (e.g., where race 
discrimination or First Amendment rights are involved), 
and this level of care may be appropriate whenever any 
fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution is at issue. 
But I shy away from the "compelling state interest" test, 
as this usually prejudges an issue. 
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As commentators and other federal judges have pointed 
out, the Court has spoken with "many voices" on equal 
protection analysis. I therefore would view with an open 
mind any broad reconsideration of a Court position. 
But absent this ambitious undertaking, I am willing 
to join your opinion subject to the change above suggested. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
To: Justice Powell Rxsm Date: Feb. 12, 1976 
From: Chris 
No. 74-1044 Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia 
These are my initial reactions to the WJB-WHR correspondence. 
I will take some more time to think the problems through, and 
may change my views, but I thought you might like a quick 
reaction. I do not see any reason (other than those we have 
already discussed) x why you should not joing WJB's opinion. 
WHR makes three points: 
(1) He takes issue with the requirement that the classification 
have a "substantial" relation to the object of the legislation. 
It is my understanding that this is no departure from previous 
opinions. WJB correctly points out that it has been frequenEtly 
used -- XREXHHiHg indeed, in some opinions in which you have 
concurred, such as Stanton, Johnson, Kahn. "Substantial" need 
mean nothing more than ~RBHKx:ix "not frivolous or arbitrary," 
an interpretation wk:iEk which would give even WHR no pause. 
Rxaxxx«HHxkHxx~xRsxpH (Incidentally, it 
model 
Gunther in his formulation of the/test.) 
{t:i.,W/, ,.pu.ru~ . ~nt.d..~, Ps) 
(2) WHR fears that the reference to 
.1\ . 
is a term used by Prof. 
a "legitimate state 
interest" imparts too much substantive H content into the court's 
evaluation of the goal sought to be furthered by the state. I 
think that this is just semantici. I see nothing in WJB's opinion 
that indicates he means anything more than that the state interest 
be"legitimate"i:Hxxka:xx:ixxxxiixxixkx in the sense that it falls 
within the state's police power and violates no counstitutional 
bounds. Again, it is language frequently used in past opinions. 
I 
2. 
(3) WHR takes issue with Wil WJB's reference to an "articulated" 
state purpose. He sees this as a departure from McGowan and he 
is correct. WJB responds that he is merely saying that in this 
case there is a rational xeix~ relationship to an articulated 
state purpose, xxkxex rather than that there must be an articulated 
{
state purpose in every case. But WJB's formulation of the 
test ~§JHH'KXiBRxx:exkexaR:s:xexeti ("question" to be answered) on 
pages 9 and 10 d~Smake "articulation" part of the test. Since 
" you agree with WJB (an~Gunther .tha~erest 
should be "articulated," however, here is no reason for you 
to reconsider your decision to join on this kxxe basis. 
Addendum -- I have changed my mind regarding WJB's response to 
WHR's criticism of his KK reference to the xxxxe:s: state's 
"announced purpose." WJB responded that he was not making 
a requirement that the purpose be "announced" part of the 
test. (If he were, you may want to ask him to change it 
to "announced or readily discernable,"x as you note above, 
in order to ensure that the legislature itself is not 
always required to be absolutely explicit). Rather, WJB 
says, he is merely x~ referring to the fact thatl in this 
case there is an announced purpose and our inquiry ends 
when we determine that the classification is rationally 
related to that purpose -- leaving open the question whether 
the court would look further for another (readily discernible 
or EBREHixakie invented by the court) urpos if there were 
no such rational relationship. At first thought that 
~XH WJB was being disingenuous in denying that he included 
"announced purpose" as part of his test. But in context 
he is merely making a factual reference. First; ~ he 
says-(on pg. 8) that the legislature here has clearly 
identified a purpose. Then he says we ask whether there 
is a rational relationship to that announced purpose. 
The whole thing is not as clear as it should be, perha~s. 
But I do not think the opinion requires that the state s 
purpose be clearly xxgiEH articulated by the legislature 
~x:s:x:e~~:exea;x:s:x~x~xxkkex; (rather than, say, BHXEBH by 
counsel in argument) in all future cases. xx Nor does 
it even reguire that the purpose be •announced '' at all . 
i n :Ettf!tt'!'e eas8s. WJB may be correct in saying that 




.JU ST IC E WM . .J . BREN NAN . .JR. 
~u:prttttt <!Jou:rt of tfrt ~ttittb ;%tafu 
1Jaafringhtn, ~. <!f. 2.0,?J!.~ 
February 12, 1976 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
RE: No. 74-1044 Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia 
Bill Rehnquist and I have been exchanging views about the equal 
protection test to be applied where the classification is neither 
11 Suspect11 nor one involving a .. fundamental right ... The Murgia opinion 
relies upon language first used some fifty-six years ago in Royster ~ 
Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, namely, whether the classifica-
tion is .. reasonable, not arbitrary, and ... rests upon some ground 
of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object 
of the legislation ... 
Bill wrote me a letter dated January 30 expressing his initial 
concern about the approach taken in my Murgia opinion. A copy of 
that letter is enclosed. I answered with the letter of February 9 
addressed to him, a copy of which I also enclose. Bill has expand-
ed his original letter into a memorandum to the conference dated 
February 11, also enclosed. 
Potter has also circulated a concurring opinion in the case in 
which he says that he cannot subscribe to the view that the inquiry 
is 11 Whether the classification is reasonably related to a legitimate 
state objective... · 
It seems to me that Bill and Potter's views are at odds with 
statements in ·a number of equal protection cases cited in my memo-
randum and decided over the past half century. 
By agreement between Bill and me these exchanges are circulated 
·with the thought that they might aid the Conference in coming to 
rest in this case. · 
W.J.B. Jr. 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
Dear Bill, 
j;u:puntt <!Jttttrl of tqt 'Jl:hrifth ;%±attg 
Jfu JringLm. ~. <!J. 2o~JI. ~ 
February 12, 1976 
74-1044 - Mass. Bd. v. Murgia 
I have read with interest the copies of the letters ex-
changed between you and Bill Rehnquist and Bill's memorandum 
to the Conference, all enclosed with your memorandum to the 
Conference of this date. As you know, I am in substantial 
agreement with Bill Rehnquist' s views. 
There would be no point in my trying to deal in specif-
ic detail with the cases you cite and discuss in your thorough 
letter of February 9 to Bill. I cannot, however, allow one of 
the statements in that letter to go unchallenged. Specifically, 
I do not in the least believe "we were wrong in the results we 
reached" in LaFleur, Vlandis, etc. It was precisely because 
I thought the state laws in those cases should not and could not 
be invalidated under the Equal Protection Clause that I wrote 
or joined opinions dealing with them under the Due Process 
Clause. I do not at all think "we were wrong" in those cases, 
but firmly believe we would have been "wrong" if we had 
invalidated the state laws there involved under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF ..JUSTICE 
S' :.tprtntt Ofcurl of tlft ~"':1.-i±,tb- ~ta.h-s 
'J! as Jringhtn. 19. QJ. 2!1~'1-~ 
March 30, 1976 
Re: 74-1044 - Mas sachusetts Board v. Murgia 
Dear Bill: 
j 
I have reviewed the commentaries on your proposed 
draft in this case and I think we now need to "count heads. 11 
In general, you can add "my head" to the position of 
Chief Justice Warren, as expressed in McGowan v. Maryland. 
I share the view that shrinks from any return to the substantive 
due process approach, which puts me near Bill Rehnquist 
but not entirely with him. 
If you think this indicates a reassignment, as you 
intimated to me on the Bench, I will proceed. Perhaps at 
Conference this week we can clarify. 
l:~~·~ 
~ 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
,jttpTmu <!Iourt of tq~ ~~ ~tales 
JTaslp:ttghttt. ~. <!I· 2ll.;T'!-~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
April 14, 1976 
Re: No. 74-1044 - Massachusetts Board of Retirement 
v. Murgia 
Dear Bill: 
I, for one, appreciate your efforts, as well as 
Lewis', to produce something that five of us could agree 
upon. You~ revision accompanying your April 14 letter I 
c~uld groh aoly j oi n, although I would much prefer a --
s omewh at more re l axed standard with respect to identify-
ing the state interest or purpose where it is not 
expressed in or plainly obvious from the statute itself. 
l I would give substantial weight--perhaps more than Lewis would--to the representations of those who enforce a statute as to the purposes the legislation serves. Your 
identification and acceptance of the ultimate aim of the 
ordinance in Dukes seems to me quite proper even though 
the provision itself appears impenetrable on its face. 
Again, thanks for all the effort. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Copy to Mr. Justice Powell 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN . JR . 
.ju:putttt <!tttttri of tlft ~h .jtattg 
11Jag£rin:ghtn. ~. <It· 2llgiJ!..;l 
April 14, 1976 
RE: No. 74-1044 Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia 
Dear Lewis: 
I've cribbed unashamedly from your circulation and the attached 
represents my end product. But I strongly feel that the opinion 
should be in your name and not in mine. This is not only because 
much of the attached is in your words it's also because, quite frank-
ly, our joint hope of a Court agreement on an equal protection 
standard in this area has a better chance of realization if you rather 
than I author the opinion. 
I am sending this rather than bringing it to you with the 
thought you might want to ponder it before we sit down to talk 
about it. 
I am sending a copy to Byron to keep him abreast of what's 
happening since he's the only one who joined my circulation. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: Mr. Justice White 
To: Justice Powell Date: April 15, 1976 
From: Chris Whitman 
No. 74-1044 Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. 
Murgia 
I have made some changes along the lines suggested by 
Justice White on page 12. The only drawback I can see with 
making this modification is that allowing post-enactment 
interprextations by administrative bodies does not serve 
the purposes described in the paragraph on pgs. 12 and 13 as 
neatly as ~XHHXBX interpretations contemporaneous with enactment 
do. That is, x£ one of the ~KX reasons an articulated purpose 
is required is to ensure that the democratic processes are 
properly 
operating/during the enactment of the statute. A post-enactment 
interpretation does not provide the same guarantee that the 
iegxi le§islature's decision has received a public airing. 
The other reason why an articulated purpose is required -- to 
ensure that the judiciary has conducted a genuine inquiry --
is served even if the x interpretation is made after enactment. 
I suppose you could argue that the legislature has k made its 
purpose sufficiently clear by delegating certain authority 
to an administrative body that B~exaxxH operates within defined 
limits. Anyway, I wouldn't add this unless it is necessary 
to get Justice White's agreement. 
I read through the draft for possible problems and found 
nothing major. Reed v. Reed is cited XEH twice (pgs. 5 and 14) 
as an example of the "mere rationality" test something I 
think we should avoid. And some of the text (especially where 
the two drafts have been spliced together, such as on pg. 9) 
-2-
is a little too choppy for my taste. I also don't think 
the long quote in n. 14 a on pg. 13 fits xx in at that place. 
On page 12, the l!ll!'H opinion:s says "we need not decide whether 
a clearly identifiable purpose is always required." Thatx 
seems a little coy,gxXHR since the rest of the paragraph 
goes on to say that it is indeed required, but the gxx problem 
is not a major one. 
I would add one thing that I should have put into my 
original draft. In the discussion of suspect classifications 
~R (ppg. 8-9) I xE:wlB would maBH make it clear that "special 
disabilities" does not refer to biological disabilities (e.g., 
mental illness) but to societally imposed disabilities that 
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No. 74-1044 
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Retirement et al., 
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v. 
Robert D. Murgia. 
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MR. JusTICE BRENNAN, memorandum. 
This case presents the question whether the provision 
of Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 32, § 26 (3) (a), that a uni-
formed State Police Officer 11shall be retired ... upon his 
11ttaining age fifty," denies appellee police officer equal 
protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.1 
1 Uniformed State Police Officers are appointed under Mass. Gen. 
Laws Ann. c. 22, § 9A, which provides : 
"WheneveF the governor shall deem it necessary to provide more 
effectively for the protection of persons and property and for the 
maintenance of law and order in the commonwealth, he may author-
ize the commissioner to make additional appointments to the division 
of state police, together with such other employees as the governor 
may deem necessary for the proper administration thereof .. .. 
Said additional officers shall have and exercise within the common-
wealth all the powers of constables, except the service of civil process, 
and of police officers and watchmen. . . . No person who has not 
reached his nineteenth birthday nor any person who has passed his 
thirtieth birthday shall be enlisted for t·he first time as an officer of 
·the division of state police, except that said maximum age qualifica-
tion shall not apply in the case of the enlistment of any woman as 
such an officer .... " 
In pertinent part§ 26 (3) provides : 
~' (a) ... Any ... officer appointed under section nine A of chapter 
7 4-1044-MEMO 
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Appellee Robert Murgia was an officer in the Uni-
formed Branch of the Massachusetts State Police. The 
Massachusetts Board of Retirement retired him upon his 
50th birthday. Thereafter, appellee brought this civil 
action in the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Massachusetts, alleging that the operation of 
§ 26 (3) (a) denied him equal protection of the laws and 
requesting the convening of a three-judge court under 
28 U. S. C. §§ 2281, 2284.2 The District Judge dis-
twenty-two .. . who has performed service in the division of state 
police in the department of public safety for not less than twenty 
years, shall be retired by the state board of retirement upon his 
attaining age fifty or upon the expiration of such twenty years, 
whichever last occurs." 
" (b) Any . . . officer .. . who has performed service . .. for not 
less than twenty years and who has not attained . . . age fifty in 
the case of an officer appointed under the said section nine A, shall 
be retired by the state board of retirement in case the rating board, 
after an examination of such officer or inspector by a registered 
physician appointed by it, shall report in writing to the state board 
of retirement that he is physically or mentally incapacitated for the 
performance of duty and that such incapacity is likely to be 
permanent." 
Since § 9A requires that new enlistees in the Uniformed Division 
be no more than 30 years of age, few retirements are delayed past 
50 until the expiration of 20 years' service. 
The question presented in this case was summarily treated in 
Cannon v. Guste, 423 U. S. 898, aff'g - F. Supp. - (ED La. 
1975) ; Weisbrod v. Lynn, 420 U. S. 940 (1975), aff'g 383 F. Supp. 
933 (DC 1974) ; Mcilvaine v. Pennsylvania, 415 U.S. 986 (1974), 
dismissing appeal from 454 Pa. 129, 309 A. 2d 801 (1973). Our 
cursory consideration in those cases does not, of course, foreclose 
this opportunity to consider more fully that question. See Usery v. 
Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., - U. S. - (1976) ; Edelman v. 
Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 670- 671 (1974). 
2 Jurisdiction was invoked pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1343, 
and declaratory and injunctive relief was sought under 28 U. S. C. 
§§ 2201, 2202. The equal protection denial was alleged to consti-
tuate a violation of 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Appellee made no claim 
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missed appellee's complaint on the ground that the 
complaint did not allege a substantial constitutional 
question. 345 F. Supp. 1140 (1972). On appeal, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in 
an unreported memorandum, set aside the District Court 
judgment and remanded the case with direction to con-
vene a three-judge court. Upon a record consisting of 
depositions, affidavits and other documentary material 
submitted by the parties, the three-judge court filed an 
opinion that declared § 26 (3) (a) unconstitutional on 
the ground that "a classification based on age 50 alone 
lacks rational basis in furthering any substantial state 
interest," and enjoined enforcement of the statute. 
Murgia v. Massachusetts Board of Retirement, 376 F. 
Supp. 753, 754 (Mass. 1974). We noted probable juris-
diction of the Retirement Board's appeal. 421 U. S. 
974 (1975). We reverse. 
The primary function of the Uniformed Branch of the 
Massachusetts State Police is to protect persons and 
property and maintain law and order. Specifically, uni-
formed officers participate in controlling prison and civil 
disorders, respond to emergencies and natural disasters, 
patrol highways in marked cruisers, investigate crime, 
apprehend criminal suspects, and provide back-up sup-
port for local law enforcement personnel. As the Dis-
trict Court observed, "service in this branch is, or can be, 
arduous." 376 F. Supp., at 754. "[H]igh versatility is 
required, with few, if any, backwaters available for the par-
tially superannuated." Ibid. Thus, "even [appellee's] 
experts concede that there is a general relationship be-
tween advancing age and decreasing physical ability to 
respond to the demands of the job." I d., at 755. 
under the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 
29 U. S. C. § 621 et seq. 
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These considerations prompt the requirement that 
uniformed state officers pass a comprehensive physical 
examination biennially until age 40. After that, until 
mandatory retirement at age 50, uniformed officers must 
annually pass a more rigorous examination, including an 
electrocardiogram and tests for gastro-intestinal bleed-
ing. Appellee Murgia had passed such an examination 
four months before he was retired, and there is no dispute 
that, when he retired, his excellent physical and mental 
health rendered him still capable of performing the duties 
of a uniformed officer. 
The record includes the testimony of three physicians: 
that of the State Police Surgeon, who testified to the 
physiological and psychological demands involved in the 
performance of uniformed police functions; that of an 
· associate professor of medicine, who testified generally 
. to the relationship between aging and the ability to per-
form under stress; and that of a surgeon, who also testi-
fied to aging and the ability safely to perform police 
functions. The testimony clearly established that the 
risk of physical failure, particularly in the cardiovascular 
system, increases with age, and that the number of indi-
viduals in a given age group incapable of performing 
stress functions increases with the age of the group. 
Appendix, at 77-78, 174-176. The testimony also recog-
nized that particular individuals over 50 could be capable 
of safely performing the functions of uniformed officers. 
The associate professor of medicine, who was a witness 
for the appellee, further testified that evaluating the risk 
of cardiovascular failure in a given individual would 
require a detailed number of studies. Id., at 77-78. 
In assessing appellee's equal protection claim, the Dis-
trict Court found it unnecessary to apply a strict scrutiny 
test, see San Antonio Independent School District v. 
,Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 (1973); Shapiro v, Thomp$on, 
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394 U. S. 618 (1969), for it determined that the age 
classification established by the Massachusetts statutory 
scheme could not in any event withstand a test of 
rationality, see Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Since 
there had been no showing that reaching age 50 forecast 
"imminent change" in an officer's physical condition, 
the District Court held that compulsory retirement at 
age 50 was irrational under a scheme that assessed the 
capabilities of officers individually by means of compre-
hensive annual physical examinations. We agree that 
rationality is the proper standard by which to test whether 
compulsory retirement at age 50 violates equal protection. 
We disagree, however, with the District Court's deter.-
mination that the age 50 classification is not rationally 
related to furthering a legitimate state interest. 
I 
We need (£_my bi iif!rstaW our reasons for agreeing 
that strict scrutiny IS not t!ie proper test for deter-
mining whether the mandatory retirement provision 
denied appellee equal protection. Ban Antonio 'Inde-
pendent School District v. Rodriguez, supra, reaffirmed 
that equal protection analysis requires strict scrutiny of 
a legislative classification only when the classification 
impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a funda-
mental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage 
of a suspect Class. Mandatory retirement at age 50 
under the Massachusetts statute involves neither 
situation. 
· The requirement implicates no fundamental right of 
appellee. Whether a right is fundamental under the 
Constitution "lies in assessing whether there is a right ... 
explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.'t 
I d., at 33-34. Although the "right to work for a living in 
·,the common occupations of the co.mrouni~y is of .the V~r;f 
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essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that 
it was the purpose of the [Fourteenth] Amenclment to 
secure," Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 41 (1915), and 
although provision of due process procedural safeguards 
is often required as a condition to termination of gov-
ernment employment, Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134 
( 1973), Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564 ( 1972), 
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U. S. 474 (1959),8 the Court's 
decisions give no support to the proposition that the 
Constitution guarantees a right of employment per se. 
See San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodri-
guez, supra; Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U. S. 56 (1972), 
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970). Accord-
ingly, we have expressly stated that a standard less than 
strict scrutiny "has consistently been applied to state 
legislation restricting the availability of employment op-
portunities." Dandridge v. Williams, supra, at 485. 
Nor does the class of uniformed state police officers 
over 50 constitute a suspect class for purposes of equal 
protection analysis. Rodriguez observed that a suspect 
class is one "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected 
to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or 
relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as. 
to command extraordinary protection from the majori-
tarian political process." 411 U. S., at 28. The 
influence of the aged in the political process has· 
brought them a high degree of success in making that 
process responsive to their needs. See, e. g., Pe~sion Re-
form Act of 1970, 29 U. S. C. § 1001 et seq.,· Age Dis-· 
crimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S. C.§ 62i 
et seq.; Older Americans Act of 1965, 42 U. S. C. 
Several States have legislation forbidding age discrimina-· 
8 Appellee makes no claim of denial of procedural due process in. 
tP,e actiWJ. .of the R!ltirement Boar.d. 
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tion,4 including Massachusetts.5 The participation of 
the aged in the functions of decisionmaking institutions 
at all levels and the continuing legislative concern at all 
levels for the problems of age discrimination and the 
elderly 6 demonstrate that the traditional political proc-
4 E. g., Cal. Unep. Ins. § 2070 et seq. (West 1972); Mich. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 17.458 (1), (3a) (1968), as amended (Supp. 1975); N. Y. 
Human Rights Law §§ 290-301 (McKinney 1972), as amended 
(McKinney Supp. 1975-1976); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, §§ 951-963 
(1964), as amended (Supp. 1975-1976); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. 
Art. 6252-14 (1970) . 
5 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 149, § 24A. Indeed, appellee asserts 
that the provisions of Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 32, § 26 (3) 
(a), do not comport with the State's statutory provisions against 
discrimination, ibid., cc. 149, 151B, and urges that "the Court must 
give weight to these legislative determinations" against discrimina-
tion. As to determinations under § 26 (3) (a), however, he makes 
no such contention, Brief for Appellee, at 59-61. 
6 See, e. g., Senate Special Committee on Aging, Developments in 
Aging: 1974 and January-April 1975, S. Rep. No. 94-250, 94th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); Senate Special Committee on Aging, De-
velopments in Aging: 1973 and January-March 1974, S. R~p. No. 
93-846, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); Senate Special Committee on 
Aging, Developments in Aging: 1972 and January-March 1973, S. 
Rep. No. 147, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); Senate Special Commit-
tee on Aging, Developments in Aging: 1971 and January-March 
1972, S. Rep. No. 92-784, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); Hearings be-
fore the Subcommittee on Employment and Retirement of the Senate 
Special Committee on Aging, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); The Gov-
ernors Special Planning Commission on Elderly Affairs, A Profile of 
Massachusetts Elderly (1971); Special Report of the Retirement 
Law Commission, Mass. Leg. Doc., House No. 5900 (1973) . 
As appellee recognizes, the actual attitude of legislatures, including 
Massachusetts', toward the problem of age discrimination in employ-
ment is one of favorable concern: 
uThe thrust of the legislative policy as expressed in Congress and 
the state legislatures is to strike down classifications based upon 
generalized misconceptions as to age, and to institute in their stead 
procedures to measure the individual's qualifications, abilities .and 
needs, regardless of age." Brief for Appellee, .at 60. 
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esses have not foundered where interests of the aged are 
at stake.7 
There is no indication in any of our cases, however, 
that evidence of high numerical representation in the 
state legislatures or the existence of a body of remedial 
legislation is alone sufficient to remove a group that 
demonstrates the other indicia-of special disabilities or 
a history of discriminatory treatment-from the category 
of suspect classes. An exemption from categorization 
as a suspect class based on the existence of remedial legis· 
lation, for example, could penalize those who properly 
seek legislative rather than judicial solutions to problems 
of discrimination. It also ignores the fact that state, 
as well as federal, legislatures have been responsive to the 
needs of Negroes, a class that few would contend is no 
longer in need of the special protection envisioned for 
them by the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
See Strauder v. West Virginia; 100 U. S. 303 (1880). 
While the treatment of the aged in this Nation has not 
been wholly free of discrimination,8 such persons, unlike, 
say, those who have been discriminated against on the 
7 Johnson v. Robison, 415 U. S. 361 (1974), which sustained a 
federal legislative classification denying Veterans' educational bene--
fits to conscientious objectors against a claim of denial of equal pro-
tection, stated : 
· "Given the solicitous regard that Congress has manifested for con-
scientious objectors, it would seem presumptuous of a court to sub-
. ject the educational benefits legislation to strict scrutiny on the 
-basis of the 'suspect classification' theory, whose underlying rationale 
is that, where legislation affects discrete and insular minorities, the 
presumption of constitutionality fades because traditional political 
·processes may have broken down." !d., at 375 n. 14. 
8 Report of the Secretary of Labor, The Older American Worker: 
Age Discrimination in Employment (1965); Comment, 41 N. Y. 
U. L. Rev. 383, 383-388 (1966). See also C. Townsend, Old Age: 
'The Last Segregation (1970) ; Symposium : Law and the Aged, 17 
Atiz. L. Rev 267 (1975) . 
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bas1s of race or national origin, have not experienced a 
"history of purposeful unequal treatment" or been sub-
jected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped 
characteristics not truely indicative of the group's abili-
ties. When those factors are present, there is reason to 
scrutinize state classifications carefully to ensure that 
they are not influenced by unfounded assumptions about 
group characteristics that have no place in our consti-
tutional system. 
The class subject to the compulsory retirement feature 
of the Massachusetts statute consists of uniformed state 
police officers over the age of 50. Therefore, it cannot be 
said to discriminate only against the elderly. Rather, it 
draws the line at a certain age in middle life. Even old 
age does not define a "discrete and insular" group, see 
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 
152-153, n. 4 (1938) , in need of "extraordinary protec-
tion from the majoritarian political process." Instead, it 
marks a stage that each of us will reach if we live out 
our normal span. Even if the statute could be said to 
impose a penalty upon a class defined as the aged, it 
would not impose a distinction sufficiently akin to those 
classifications that we have found suspect to call for strict 
judicial scrutiny. There is no basis upon which to assume 
that state and federal legislatures will not deal fairly 
with persons as they age and be responsive to their needs. 
Under the circumstances, it is unnecessary to subject 
the State's resolution of competing interests in this case 
to strict judicial scrutiny in order to ensure that it is 
consistent with the requirements of the Equal Protection 
Clause. 
II 
We turn then to the inquiry appropriate in the absence 
of a need for strict scrutiny. In such cases, it is neces-
-sary to determine whether the Massachusetts scheme 
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"rationally furthers some legitimate, articulated state 
purpose.'' San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 
U. S., at 17. The statute is presumed to be valid.11 
Perfection in the way in which the means are adapted to 
serve the State's purpose is not -required.~0 But judicial 
review, even under this relatively relaxed standard, must 
have substance if the Equal Protection Clause is to have 
meaning. 
The term "legitimate" state purpose does not suggest~ 
S'ii J\h hiAA:ICF RE~IIill' £8&111!1; post, u* _ that the 
Court is required to engage in a substantive review of 
the permissibility of a State's objectives. Indeed, an 
inquiry of this sort is one of the factors that distinguishes 
traditional scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause 
from the most searching review appropriate when a sus-
pect claSsification is involved. See, e. g., In re Griffiths, 
413 U.S. 717, ·721....:722 (1973). The requirement that a 
State's purpose be "legitimate" indicates only that the 
purpose must fall within the very broad range of powers 
entrusted the state legislatures and that it must not inde-
pendently infringe upon other constitutional restrictions. 
The State's purpose justifying the classification must not 
be illusory, a mere facade concealing the existence of an 
objective that is illegitimate in this very narrow sense. 
See U. S. D. A. v. Moreno, 413 U. S. 528 (19'73); 
McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U. S. 263, 276 (1973) . 
9 See, e. g., San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, supra, at 
40-41, Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U. S. 83, 88 (1940) ; Lindsley v. 
Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911). 
The presumption of validity is particularly strong with respect to 
the legislative judgment m areas of economics, taxation, and the 
allocation of necessarily limited state resources. In addition to the 
cases cited, see, e. g., Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535 (1972); 
Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S. 78, 81 (1971); Dandridge v. Wil-
liams, 397 U. S. 471, 484 (1970) . 
10 See, e. g., Richardson v. Belcher, supra, at 84; Dandridge v. 
WtUiams, supra, at 4&1. 
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The Massachusetts LegislatureQcieari~dentified aj  
st• ~ to be promoted by the age 50 classi .. 
fication. Through mandatory retirement at age 50, 
the legislature seeks to protect the public by assuring 
the physical preparedness of its uniformed police.11 The 
legitimacy of this objective ee 
Sheltort v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479 (1960); Schware v, 
13oard of 13ar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957). Appellee 
11 A special legislative commission's report preceding the enact-
ment of the age 50 maximum for uniformed police stated: "The 
Division of State Police, by virtue of the work demanded of its 
members, undoubtedly requires comparatively young men of vigorous 
physique. The natUre of the duties to be performed in all weathers' 
ls arduous in the extreme. . . . No argument is needed to demon-
strate that men above middle life are not usually physically able to 
perform such duties." Mass. ta-g. boe., House No. 1582, at 8 
(1938) . With these considerations in mind, the State's Commis-
sioner of Public Safety argued before the commission for provisions 
permitting retirement of State Police at 45. The commission ob-
served in response that it was "not prepared to say that the con-
tention of the Commissioner of Public Safety, that [State Police] 
over age forty-five should be eligible to retirement, is unsound as a 
matter of public policy." !d., at 8. The commission, however, de-
ferred the problem of setting retirement ages for the State Police 
to special study, their sole reason for not recommending age 45 being 
the anticipated pension costs to the State, not the reasonableness 
of the age with respect to job qualification. !d., at 7-9. Though 
the age 50 limitation was not specifically proposed by the commis-
sion, but was ultimately enacted by the legislature after further 
study, Act of Aug. 12, 1939, e. 503, § 3 (1939), Mass. Acts & Resolves 
737-738, it is apparent that the purpose of the limitation was to 
protect the public by assuring the ability of State Police to respond 
to the demands of their jobs. See also Mass. Leg. Doc., l!ouse No. 
5316, at 16, 17 (1967) ; Mass. Leg. Doc., House No. 2500, at 21, 23-
25 ( 1955) . This purpose is also clearly implied by the State's 
maximum age scheme which sets higher mandatory retirement ages 
for less demanding jobs. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. e. 32, §§ 1, a· 
,{2) (g) , 26, (3) (a) (1966.). as amended (Supp. 1975) . 
I 
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neither denies that this was the interest intended to be 
served nor disputes legitimacy.1.2 
Since the purpose of the Massachusetts retirement 
ilQQ9Me has been (iilearl:i) 1ctentiil:e~in the legislative his~ 
tory, we need not decide w ether a cl'M!lldV Ictenbil:able 
purpose IS ways required. We tn1nk it clear, however, l 
[ t at our eCisiOns mcreasingly have departed from the 
extremely relaxed standard of M eGo wan v. Maryland, 
366 U. S. 420, 426 (1961), which indicated that the con~ 
stitutional requirements are met "if any state of facts 
reasonably may be conceived to justify" a statutory dis~ 
crimination. Rather, we have required that the state 
purposes to be served by the classification be capable of 
being discerned by some means short of hypothezation 
by a judge. See, e. g., McGinnis v. Royster, supra, at 
270. That is, they must be either expressly articulated 
by the legislature or clearly implicit in the statutory 
scheme.18 Ingenious judges almost always will be able 
to devise some basis for a state law. But the judicial 
function calls for a more genuine inquiry if the constitu~ 
tiona.l requirement oLra.t.ion.9libr i« nnLt.rd-,o m£U>.n.:u:' UJtL:>.a.a..---'---
lfp/ss 4/20/76 Rider B. p. 12 (Murgia) 
The legislative purpose also may be derived from the 
contemporary interpretationfuereof by the agencies of 
government entrusted with its enforcement of administration. 
? 
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a majoritarian democracy. It does not follow from this 
assumption, however, that it is appropriate for a court 
to devise or imagine policy where none has been indi-
cated by the legislature or is clearly implicit from the 
action taken. The proper functioning of the political 
process is best served where the State bears the responsi-
bility of enacting legislation that is designed to serve 
identifiable policies or· objectives. When legislation is 
enacted against such a background, the Court has some 
guarantee that the legislature has focused on the problem 
and also that its decision has received a public airing.14 
In such circumstances, deference to the decision of the 
State is not only appropriate, but required by the de-
mands of our democratic system. 
H See Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing 
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 
44 (1972); 7Ue principle that the Equal Protection Clause should 
be applied so as to facilitate the functioning of our democratic 
processes is not novel. See Railway Express Agency v. New York, 
336 U. S. 106, 112-113 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring): 
"Invocation of the equal protection clause, on the other hand, 
does not disable any governmental body from dealing with the sub-
ject at hand. It merely means that the prohibition or regulation 
must have a broader impact. I regard it as a salutary doctrine 
that cities, states and the Federal Government must exercise powers 
so as not to discriminate between their inhabitants except upon some 
reasonable differentia.tion fairly related to the object of regulation. 
This equality is not merely abstract justice. The framers of the Con-
stitution knew, and we should not forget today, that there is no more 
effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable gov-
ernment than to require that the principles of law which officials 
would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally, Con-
versely, nothing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as 
to allow those officials to pick and choose only a few to whom they 
will apply legislation and thus to escape the political retribution 
that might be visited upon them If larger numbers were affected. 
Courts can take no better measure to assure that laws will be just 
than to reqmre that laws be equal m operation., 
74-1044-MEMO 
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Even though the State's purpose is clearly identifiable, 
it is still necessary, of course, that the challenged classifi., 
cation bear a rational relationship to that purpose. The 
relationship may not be trivial or illogical. A trivial or 
illogical relationship would not only fail to com-
port with the requirement of ·rationality, but may 
indicate that the defined purpose actually masks an 
improper (for example, racially discriminatory) purpose. 
''ftGiven that physical ability generally declines with age, 
mandatory retirement at 50 does serve to remove from 
police service those whose fitness for uniformed pdlice 
work has diminished with age and is, therefore, ration-
ally related to the State's objective.15 There is no indi-
cation that § '26 (3)(a) has the effect of excluding from 
service so few officers who ~re in fact unqualified as to 
render age 50 a criterion "w 1 unre h 
tive of that statute." 16 eed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71, 75 
15 Appellee seems to have suggested in oral argument that Mass. 
,. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 32, §§ 1, 3 (2) (g), 26 (3) (a), also deny equal pro-
tection through the job classification established by them. Tr. of Oral 
Arg., at 14, 17-18. Any such argument, however, is unpersuasive. 
The sections do set a maximum retirement age for uniformed state 
·officers which is less than that set for other law enforcement 
personnel. It has never been seriously disputed, if at all, however, that 
the work of state uniformed officers is more demanding than that of 
other state, or even municipal, law enforcement personnel. It is 
thjs difference in work demands that underlies the job classification. 
Mass. Leg. Doc., House No. 2500, at 21-22 (1955). And it is this 
difference that renders the different employment requirements reason-
able and hence constitutional. 
16 Review of Massachusetts' maximum age limitations by state leg-
islative commissions has proceeded on the principle that "maximum 
retirement age for any group of employees should be that age at 
which the efficiency of a large majority of the employees in the 
· group is such that it is in the public interest that they retire." 
Final Report of the Special Commissiop. to Study and Revise the 
Laws Relating to Retirement Systems and Pensions, Mass. Leg. Doc., 
House No. 2500, at 7 (1955) . 
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(1971). That the State chooses not to determine fitness 
more precisely through individualized te13ting after age 50 
is not to say that the State's purpose is not rationally fur-
thered by a maximum age limitation. It is only to say 
that with regard to the interests of all concerned, the 
State perhaps has not chosen the best means to accom-
plish its purpose.17 But where rationality is the test, a 
statute "does not violate the Equal Protection Clause 
merely because the classifications m~tde by [it] are im-
1 
perfect." Dandridge v. Williams, supra, at 485. 
We do not m~e light of the substantial economic and 
psychological effects premature 'and compulsory retire-
ment can have on an individual, Or' of the stifled ability 
of the aged to contribute to society. These problems 
h~.ve been well documented ~t:P.d are beyond serious dis-
pute.18 But ~'[w]e do not decide today that the [Mas-
sachusetts statute] is wise, that it best fulfills the rele-
vant social and economic objectives that [Massachu-
setts] 111ight ideally espouse, or that a more just and 
17 Indeed, were it not for the existing annual individual examina-
tions through age 50, appellee would conceqe the rationaUty of man-
datorY retirement at 50. Tr. of Oral Arg., at 22-23. The introduc-
tion of individual examinations, however, hardly qefeats the 
ration~tlity of the State's scheme. In fact, it augments ration-
ality since the le~islative judgment to avoid the risk posed by even 
the healthiest fifty-year-old officers would be implemented by annual 
· individual examinations between ages 40 and 50 which serve to 
eliminji.te those youn~er officers whq are not at least as healthy as 
·the best fifty-year-old officers. 
1 8 E. g., M. B11-rron, The Aging American (1961); Cameron, Neu-
roses of Later Maturity, in Mental Disorders in Later Life 201 (2d 
ed. 0. Kaplan 1956) ; Senate Special Committee on Aging, 
Developments in Aging : 1971 and January-March 1972, S. Rep. 
No. 92-784, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. ~8-53 (1972) ; Jlearings before 
the Senate Subcommittee on Retirement and the Individual of the 
Senate Special Committee on Aging, 90th Cong., 1st Bess., pts. 1 & 2, 
46-46, 87-101, 121- 127, 212-217, 464-471 (19~7). 
14-1044-MEMO 
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humane system could not be devised." ld., at 487. We 
decide only that the system enacted by the Massachu-
setts Legislature does not deny appellee equal protection 
of the law. 
The judgment is reversed. 
MR. JusTICE STEVENS took no part in the considera-
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•'· o>·· J· MEMORANDUM r . 
TO: Chris Whitman DATE: April 20, 1976 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Murgia 
I reviewed last night Justice Brennan's "marriage" of 
his opinion with ours, and for the most part I find it quite 
acceptable to me. I have indicated some changes for our furthftr 
consideration. The only ones of substance are on page 12, 
where I tried redictating the first full paragraph with the 
view to making it more palatable to my Brothers who have 
continued to cite McGowan. T~ID~ is a critical paragraph in 
the opinion, and requires your most delicate and artful touch. 
In my opinion previously circulated, we cited only 
.,.,. :r 
'f. 
McGinnis as evidence that the Court over the past 15 years 
has required something more than McGowan. Now that we may ., , 
possibly be writing for the Court, we should add additional : 
citations. ;It would be especially helpful to have a case 
written by Ju•tice Blackmun or perhaps one of the other 
"unconmitted" Justices. 
You will note the one sentence added to footnote 13, 
hoping it ' - or something like it- will suffice tom~ 
Justice White's views. ''.,1'' 




By the time I reached page 14, I was a bit too sleepy to 
tackle the full paragraph on that page. This also is quite 
important, although not as controversial as page 12. As 
presently written, the first three sentences address the 
second requirement of equal protection analysis: that, even 
when the state purpose is proper and identifiable, the means 
adopted to achieve the purpose must bear a rationale relation-
ship to the purpose. I think Gunther has framed this second 
requirement rather well, and possibly you can identify a 
case or two that may be included. My suggestion is that these 
three sentences be expanded, and written abit more carefully. 
The fourth sentence [Given that physical ability, etc.] 
should begin a new paragraph, possibly with a transitional 
sentence. Here, we are moving from a general discussion of 
equal protection analysis to the specific facts of this case. 
ss 







FROM Justice Powell 
No. 74-1044 MURGIA 
As you will see, I have substantially revised pages 
9·14 of our second draft memorandum. I was prompted to do this 
for two reasons: (i) a further conversation with Justice 
Stewart (who reviewed the Brennan attempt at blending our 
opinions) persuades me that some changes in emphasis are 
necessary if there is any real chance of obtaining his concurrence; 
and (ii) ! .believe a rearrangement of Part II is desirable in 
any event. 
You will observe that, for the most part, my revision 
is l~ited to a rearrangement and to some change in verbage. 
I also tried to identify somewhat more clearly the Gunther 
emphasis on a "means model". I have plagiarized Gunther somewhat 
more than our first draft. 
You will observe that the paragraph on McGowan (p. 12) 
has been omitted. In a concurring opinion, I would not hesitate 
to deal directly with McGowan. But I fear our chances of 
winning a court would be d~inished by even a tactful frontal 
. .:. 
... .. . 
.' 
2. 
assault on McGowan. We can make clear, by the way 
the opinion is written, that I describe a standard considerably 
different from that of McGowan. 
The revised draft, that will accompany this memorandum 
to you, reflects unedited dictation - except where I have 
asked Gail to copy or include portions of the printed memorandum. 
Thus, I expect you to edit, polish and rewrite to whatever extent 
you think desirable. 
I am conscious of some things having been omitted that 
should be included, which no doubt you will identify. For 
example, I certainly do want to say that "judicial review even 
under the relatively relaxed traditional standard must have 
substance if the Bqual Protection Clause is to have meaning". 
Also, I did not attempt to include all citations, or 
to relate the text to the footnotes. You are far better equipped 
to do this than I. Incidentally, I omitted the textual citation 
to Guntaer, as I think you can find a more appropriate place 
to put it. 
If you have a chance to put this "humpty-dumpty" back 
together again, during the early part of the week, I will give 
it priority to the extent of a quick reading. We can then 
have it printed for Bill Brennan's review. 








No. 74-1044 MURGIA 
Some thoughts, dictated at random on Sunday: 
I. Would it be helpful to add a footnote in Part I 
that merely lists, with a phrase describing the subject of 
each, the decisions of the Court applying two-tier equal 
protection? The merit, if any, of doing this would be (i) 
to remind my .Brothers of the extent of the Court's commitment 
· to the two-tier analysis, and (ii) to indicate the relatively 
narrow confines within which the two-tier analysis has been 
confined, especially since Rodriguez. 
II. I would like to find a way to mention Jay Wilkinson's 
article, as I think it a scholarly, thoughtful contribution, even 
if we can't "buy it". Moreover, I want to promote the "product" 
of all former clerks. I will be looking out for Professor 
Whitman, I hope, for years to come. We might find a place to 
include a note similar to the one in the draft I initially 
circulated. 
III. Justice Stewart is essential to our plurality. 
We have included Jefferson v. Hackney, but if you can think of 
any other opinions he has written or joined that arguably come 
within the broad contours of our analysis, they should be included. 
L.F .P., Jr. 
•. 
Here is a memorandum in Which I suggest an 
~ opinion for the Court in the above case. 
. ·' 
As you will recall, after Bill Brennan's 
first circulation several months ago, several 
Justices expressed differing views in dissenting : :;, ' , 
and concurring opinions. Others have not yet · · 
spoken. On April 7th I circulated a concurring ,. 
opinion, much of which was adopted by Bill Brennan ', 
and circulated aa a combination of his views and 
mine. "' 
" As no court developed, Bill thereafter 
generously suggested that I make such revisions 
as I thought appropriate and circulate a fresh 
memorandum. Bill's concern, and one we all share, 
',• is to agree at least on a formulation of the 
rational basis equal protection test. OUr cases 
reflect a rather wide variety of formulations. 
The enclosed memorandum which I developed 
with considerable help from Bill Brennan, is 
satisfactory to him and to me. I believe it also 
will be satisfactory to Byron. At this ttme, no 
one else bas seen it. 
I would be happy to discuss 
with you. 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
CC: Mr. Justice Brennan 
' ," 
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;Dear Potter: 
$ ..• <If" 
·~·, "' 
· ~~~~:\ Here is a memorandum in which I suggest an 
' "opinion for the Court in the above case. 
As you will recall, after Bill Brennan's 
first circulation several months ago, several 
Justices expressed differing views in dissenting ~ 
and concurring opinions. Others have not yet , 
, spoken. On April 7th I circulated a concurring ~ ', 
,, " opinion, much of which was adopted by Bill Brennan .,"~ " 
and circulated as a combination of his views and 
mine. 
~~il.),~l~ 
As no court developed, Bill thereafter 
generously suggested that I make such revisions ... , ' 
' as I thought approvriate and circulate a fresh ' ·&i 
.. memorandum. Bill s concern, and one we all share, 
is the present disparity in the way in which we state 
the basic test for analysis of equal protection clatma. 
Although we will continue, in a good many cases, to 
differ as to the results, it would be constructive 
at least to bave a court formulation of the test 
itself. J' '': 
·~n8'MJi·.'fi·.;:~r, ·"·, 
' t ~ 
I have tried to distill from relatively 
precedents the essence of rational basis equal 




standard. · · " , ,· ,, ·.:l; 
;'ill'" ·• 
,, 
1 The enclosed memorandum, which I developed 
with considerable help from Bill Brennan, is 




·_;~' "'!!'( '.ir ' 
will be satisfactory to Byron. 
one else has seen it. '>i-' 
I would be happy to discuss any part of 












No. 74-1044 Massachusetts Board v. MUrgia 
' Dear Harry: 
Draft opinions in this case have now been in circulation 
since January. In an effort to find common ground for at 
least four of us, and possibly five, Bill Brennan suggested -
as you know from what be said at one of our Conferences -
that I prepare a memorandum embodying what might be called 
a compromise version of his views and mine. 
I deliver to you herewith two copies of my memorandum. 
Although designated a "third draft", it bas not yet been 
circulated to the Conference. This memorandum was developed 
in cooperation with Bill Brennan~ and it baa his approval. 
Copies also were recently reviewed by Byron and Potter, and 
it now has Byron's approval. Potter is willing to join if 
the full paragraph beginning at the top of page 11 is omitted. 
Bill and I both would very much prefer to leave the paragraph 
in the opinion for its relevance to the ascertainment of 
state purpose. ,, 
As with Byron and Potter, I am anxious to have your 
views before IJ.'I.8king a general circulation of the memorandum. 
I have not tried to do a "restatement" of equal protection 
analysis, as this would require the unsettling of too many 
prior precedents. Rather, the purpose has been to articulate 
a framework of analysis for the rational basis test that a 
majority of us can accept. 
Bill Brennan and I tried to reach you on Monday when 
each of us spoke to Potter. I know how pressed you are, 
and hesitate to intrude even by a letter. If you should 
wish to discuss this, Bill and I will be happy to come to 
your Chambers. 
Mr. Justice Blac.kmun 
lfp/ss 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN May 18, 1976 
Re: No. 74·1044 - Massachusetts Board v. Murgia 
Dear Lewis: 
I have read your letter of May 12 and the draft of your 
memorandum for this case with great care. It strikes me as a 
reasonable and thoughtful resolution of the views that have been 
expressed in the respective circulations. 
As you know from some of my comments at the confer-
ence table, I have been attracted by the middle tier concept of 
equal protection. This was perceived initially, I believe, by 
Gerald Gunther in his 1972 Harvard Law Review article. I had 
hoped that the Court would arrive at a conclusion along that line, 
perhaps this Term. There is, however, much to be said for your 
approach to the rational basis test for this case and for others 
like it. I therefore am content to go along with it for now. 
The paragraph on page 11 is all right with me. My 
preference is that it be retained rather than omitted. 
In sum, I would join you. 
Sincerely, 
14 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: Mr. Justice Brennan 
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May 19, 1976 
' '·
.· 
No. 74-1044 Massachusetts Board of Retirement 
v. Murgia 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
Draft opinions and memoranda in the case have been in 
circulation since January. Bill Brennan made the initial 
circulation, and differ~ng views were expressed thereafter 
by several members of the Court. On April 7 I circulated 
a concurring opinion, ~st of which was adopted subsequently 
by Bill and circulated as a combination of his views and 
mine. 
As no Court developed, Bill thereafter generously 
suggested - as he stated at one of our Conferences - that 
I make such revisions as I thought appropriate and circulate 
a fresh memorandum. Bill's objective, and one we all share, 
is to attain as much unanimity as possible on a general 
formulation of the rational basis equal protection test. 
I do not think we have been far apart in substance, but 
the terminology employed in our cases haa varied rather 
widely. 
The enclosed memorandum has been seen by several of 
''·!." 
you, as - in view of past differences - it seemed best to 
seek some common ground before making any further circulation. 
of 
I would be happy to discuss any part of this with any 
L.F.P., 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
May 19, 1976 
Re: No. 74-1044 - Massachusetts v. Murgia 
Dear Lewis: 
I think my views on the questions that your new 
circulation covers are pretty much unchanged from the 
memorandum which I earlier circulated, with respect to 
which the Chief, Potter, and Harry expressed greater or 
lesser degrees of agreement. I will try to revise my 
/ 
earlier memorandum to address points covered by your memorandum 
which my earlier circulation did not cover, and get it out 
in the reasonably near future. 
Sincerely~ 
Mr. Justice Powell 




JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
.iupt"ttnt <!f01trlllf tlrt ~~ .ihttts 
11Jaslfhtghttt, ~. <If. 21Tp~~ 
May 19, 1976 
RE: No. 74-1044 Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia 
Dear Lewis: 
I am happy to join your Memorandum and hope it becomes 
./ 
the opinion for the Court. I therefore withdraw my circulated 
opinion. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
~-=...~~ 
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Just i ce Stevens 
F~om: Mr . Justice Stewart 
... · tr culated: -------
I ·. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 74-1044 
l\{assachusetts Board of 
Retirement et al., 
Appellants, 
v. 
Robert D. Murgia. 
On Appeal from the United 
States District Court for the 
District of Massachusetts. 
[February -, 1976] 
MR. JusTICE STEWART, concurring in the result. 
The Court says that a state law challenged under the 
Equal Protection Clause may be judicially nullified if its 
"purpose" is not "capable of discernment by some means 
-short of hypothesizing by a court or a lawyer in the 
course of litigation concerning [its] constitutionality." 
Ante, p. 11. This extraordinary pronouncement strikes 
me as contrary to the first principle of constitutional ad-
judication-the basic presumption of the cpnstitutional 
validity of a duly enacted state or federal law. See 
Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine 
of Constitutional Law, 7· Harv. L. Rev. 129 ( 1893-). The 
Court's pronouncement is also specifically contrary to :lfu.. 
teaching of Chief Justice Warren's opinion for the Court 
in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 426: "A statu-
tory discrimination will not be set aside...i.£ any state of 
facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it." (Em-
phasis added.) 
Three years ago I tried to set down in a few words 
my considered understanding of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See San Antonio 
School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S: 1, at 59 (con-
curring opinion). It is on the basis of that understand-
ing that I concur in the judgment in this case. The 
14-10#,---eoNCU:Jt 
~ MASSAeH"QSETTS :6D. OF R;ETIR,EMENT 'IJ· •. MUR~IA 
c]as_sifi:cation made by this Massachusetts law is not, 
constitutionally suspect,~ does not impinge upon a con-
stitutionally protected right or ]iberly/ and does. not rest. 
on: grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the 
S'tate's objective.8 Since, the1mfore, the law is not in-
vidiously discrinnatocy, i1l does: noi violiate the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
1 Cf. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184, 198 (concurring 
opinion). 
2 Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 642 (concurring 
•opinion) . 
3 Cf. Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U. S. 305. 
CHAMBERS OF" 
,jupuuu Qitturl of !4~ ~ub: ,jmu,g 
Jl'a.tdtin¢on. ~. QI. 2ll~~~ 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
PERSONAL 
May 21, 1976 
Re: 74-1044 - Massachusetts Board of Retirement 
v. Murgia 
Dear Lewis: 
Although it might be wise for me to reflect on the 
problem, perhaps there is some virtue in giving you 
my immediate reaction to the memorandum which you gave 
me yesterday afternoon. 
The "assumption that the political process is most 
sensitive to the wishes of the people in a majoritarian 
democracy" is certainly an important predicate for the 
rule that legislative decisions are entitled to great 
deference, but I would not agree that it is the only, or 
indeed, the principaJ _ basis for the rule. I would add 
at least these additional justifications: 
First, under any program invoJving a 
di~ision of labor, whether of menial tasks 
or of the high responsibility of government, 
the effective delegation of responsibility 
must carry with it the right to make some 
mistakes. Error is an inescapable characteristic 
of human endeavor, and the judiciary has neither 
the power nor the ability to correct all the 
errors made by a co-equal branch of government. 
This is perhaps the same thought that Justice 
Holmes has described as the need for some "play 
in the joints," or words to that effect. 
Second, we have no special skills in making 
policy judgments. Even though we phrase the 
test in terms of "rational basis," we are merely 
saying that a law must reflect a policy judgment 
which we find acceptable. Since the legislature 
is the policy making branch of the government, 
- 2 -
and since we have an overriding obligation to 
be neutral on questions of policy, it inevitably 
must follow that we accord great deference to 
legislative judgment. 
Third, perhaps of greatest importance, the 
strength of the judiciary is largely the conse-
quence of its tradition of self-restraint. The 
more often we substitute our judgment for the 
product of the majoritarian process the greater 
is the risk that our moral authority will diminish 
and our mountain of work will increase. 
I am sure that much more is involved, but I surely am 
not persuaded that the basis for the rule of great deference 
is as narrow or as easily stated as _ page 11 of your memo-
randum implies. 
Since you invited me to study the draft, perhaps you 
will forgive me if I add a comment that goes somewhat beyond 
the specific problem of this case. It has been my impression 
that the disputes within an appellate court that are the most 
difficult to resolve are frequently over matters that do not 
affect the outcome of the particular case before the court. 
I had that impression (and it may well have been incorrect 
because I did not understand the case as well as those who had 
studied the briefs) about the dispute between you and Bill 
Brennan in Franks v. Bowman. I have that impression about 
this case. For that reason, were I the author of the opinion, 
{ 
I would be inclined simply to omit the material beginning in 
the middle of page 10 and including the first three lines of 
page 12, or to say something along the line: "No matter what 
problems may be associated with the identification of the 
relevant state interest in other cases, in this case we have 
no such problem .... " 
If this type of approach is followed, sooner or later a 
case will come along in which the differing statements of the 
applicable rule will actually affect the outcome of the case. 
It is in that kind of context, rather than in a law review 
type of hypothetical analysis, that we do the best job of 
hammering out rules that we will follow in future cases. In 
short, I firmly believe the virtues of the common law tradition 
apply to constitutional adjudication. If we accept that premise, 
we should also minimize the amount of our obiter dicta. I am 
well aware of, and thoroughly respect, the v1ew that our rule-
making responsibility in the field of constitutional law justifies 
a different approach, but I happen to feel otherwise. 
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As I said at the outset, I am responding quite frankly 
and without a great deal of reflection, but I think that 
is really what you want me to do even though my conclusion 
differs from your proposal. I greatly appreciate your 
asking for my reactions. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
,jnprtntt Ofourl of tqt Jhlttb ~g 
Jlufringhtn. ~. <If. 2Llbt~$ 
May 24, 1976 
/ 
/ 
Re: 74-1044 - Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia 
Dear Lewis: 
I have not come to rest on your memo but wi.th 
June rushing at us I feel bound to tell you it is very 
doubtful that I could join. 
Regards, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
;iupTtttU <!J-ttud 4tf tlft ~nittb .:itatts 
~asJri:ughttt. ~. <!J. 2llb'Jl.~ 
May 24, 1976 
Re: No. 74-1044 - Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. 
Murgia 
Dear Lewis: 
Although in chatting with Bill Brennan I indicated 
my agreement in general with the third draft of your memo-
randum, I still have some difficulties. On page 11, you 
indicate that the legitimate purpose required must be 
"capable of discernment by some means short of hypothesiz-
ing by a court or a lawyer in the course of litigation 
.... " I wonder, however, if the Constitution permits 
or requires us to disregard a state court's considered 
holding as to the purpose of a state statute where insofar 
as we are advised, the purpose attributed to a statute by 
the state court is accepted by the State in applying the 
State's own constitutional provisions. Arguably, under our 
prior cases, we should view a state court's interpretation 
as having been expressly written into the statute. 
Also, on page 14, you require that the means chosen 
not only be rational but also bear a fair and substantial 
relation to the discerned purpose. On pages 15 and 16, 
however, you refer to the test as one of "rationality" and 
on page 15 indicate that the test is satisfied if the 
classification is not "wholly unrelated to the objective of 
the statute." I would prefer not to indicate that the "fair 
and substantial relationship" requirement adds anything to 
the "rationality" standard. 
Perhaps we could chat about this. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: Mr. Justice Brennan 
CHAMBERS OF 
.§tt.pfttttt <!fo-u:rt of tlrt 'JlUrif;r-.§tates 
'jtaslrhtghm. :!B. <!f. 2n.;;>1~ 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
May 25, 1976 
Re: No. 74-1044 - Massachusetts Board of Retirement 
v. Murgia 
Dear Lewis: 
Since it is getting late in the year, and since the 
present status of this case seems so uncertain, I thought 
I would set forth in rough form my reaction to your current 
memorandum. If your memorandum should acquire the necessary 
votes for a Court opinion my letter could be used as a 
basis for my concurrence in the result~ if your memorandum 
does not acquire that number of votes, my letter might 
provide the basis for an opinion in support of the result 
upon which we all agree. 
(1) Absence of fundamental right. I 
agree entirely with your treatment of this 
question on page 6 of your memorandum 
opinion • 
. . ' ' . 
. ·. 
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(2) Suspect classification. Since appellee 
in his brief seems to me to all but abandon 
any claim that the Massachusetts statute creates 
a "suspect classification", I would not as 
an original proposition think this were an appropriate 
case to discourse at length upon the criteria 
for determining a suspect classification. It 
seems to me that in one sentence of your 
memorandum on page 9, you say virtually all that 
need be said in the way of substantive analysis 
on this point: 
"But even old age does not define a 'discrete 
and insular group Instead it marks 
a stage that each of us will reach if we live 
out our normal span." 
That, plus a citation to your treatment of the 
subject in San Antonio Independent School District 
v. Rodriguez, and a citation to Harry's treatment 
of the subject in Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 
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634, 642, would be adequate. Neither the Chief 
nor I, of course, agree that aliens are a 
"suspect classification", but obviously we are 
not in a position to insist that the conclusion 
previously reached by the majority of the Court 
be repudiated. 
I would be somewhat concerned if all of your discussion 
of the relative success of the aged in obtaining their wishes 
legislatively remained in your opinion the way it is now 
written. The more general reference to the same sort of 
test contained in Rodriguez seems to me to be more satisfactory 
here, where appellees really are not plumping very hard 
for a "suspect classification" analysis. 
I add a word here in a somewhat broader context. I 
agree with you that there is a need for clarification of 
equal protection doctrine, but I basically disagree with 
your expansion of the "rational basis" test which I discuss 
infra. It seems to me what has most troubled the lower 
courts and the commentators are cases such as those involving 
sex discrimination, where although the Court has stated 
the test in terms of minimum scrutiny they believe that it 
is applying some higher level of scrutiny. As I read 
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Professor Gunther's article in 86 Harv. Law Rev. 1, which I 
~ke you to task for relying on so heavily in your 
memorandum, see infra, the genesis of the article was at 
least in part a felt need to explain cases such as these 
and your opinion in Weber v. Aetna Casualty Co., 406 U.S. 
164. 
If there is to be some sort of doctrinal expansion 
in the area of equal protection -- and I am by no means sold 
on the n~cessity or desirability for it -- it seems to me 
that it should come in some area other than that of the 
minimum scrutiny -- rational basis test. I think that 
your expansion of this test in the latter part of your 
memorandum will simply permit lower courts to make more 
erroneous decisions striking down social and economic 
legislation, such as the District Court did in this case, 
without in any principled way accommodating cases such 
as those dealing with sex discrimination. In other words, 
if we expand the rational basis test in this opinion, we 
will still be confronted further down the pike with a 
demand to expand "suspect classifications" or else adopt 




While my own personal view of the matter is that the 
standard of review in both areas should be left pretty much 
the way it is, if I had to choose between some doctrine 
explaining cases such as the sex discrimination cases, on 
the one hand, and the across-the-board expansion of the 
minimum scrutiny test which you propose, on the other, I 
should unhesitatingly choose the former. This seems to me 
to be another reason why it is undesirable to say anything 
more than is necessary to decide this case about "suspect 
classification". For this reason I think Potter's very 
brief opinion concurring in the result has much to commend 
it, although it would obviously have to be expanded if it 
were to be an opinion for the Court. 
{3) "Purpose": Its Legitimacy v. Its Significance. 
As I now understand it, I quite agree with your 
observations that there inheres in the Consti-
tution some "requirement that a State's purpose 
be 'legitimate'". For although I do have some 
difficulty seeing any difference between deciding 
whether a "purpose falls within the very broad 
range of powers entrusted the state legislatures" 
and deciding whether it does not "independently 
violate other constitutional requirements", it 
' . 
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seems indisputable that a state legislative enactment 
which fails to pass these tests must be held invalid. 
But I draw back from some of the precepts of consti-
tutional litigation which you seem to draw from this 
requirement of 11 legitimacy. 11 
As I read your memorandum, you create in equal protection 
cases several express limitations upon the normal function of 
courts in ascertaining legislative intent so as to reduce the 
chances of their being somehow fooled by clever assertions of 
purpose which may actually mask the existence of an illegiti-
mate objective in the challenged law. I don't see how such 
~ priori limitations on what arguments courts 
may accept are likely to advance the cause in which you seek 
to enlist them. Instead, I fear that these limitations may 
obscure, and must thereby eventually confuse,constitutional 
adjudication under the Equal Protection Clause. 
I don't think that a plaintiff, even when he assumes 
the burden traditionally imposed on one challenging a 
statute as being unconstitutional, will necessarily derive 
much benefit from these limitations. The burden on the 
plaintiff is to demonstrate that the statute is unconsti-
tutional; one of the methods by which he may do this, in 
.. 
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the terms of your memo, is to show that the statute implements 
an illegitimate objective. If he can do this, i.e., if as 
you suggest in note 17, he can demonstrate that the statute 
implements a racially discriminatory objective, then the 
litigation is at an end. If he cannot do so, then ex hypothes i 
I 
there is no "illegitimate objective" behind the statute which 
could be obscured by an assertion of "illusory purpose" put 
forth by counsel. 
While these limitations, in my view, will not appreciably 
benefit one whose challenge to a statute deserves to succeed, 
I think that they will have more than one undesirable side 
effect as courts come to apply them. One such side effect 
could be to divert the attention of a court from the question 
of whether a statute directly contravenes the Constitution 
by invidiously discriminating against a suspect class to a 
focus upon discovering the "purpose" of the statute. I must 
also confess I do not understand your use of "hypothesizing" 
as the antithesis of proper judicial review. Initially, I 
am not at all sure I grasp what you mean by that term. You 
suggest that the only acceptable methods of determining a 
statute's purpose is either to draw upon a preamble or some 
other form of legislative history or to ascertain some 
•. . . 
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"clearly implicit" message on the face of the statutory scheme. 
As to the former, however, many if not most equal protection 
claims today are challenges to state legislation for which there 
may exist no legislative history, preamble, etc. Surely this 
heretofore unquestioned p'ractice cannot, as a noncombatant casu-
alty in the course of this Court's quest for a uniformly agreed-
upon standard for minimal scrutiny challenges under the Equal 
Protection Clause, suddenly have become constitutionally 
suspect. And if your observations in note 13 that the Consti-
tution does not require state legislatures to articulate the 
purpose of every legislative enactment, is meant to suggest 
that it may do so with respect to some enactments, they seem 
to me difficult to support in law or logic. Moreover, the 
basis for the suggestion with which you close note 13 escapes 
me entirely. I would have thought that the interpretation of 
a state administrative or executive agency regarding the 
meaning and purpose of the statute it was charged to enforce 
was a determination of state law which would be fairly bind-
ing upon any federal court before which the issue might be 
properly raised. I can't imagine how a conclusion that there 
was "hypothesizing by a lawyer" somehow involved, would entitle 




Your alternative suggestion for divining the "purpose" 
of a statute, that it will usually be "clearly apparent from 
the face of the enactment," may be true as to most statutes 
which are passed. But when considered against those statutes 
which have led to litigation, I would have thought that the 
volumes written on statutory interpretation, as well as a 
very sizeable portion of this Court's case law, demonstrate 
that the "purpose" of a disputed statute is seldom so easily 
discernible. Indeed, the lesson of these authorities seems 
to be that it is a mistake of some dimension to assume that 
there exists a single "purpose" which may be ascribed to the 
legislature with regard to any particular statute, or that 
courts can adequately undertake to examine the subjective 
"motive" or "intent" of the legislators in performing their 
review function. 
All this leads me to conclude that the test which you 
propose is really a very significant departure from consti-
tutional adjudication as developed in the decisions of this 
Court. I'm not sure that the focus upon the "purpose" of 
the statute, assuming that we could agree upon that aspect 
of a statute's meaning, has much relevance to traditional 
judicial review; at least not where there is no dispute 
- 10 -
that only minimum scrutiny is appropriate. I am thus much 
more comfortable with Potter's suggestion that we adhere to 
the test announced in cases such a McGowan: that a statutory 
legislative choice will not be invalidated unless no set of 
facts can be conceived to justify it. That formulation, 
while perhaps not embodying what political scientists might 
want in a model of judicial review, seems to me the proper 
role for a court enforcing the Constitution which we have. 
(4) Professor Gunther's "Ends-Means" Analysis. 
I have the most serious reservations about that 
portion of your memorandum which seems to contemplate 
the bodily assumption into the Equal Protection 
Clause of Professor Gunther's article in 86 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1 (1972); you refer to it approvingly once 
in your text, and once again in a footnote, at 
pages 10-17 of your memorandum. Professor Gunther, 
as I read his article, advances what he calls a 
"model of modest interventionism", id., 24, which 
he says was suggested to him by developments in 
the October 1971 Term. More than one passage in 
the article seems to me to be in the area of 
political science, rather than of constitutional 




law -- a choice which a law review commentator is 
certainly free to make, · but which I am not sure 
ought to be carried over into this Court's opinion. 
For example, Professor Gunther says: 
·. '· .·.·, 
"It does indeed follow from the 
political process theme that 
legislative value choices warrant 
judicial deference so long as the 
people can have their say in the 
public forum and at the ballot 
box. It does not follow, however, 
that the Court should eschew all 
concern with the relationship of 
the means adopted to the legisla-
tively chosen ends. Means scrutiny, 
to the contrary, can improve the 
quality of the political process 
without second-guessing the 
substantive validity of its results 
by encouraging a fuller airing 
in the political arena of the 
grounds for legislative action. 
' ... ·· . 
.·. 
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Examination of means in light of 
asserted state purposes would 
directly promote public consideration 
of the benefits assertedly sought by 
the proposed legislation; indirectly, 
it would stimulate fuller political 
examination, in relation to those 
benefits, of the costs that would be 
incurred if the proposed means were 
adopted." Id., at 44. 
While I support popular government and open debate as 
much as the next person, the quoted statement is pure political 
science, not constitutional law; it is surely miles removed 
from what this Court's decisions have ever intimated to be the 
purpose or meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
Professor Gunther's article has not gone unchallenged 
even among his academic brethern. In the "Foreword" to 
the Harvard Law Review issue on the Supreme Court in the 




"[His] aim of a 'relatively vigorous' 
judicial scrutiny ••• evaporates 
in a verbal mist whicle inviting 
manipulation that conceals the 
substan~ive judgments underlying 
judicial choice." 
Even Professor Gunther later expressed doubts about his 
proposed Equal Protection analysis when he participated in a 
forum for the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly last 
year: 
"I recognize more difficulties now than 
I spoke about in the Foreword, as to both 
purposes and means, and in application. I 
would hate to be trying to decide some of 
the cases which would be thrown at me to 
decide.~ 2 Hastings Const. L. Q., at 660. 
Nor has Professor Gunther's doctrine faired particularly 
well in the one case that I know of which came here after a 
Court of Appeals adopted his theory. The Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit in Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 
476 F.2d 806, cited Professor Gunther's article, and said it 
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was focusing "on the actual rationality of the legislative 
means under attack •••• ", 476 F.2d 806, 815. It held 
that the Belle Terre ordinance violated the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The rest is history. 
That judgment was reversed by this Court by a vote of seven 
to two in an opinion written by Bill Douglas. 416 u.s. 1. 
I think that a principal shortcoming, at least in my 
opinion, of Professor Gunther's article; of some of the 
intimations in your memorandum; and, of some of the language 
in some of our equal protection cases, is the idea that any 
single legislative "purpose" can be divined with respect to 
a statute containing a number of different sections. 
v 
Let us suppose, for example, that the state in which 
I presently reside, and the one in which you formerly 
resided -- Virginia -- enacts a law entitled the "Truck 
Safety Act of 1976". It has a short preamble reciting a 
history of accidents resulting from the difficulties of 
safely stopping heavily laden vehicles and stating explicitly 
V This is not entirely suppositious, since it resembles 
the federal statute I dealt with in a stay application in 
Coleman v. Paccar, No. A-651. 
'·· - . 
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that the purpose of the Act is to improve highway safety in 
the state. The principal operative provision requires that 
all trucks commercially licensed in Virginia having an 
unladen weight in excess of five tons shall have antiskid 
devices on their hydraulicbraking systems, and describes with 
some particularity the type of devices which will satisfy 
the statutory requirement. 
The statute contains the following additional 
provisions: 
(1) The Act shallapply only on the 
occasion of the sale or resale of a truck 
which is covered by its terms. 
(2) Trucks otherwise covered by the 
Act which are used in connection with an 
agricultural enterprise may obtain exemptions 
from the provisions of the Act if their 
owners make a showing of economic hardship. 
One year later the Act is amended so as to provide that 
it applies only to new vehicles at the time they are sold. 
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It seems to me that it is impossible to say that 
single 
there is any/'purpose' to this Act, notwithstanding the 
preamble which would indicate the contrary. The basic 
provision is indeed designed to foster highway safety, but 
the original exception would in effect grandfather in existing 
trucks until they are resold, and thus avoid immediate imposition 
of financial burden on those who are currently operating 
trucks which would otherwise be subject to the Act. The 
amendment passed the following year still further restricts 
the operation of the Act, and in effect grandfathers in all 
existing trucks, even after resale. The agricultural 
exception cuts directly against the purpose of highway 
safety, and would have to be justified in terms of legislative 
recognition that the typical agricultural entrepreneur may be 
in shakier financial condition than most other truck 
operators, that the business of agriculture was one which 
the legislature wished especially to encourage, and that 
therefore less stringent requirements would be applied to 
trucks used in that business. 
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As I read pages 10-17 of your memorandum, one or more 
provisions of this hypothetical statute would run into 
~me difficulty if challenged on Equal Protection grounds. 
Yet if the analysis in McGowan v. Maryland, which Potter 
adopts in his separate concurrence, were followed, I think 
there would be no difficulty in sustaining any one of the 
provisions. 
As a final wrinkle, suppose that West Virginia, long 
known to be less enlightened than Virginia, adopted the 
same statute but fails to enact any preamble. Does the 
West Virginia statute, under your approach, fare better 
or worse than the Virginia statute? 
If this hypothetical poses problems, as I think it 
does, it nonetheless avoids what seems to me to be one 
of the most difficult problems of all under your analysis: 
the situation which arises when there is genuine disagreement 
about the legislative purpose behind any particular statute 
or subsection of a statute. 
Peroration. This letter is too long already, but in 
the process of writing it I have gotten myself sufficiently 
W)rked up so that I shall indulge myself in a bit of a 
perroation. I think the basic shortcoming of the "end-
means" analysis, of focusing on whether "the distinctions 
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made by a classification [are] genuinely related to the 
State's purpose" (your memorandum, p. 14) are twofold. If 
the approach means what it says, it sets up this Court, 
which claims no legislative competence, to evaluate a 
legislative decision to implement a particular purpose 
by enacting some provision of a given statute. It seems to 
me almost inconceivable that we could correctly conclude 
that a group of legislators, all devoting a good part of 
their time to the art of legislation, chose a means which 
was not "genuinely" related to their purpose. 
If we reach that conclusion, it seems to me far more 
likely that we have misconceived the legislative purpose, 
or are deliberately refusing to acknowledge it, and are 
therefore masking the actual operation of the Equal 
Protection Clause behind a surface doctrine which set 
this Court up as a tutor for legislators in order that they 
may be taught how to enact statutes which carry out the 
purpose that they have in mind. 
Sincerely, ~ 
~JV .. 'v 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
'. 
'•. 
5 5 ~' ..... ~· ij 
lfp/ss 5r;'26/76 Rider · p. 10 (Murgia) 
Identification of the state purpose normally presents 
little difficulty. Although the purpose may not be imagined, 
it usually is apparent from the face of the statute and ita 
13 
legislative history. 
13. AScertainment of purpose by a state court, of 
course should be respected, and substantial weight also 
should be given to contemporaneous interpretation by the 
administrative or executive agency charged with a statute's 
enforcement. 
We do note that the proper functioning of the political 
process usually is best served where the policies or 
objectives of the legislature are identified at the time 
of enactment. When legislation is enacted against such a 
background, there is greater assurance that the legislature 
has focused on the problem. 
~---~~-------- --·-~--
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, and ascertainment of purpose by the appropriate state 
court or agency charged with a statute's enforcement, of 
course, should be respected. 
To: Justice Powell Date: May 30, 1976 
From: Chris Whitman 
No. 74-1044 Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia 
Now that I have toesed the death penalty cases into your 
lap, I will take the time to write down some of my reactions 
to Justice Rhenquist's memo in this case. Much of his 
disagreement with our opinion is just that -- a difference in 
point of view. But I do think that x he does misread what 
we said in one m important respect -- which I shall explain 
below. 
P. 2 -- I do not think that the contention that the statute 
creases a "suspect classification" is· quite as frivolous as 
WHR paints it. I am sure that it does not appear to be so 
to those outside the Court, who do not know that the Court 
has xax£xim decided to Eia close the door on further expansion 
on suspect classes -- or even to cut back on them, as WHR 
and the Cmief would in the case of aliens. The only substantive 
point that WHR makes, however, has to do with the discussion 
of the relative success of the aged in obtaining their wishes 
legislatively. I agree with WHR that that is much longer than 
necessary. As I recallyit was residue from WJB's first version 
which he included when he combined our two drafts. It was 
my impression that we accepted it in the spirit of compromise, 
for it does no real damage~ even though we may not have included 
it in an opinion that we wrote from scratch. 
P. 3 --It seems to me that SHR WHR's comment that the sex 
discrimination cases are the most x troubling to those trying 
to understand our equal protection cases is entirely correct. 
But, clearly, the Court is not prepared to reach a consensus 
on those. Other cases applying the rational basis test have 
also created a great deal of confusion -- the very BHg debate 
between you and Rhenquist exhibits the xax split amaRg in the 
Court on this issue -- and xkaxxmxgkxxkHxxaxiaRaixxHsxxaxxamH 
there is some hope of at least getting a £BHXX four-Justice 
consensus on the approach to be used in these non-sex cases. 
WHR is correct that the sex cases will continue to be a problem 
pushing towards expanding the category of suspect classifications 
or xkH creatin~ a middle tier. 
P. 7 -- I am not as convinced as WHR that xkHXHxixxRB we can 
~iiiHgxxiamxH assume that there is no illigitimate objective 
where the challenger cannot demonstrate one. Implicit in our 
approach, it seems to me, is that the absence of any discernible 
purpose is one indication that the legislature's purpose has 
been illegitimate. It seems to me that it would be almost 
impossible to prove XRXMBXXXEXXHX by affirmative evidence that 
a~ legislature'§ purpose is illegitimate. Few bodies are 
naive enough to be so explicit. 
2. 
In asking you to XH#HEX discard ~he requirement that the 
state's purpose be articulated, WHR is asking you to depart 
from the views you have indicated in your past opinions. 
There are cases -- the New Orleans hotdog case appears to 
be one -- when this difference of opinion will make the 
difference in the result one reaches. ~BHxma~XEXRXXXE 
rHEBRXXBHxxwkHxkHx And, to that ~xtent, your view does 
put the Court in a more active ~. The problem with 
WHR's view is that it seems to deprive the Court of any 
role, except for the devising of conceivable justifications 
a purely theoretical and meaningless exercise. 
~¥xKixaRBXX P. 14 and following -- The hypothesis WHR \ 
presents here reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of 
our opinion -- and indicates that we should clarif~ tpe 
eg int. We do not look at the relat 1on 6f che means to the 
en~f the statute as a whole. Nor do we insist that there 
only be a single end. Rather, we require that the rreans be 
related to the purpose sxxxkHx,axxxEHiaxxEiaxxxxxEaxxsR (or 
one of the several purposes) of the particular E:iaxxf classification 
under attack. Thus, in WHR 1 s example, the statute woufd pass 
cons 1 utional muster. The grandfather HXEH,XXBR clause can 
be justified by a desire to avoid immediate imposition of the 
financial burden on EHXXHi~s,HxaxxsR those currently operating 
trucks.xxxsxxaiixsiB The exception for agriculatural equipment 
is rationally related to the purpose of encouraging (or not 
destroying) agriculaure. The court need not be concerned 
with how these provisions serve the overall purpose of the 
Act -- unless they XBxaii~XBH,XXlllfXXHHX:AEXXBXXRR~ create 
exceptions so large that the Act does not serve its overall 
purpose at all and becomes axmH simply a means of imposing 




SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 74-1044 
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Retirement et al., 
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R,obert D. Murgia. 
On Appeal from the United 
States District Court for the 
District of Massachusetts .. 
[April -, 1976] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring in the judgment. 
I am in accord with the result reached by the Court 
and with much of the reasoning underlying that result. 
I think it appropriate, however, in view of the discussion 
that has arisen among the Members of the Court, to ex-
press my views on the proper analysis to be applied in 
determining whether the Massachusetts legislation com-
ports with the requirements of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. I agree that the 
proper inquiry is whether the State's classification "ra-
tionally relates to the furtherance of the State's an-
nounced objective." Ante, at 10.1 I cannot, however, 
1 MR. JusTICE MARSHALL makes an appealing case in his con-
curring opinion for a new formulation of equal protection analysis. 
He proposes, as I understand it, a "middle-tier" type of test. When 
I came on the Court (January 1972) "two-tier" analysis was firmly 
established by prior decisions. See, e. g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 
U. S. 365 (1971); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969); 
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U. S. 663 (1969). See 
also Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 
1065, 1076-1132 (1969). Rod1iguez, like similar cases involving the 
funding of education (see, e. g., Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. 
Supp. 870 (Minn. 1971), had been decided below and was argued 
before us on the assumption that the Court was committed to this 
analytical approach. In writing for the Court in that case, I ac-
cepted and attempted to define more clearly the boundaries of two-
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accept the Court's central position that a high degree of 
political participation in itself is sufficient to support the 
conclusion that those of middle age do not form a suspect 
class for purposes of equal protection analysis. 
I 
I turn first to the question whether the most demand-
ing judicial scrutiny appropriately is applied to the classi-
fication made by Massachusetts. Although I depart in 
some respects from the Court's reasoning, I concur in its 
conclusion that strict scrutiny is not proper. 
As the Court indicates, appellees can point to no fun-
damental personal rights that are infringed by Massachu-
setts' compulsory retirement scheme. We have said, in 
San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 
33-34 ( 1973), that "the key to discovering" whether a 
certain interest is " 'fundamental' is not to be found in 
cbmparisons of . . . relative societal significance" or in 
weighing relative impot'tance: "Rather, the answer lies in 
assessing whether there is a right ... expiicitly or im-
plicitly guaranteed by the Constitution." See also, e. g., 
tier analysis. This is not to say the Constitution requires such 
5tnalysis or that I would have embraced it initially had I been on the 
Court at the time it was adopted. But whatever formulation is 
used, certain types of legislative enactments and classifications will 
be scrutinized more closely than others. Until a majority of the 
Court wishes to attempt a new formulation, I think we must adhere 
to the existing precedents. 
One does find in the literature creative and intriguing ideas, in 
addition to the not undeserved criticism of the ambiguity and even 
fnconsistency in some of our opinions. E. g., Wilkinson, The Su-
preme Court, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of 
Constitutional Equality, 61 Va. L. Rev. 945 (1975); Michelman, The 
Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On Protecting the Poor 
Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 7 (1969). 
For the most part, the proposals made would require a dramatic 
departure from existing precedent. 
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:Selle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1974); Lindsey v. 
Normet, 405 U. S. 56, 74 (1972). There is no constitu-
tional guarantee, explicit or implicit, of a right to con-
tinue in employment indefinitely, free of compulsory 
termination at a specified age. I am particularly mind-
ful that a decision to the contrary in this case-where the 
State has an interest as both legislator and employer-
would represent a serious intrusion upon the State's flex-
ibility in determining the qualifications necessary to en-
sure that law enforcement personnel have optimum 
fitness and morale and in developing an ordered pension 
and retirement plan for its employees. 
For reasons different from those relied upon by the 
Court, I also conclude that the class of persons subject to 
compulsory termination under Massachusetts' statute 
does not constitute a suspect class. The "traditional in-
dicia of suspectness" were defined in Rodriguez, supra, at 
28. We are to consider whether 
"the class is ... saddled with such disabilities, or 
subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal 
treatment, or relegated to such a position of political 
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protec-
tion from the majoritarian political process." 
There is no indication in any of our cases that evidence 
of high numerical representation in the state legislatures 
or the existence of a body of remedial legislation is alone 
sufficient to remove a group that demonstrates the other 
indicia-of special disabilities or a history of discrimina-
tory treatment-from the category of suspect classes. 
An exemption from categorization as a suspect class 
based on the existence of remedial legislation, for ex-
ample, could penalize those who properly seek legislative 
rather than judicial solutions to problems of discrimina-
tion. It also ignores the fact that state, as well as fed-
eral, legislatures have been responsive to the needs of 
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blacks, a class that few would contend is no longer in 
need of the special protection envisioned for them by the 
drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Strauder v. 
West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 ( 1880). Moreover, I be-
lieve it inappropriate for the Court to embark upon the 
task, highly charged with political ramifications, of evalu-
ating 'vhen a given group is sufficiently represented in 
the legislatures or sufficiently protected by legislation to 
justify a relaxation of strict judicial scrutiny. 
The class subject to the compulsory retirement feature 
of the Massachusetts statute consists of uniformed state 
police officers over the age of 50. Therefore, it cannot be 
said to discriminate only against the elderly. Rather, 
it draws the line at a certain age in · middle life. Even 
if the statute cotild be said to impose a penalty upon a, 
class defined as the aged, it would not impose a distinc· 
tion sufficiently akin to those classifications that we have 
found suspect to call fot strict judicial scrutiny. 
The Court's opinion acknowledges that persons of ma-
ture age have not suffered any deprivation of political 
power. indeed, they may have a unique influence on the 
political dccisionmaking, especialiy in those legislatures 
where leadership is allocated on a seniority basis. More-
over, such persons, unlike, say, those who have been dis-
criminated against on the basis of race or national origin, 
have not experienced a ahistory of purposeful unequal 
treatment" or been subjected to unique disabilities on 
the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truely indica-
tive of the group's abilities. When those factors are 
present, there is reason to scrutinize state classifications 
carefully to ensure that they are not influenced by un-
founded assumptions about group characteristics that 
have no place in our constitutional system. Even old 
age does not define a "discrete and insular" group, see 
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 
74-1044-CONCUR (A) ' 
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152-153, n. 4 ( 1938) , in need of "extraordinary protec-
tion from the majoritarian political process." Instead, it 
marks a stage that each of us will reach if we live out our 
normal span. There is no basis upon which to assume 
that state and federal legislatures will not deal fairly 
with persons as they age and be responsive to their needs. 
Under the circumstances, it is unnecessary to subject 
the State's resolution of competing interests in this case 
to strict judicial scrutiny in order to ensure that it is 
consistent with the requirements of the Equal Protection 
Clause. 
II 
In defining the test to be applied in this case, I am in 
basic agreement with the opinion for the Court. We 
must determine whether the Massachusetts' scheme "ra-
tionally furthers some legitimate, articulated state pur-
pose." San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 
U. S., at 17. The statute is presumed to be valid.2 
Perfection in the way in which the means are adapted to 
serve the State's purpose is not required.3 But judicial 
review, even under this relatively relaxed standard, must 
have substance if the Equal Protection Clause is to have 
meaning. 
The term "legitimate" state purpose docs not suggest, 
as MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST fears, that the Court is re-
2 See, e. g., San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, supra, at 
40-41; Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U. S. 83, 88 (1940); Lindsley v. 
Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911). 
The presumption of validity is particularly strong with respect to 
the legislative judgment in areas of economics, taxation, and the 
allocation of necessarily limited state resources. In addition to the 
cases cited, see, e. g., Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535 (1972); 
Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S. 78 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 
397 U. S. 471 ( 1970). 
3 See, e. g., Richardson v. Belcher, supra, at 84; Dandridge v. 
Williams, supra, at 485. 
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quired to engage in a substantive review of the permissi-
bility of a State's objectives. Indeed, an inquiry of this 
sort is one of the factors that distinguishes traditional 
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause from the 
most searching review appropriate when a suspect classi-
fication is involved. See, e. g., In re Griffiths, 413 U. S. 
717, 721 (1973). The requirement that a State's purpose 
be "legitimate" indicates only that the purpose must fall 
within the very broad range of powers entrusted the state 
legislatures and that it must not independently infringe 
upon other constitutional restrictions. The State's pur• 
pose justifying the classification must not be illusory, a 
ine~e facade concealing the existence of an objective that 
is illegitimate in this very narrow sense. See McGinnis 
v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 276 (1973). 
In this case, as the opinion for the Court points out, 
the purpose of the Massachusetts retirement scheme was 
clearly identified in the legislative history. We need not 
decide, therefore, whether a clearly identifiable purpose is 
always required. I think it clear, however, that our 
decisions increasingly have departed from the extreme.ly 
relaxed standard of McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 
425-426 (1961), which indicated that the constitutional 
requirements are met if "any state of facts reasonably 
may be conceived to justify" a statutory discrimination. 
Rather, we have required that the state purposes to be 
.served by the classification be capable of being discerned 
by some means short of hypothezation ·by a ·judge. See, 
e. g., McGinnis v. Royster, supra, at 2i0. That is, they 
must be either expressly articulated by the legislature or 
clearly implicit in the statutory scheme.4 Ingenious 
4 This is not to say that the Constitution requires the States to 
articulate, in a preamble or otherwise, the purpose of every legisla-
tive enactment. Although the inclusion of such preambles is help-
ful, and is a policy adopted by legislative bodies with increasing 
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judges will almost always be able to devise some basis 
for a state law. But the judicial function calls for a 
more genuine inquiry if the constitutional requirement of 
rationality is not to be meaningless. 
The great deference to which legislative accommoda-
tion of conflicting interests is entitled under this relaxed 
scrutiny rests upon the assumption that the political 
· process is most sensitive to the wishes of the people in 
·a majoritarian democracy. It does not follow from this 
. .' assumption, however, that it is appropriate for a court 
to devise or imagine policy where none has been indi-
cated by the legislature or is clearly implicit from the 
action taken. The proper functioning of the political 
process is best served where the State bears the responsi-
bility of enacting legislation that is designed to serve 
identifiable policies or ,objectives. When legislation is 
enacted against such a background, the Court has some 
guarantee that the legislature has focused on the problem 
and also that its decision has received a public airing.5 
In such circumstances, deference to the decision of the 
State is not only appropriate, but required by the de-
mands of the separation of powers doctrine and our 
federal system. 
The necessary relationship between the challenged 
·Classification and the articulated or clearly implicit state 
·purpose has been defined in the Court's opinion as "fair 
and substantial." This term has been used by the Court 
in other cases applying traditional scrutiny.6 I have 
frequency, it is neither required or even desirable with respect to 
every piece , of legislation. The purpose of most statutes is clearly 
apparent from the face of the enactment. 
5 Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: 
A Model for .a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 44 
·::, •. (1972). ' ' ·, 
6 See, e. g., Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U. S. 361, 374 (1974); Roy-
ster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). 
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understood the term-as our conclusion in this case indi-
cates-to signify only that the relationship be rational, 
something more than trivial or illogical. A trivial or 
illogical relationship would not only fail to comport with 
the requirement of rationality, but may indicate that the 
defined purpose actually masks an improper (for example, 
racially discrimina.tory) purpose. Where the means 
chosen is rationally related to the legislature's purpose, 
it need not be necessary or the best scheme devisable to 
serve the chosen end.7 Nor does the Constitution re-
quire that the classification be as narrowly drawn or 
precisely tailored as possible. Rather, it accepts the 
need to make rough accommodations in thee ourse of 
devising political solutions. In this case it is sufficient 
to say, as appellees concede, that physical ability declines 
with age. Where, as here, the job is arduous and physi-
cally demanding, requiring that those who hold it be in 
top physical condition, the State's decision to require 
retirement after a certain age comports with the require-
. m~mts of the Equal Pnhection Clau.Se, 
7 This further requirement is imposed only when the Court en-
~ gages in the most exacting scrutiny. In re Griffiths, 413 U. S. 717, 
722 (1973); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964). 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring in the judgment. 
I am m accord with the result reached by the Court 
and with much of the reasoning underlying that result, 
r think it appropnate, however, in light of the exchange 
of views among the Members of the Court, to express 
my thmking as to the proper analysis to be applied in 
determining whether the Massachusetts legislation com-
ports with the requirements of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. I agree that the 
proper mq uiry is whether the State's classification "ra-
tionally relates to the furtherance of the State's an-
nounced ob.1ective." Ante, at 10 1 l cannot, however, 
1 MR ,JU::lTICE. MARSHALL makes an appeahng case in his dis-
sentmg OpiniOn for :1 new formulation of equal protection analysis. 
He proposeo;, ao; I understand It, a "middle-tier" type of test. When 
[ came on thr C'ourt (.January 1972) "two-tier" analysis was firmly 
established by pnor decisiOnb See, e. g., Graham v. R ichardson, 403 
P S 365 (1971) . Shaptro v Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969) ; 
Harper \ V7rmma Bonrd of Electwns, 383 U S. 663 (1966). See 
abo Drveloprnent;; m the Law-Equal ProtectiOn, 82 Harv. L. Rev 
1065, 1071i- 11:32 ( 19119) Rodnou.ez, hke similar cases mvolving the 
funchng of Pdnratwn (sre, e q ., Serrano v Pnest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 
41{7 P 2d 1241 ( 1971), Van Dusartz v Hat field, 334 F . 
Supp. 870 ( Mmn 1971)), had been decided below and was argued 
before u;; on th<' assmnptwn that the Court was committed to t his 
analytic•:JI fl pproarh In wntmg for thr Court m that rase, I ac• 
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accept the Court's central position that a high degree of 
political participation in itself is sufficient to support the 
conclusion that those of middle age do not form a suspect 
class for purposes of equal protection analysis. 
li 
I turn first to the question whether the most demand-
ing JUdicial scrutiny appropriately should be applied to 
the classification made by Massachusetts. Although I 
depart in some respects from the Court's reasoning, I con-
cur m its conclusion that strict scrutiny is not proper. 
As the Court indicates, appellees can point to no fun~ 
damental personal rights that are infringed by Massachu-
setts' compulsory retirement scheme. We have said, in 
San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 
33-34 ( 1973), that "the key to discovering" whether a, 
certain interest is " 'fundamental' is not to be found in 
comparisons of 0 0 • relative societal significance" or in 
weighing relative importance: "Rather, the answer lies in 
assessing whether there is a right ... explicitly or im-
plicitly guaranteed by the Constitution." See also, e. g.,. 
cepted and attempted to define more clearly the boundaries of two-
tier analysis . Thts 1~ not to say the Constitution requires such 
analysis or that 1 would have embraced it initially had I been on the 
Court at the tim«.> 1t was adopted. But whatever formulation is 
ur:,ed, certam types of legtslattve enactments and classifications prop-
erly will be t>crutmized more closely than others. Until a majority 
· of th«.> Court wtshes to attempt a new formulatiOn, I think we must 
adhert' to the existing prt'cedents. 
In addttlon to the not undeserved criticism of the ambiguity and 
even mcoruiistency m some of our opimons, one does find in the 
hteniture creat1ve and mtngmng ideas. E. g., Wilkinson, The Su-
preme Court, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of 
ConstitutiOnal Equality , 61 Va. L. Rev. 945 (1975); Michelman, . 
On Protectmg the Poor Through the Fourte«.>nth Amendment, 83 
Harv . L. Rev 7 ( 1969) For the most part, the proposals mad.e. 
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Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1974); 
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972). There is no 
constitutional guarantee, explicit or implicit, of a right to 
contmue in employment mdefinitely, free of compulsory 
termination at a specified age. I am particularly mind-
ful that a decision to the contrary in this case-where the 
State has an interest as both legislator and employer~ 
would represent a serious intrusion upon the State's flex~ 
ibility in determining the qualifications necessary to en-
sure that law enforcement personnel have optimum 
fitness and morale and in developing an ordered pension 
and retirement plan for its employees. 
For reasons different from those relied upon by the 
Court, I also conclude that the class of persons subject to 
compulsory termination under Massachusetts' statute 
does not constitute a suspect class. The "traditional in~ 
dicia of suspectness" were defined in Rodriguez, supra, at 
28. We are to consider whether 
"the class 'is . 0 0 saddled with such disabilities, or 
subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal 
treatment, or relegated to such a position of political 
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protec-
tion from the ma,toritarian political process." 
There ts no indicatiOn m any of our cases that evidence 
of high numerical representation in the state legislatures 
OJ" the existence of a body of remedial legislation is alone 
sufficient to remove a group that demonstrates the other 
indicia-of special disabilities or a history of discrimina-
tory treatment-from the category of suspect classes. 
An exemptiOn from categorization as a suspect Class· 
based on the existence of remedial legislation, for ex-· 
ample, could penalize those who properly seek legislative· 
rather than JUdicial solutions to problems of discrimina-
tiOn It also ignores the fact that state, as well as fed-· 
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Negroes, a class that few would contend is no longer in 
need of the special protection envisioned for them by the 
drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Strauder v. 
West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 (1880). Moreover, I be-
lieve 1t inappropriate for the Cou,rt to embark upon the 
task, highly charged with political ramifications, of evalu~ 
ating when a given group is sufficiently represented in 
the legislatures or sufficiently protected by legisl11tion to 
.i ustify a relaxation of strict judicial scrutiny. 
The class subject to the compulsory retirement feature 
of the Massachusetts statute consists of uniformed state 
police officers over the age of 50. Therefore, it cannot be 
said to discriminate only against the elderly. Rather, 
it draws the line at a certain age in middle life. Even 
if the statute could be said to impose a penalty upon a 
class defined as the aged, it would not impose a distinc-
tion sufficiently akin to those classifications that we have 
found suspect to call for strict judicial scrutiny. 
The Court's opinion acknowledges that persons of ma-
ture age have not suffered any deprivation of political 
power. Indeed, they may have a unique influence on the 
political decisionmaking, especially in those legislatures 
where leadership is allocated on a seniority basis. More-
over, such persons, unlike, say, those who have been dis-
crimmated against on the basis of race or national origin, 
have not experienced a uhistory of purposeful unequal 
treatment'' or been subjected to unique disabilities on 
the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truely indica-
tive of the group's abilities. Wheu those factors are 
present, there is reason to scrutinize state classifications 
carefully to ensure that they are not influenced by l.,lll-
founded assumptions about group characteristics that 
have no place in our constitutional system. Even old 
age does not define a "discrete and insular" group, see 
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152-153, n. 4 ( 1938), in need of "extraordinary protec~ 
tion from the majoritarian political process." Instead, it 
marks a stage that each of us will reach if we live out our 
normal span. There is no basis upon which to assume 
that state and federal legislatures will not deal fairly 
with persons as they age and be responsive to their needs. 
Under the circumstances, it is unnecessary to subject 
the State's resolution of competing interests in this case 
to strict judicial scrutiny in order to ensure that it is 
consistent with the requirements of the Equal Protection 
ClaUSf'o 
II 
In defining the test to be applied in this case, I am in 
basic agreement with the opinion for the Court. We 
must determine whether the Massachusetts' scheme "ra~ 
tionally furthers some legitimate, articulated state pur-
pose." San Antonio School Di$trict v. Rodriguez, 411 
U. S., at 17. The statute is presumed to be valid.2 
Perfection in the way in which the mel:+ns 'are adapted to 
serve the State's purpose is not requirecV But judicial 
review, even under this relatively relaxed standard, must 
have substance if the Equal Protection Clause is to have 
meaning. 
The term "legitimate" state purpose does not suggest, 
as MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST fears, that the Court is re .. 
2 See, e. g., San Antonio Sckool Dist'r-ict v. Rodriguez, supra, at 
40-41; Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940); Lindsley v. 
Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 7&--79 (1911) . 
The presumptiOn of validity is partiCularly strong with respect to 
the legislative judgment m areas of economics, taxation, and the 
allocatiOn of necessarily limited state resources . In addition to the 
cases cited, see, e. g., Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535 (1972); 
Rtcha.rdson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 81 (1971); Dandridge v. Wil-
liams, 397 U. S. 471, 484 (1970) 
8 See, e g., Rwhardson v Belcher, supra, at 84; Dandridge v. 
·w,.tliam81 .mpra1 at 485. 
., . . .. ~ 
,. 
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qutred to engage in a substantive review of the permissi-
bility of a State's objectives. Indeed, an inquiry of this 
sort is one of the factors that distinguishes traditional 
scrutif1.Y u;nder the Equal Protection Clause from the 
most searcring review appropriate when a suspect classi-
fication is involved. Se!=l, e. (J., In re Griffiths, 413 U. S. 
717, 721-722 (1973). The reqtJirement that .a State's pur-
pose be "legitimate" indicates only that the purpose must 
fall within the very broad range of powers entrusted the 
state legislatures and that it must not independf3ntly in-
fringe upon other constitutional restrictions. The State's 
purpose justifying the classification must not be illusory, 
a mere facade concealing the existence of an objective that 
is illegitimate in this very narrow sense. See McGinnis 
v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 276 (1973). 
I 
In this CftSe, .as the opinion for the Court points out, 
the purpose of the Massachusetts retirement scheme was 
clearly identified in the legislative history. ' We need not 
decide, therefore, whether a clearly identifiable purpose is 
always required. I think it clear, however, that our 
decisions increasingly have departed from th~ extremely 
relaxed standard of McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. 
1
S. 420, 
426 . (1961), which indicated that the constitutional 
requirements · are met ~'if any state of facts reasonably 
may be conceived to justify" a statutory discrimination. 
Rather, we have required that the state purposes to be 
served by the classification be capable of being discerned 
by some means short of hypothezation by a judge. See,. 
e. g., McGinnis v. Royst·er, supra, at 270. That is, they 
must be either expressly articulated by the legislature or 
clearly implicit in the statutory scheme.4 Ingenious 
4 '!'his is not to say that the Constitution requires the States to• 
·articulate, Ill a preamble or otherwise, the purpose of every legisla-
tive enactment. Although the inclusion of such preamblP.s is help-
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judges almost always will be able. to devise some basis 
for a state law. But the judicial function calls for a 
more genuine inquiry if the constitutional requirement of 
rationality is not to be meaningless. 
The great deference to which legislative accommoda-
tion of conflicting interests is entitled under this relaxed 
scrutiny rests upon the assumption that the political 
proce&s is most sensitive to the wishes of the people in 
a majoritarian democracy. It does not follow from this 
assumption, however, that it is appropriate for a court 
to devise or ifl1agine policy where none has been indi-
cated by the legislature or is clearly implicit from the 
action taken. The proper functioning of the political 
process is best served where the State bears the responsi-
bility of enacting legislation that is designed to serve 
identifiable policies or objectives. When legislation is· 
enacted ag11inst such a background, the Court has some 
guarantee that the legislature has' focuseq on the problem 
and also that its decision has received a public airing.5 
In such circm~stances, deference to the decision of the 
State is not only appropriate, but required by the de-
mands of the separation of powers doctrine and our 
federal system. 
The necessary relationship between the challenged 
classification and the articulated or clearly implicit state 
purpose has been defined in the Court's opinion as "fair 
and substantial." This term has been used by the Court 
In other cases applying traditional scrutiny.6 I have 
frequency, it is neither required or even desirable with respect to· 
every piece of legislation. The purpose of most statutes is clearly· 
apparent from the face of the ena.ctment. 
6 See Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing· 
Court A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 
44 ( 1972) 
6 See, e. g, Johnson v Robmson, 415 U.S. 361,374 (1974), quot~· 
ing }f. S. Uou.~tPr Guano ro v. Virginia, 253 U . S. 412, 415 (1920) .. 
' .. 
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understood the term-as our conclusion in this case indi .. 
cates-to signify only that the relationship be rational, 
something more than trivial or illogical. A trivial or 
tllogical relationship would not only fail to comport with 
the requirement of ,rationality, but may indicate that the 
defined purpose actually m~sks an improper (for example, 
racially discrimi11atory) purpose. Where the means 
chosen is rationally related to the legislature's purpose, 
it need not be necessary or the best scheme devisable to 
serve the chosen end.7 Nor does the Constitution re-
quire that the classification be as narrowly drawn or 
precisely tailored as possible. Rather, it accepts the 
need to make rough accommodations in the course of 
devising political solutions. In · this case it is sufficient 
to say, as appellees concede, that physical ability declines 
with a.ge. Where, as here, the job is arduous and physi-
cally demanding1 requiring that those who hold it be in 
top physical condition, 'the State's decision to require 
retirement after a certain age comports with the require-
ments of the Equal Protection Clause. 
7 This further requirement is imposed only whep. the Court en~ 
gages m the most exactmg scrutiny' In re Griffiths, supra, 
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This case presents the question whether the provision  ._,1 
of Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 32, § 26 (3)(a), that a uni~ ~ J 
formed State Police Officer "shall be retired . . . upon his M~ ~;. ~ _ . ::.. .... 
attaining a~e tHty," denies appellee police offi£,¥r equal -,~-­
protection of t e laws in violation of the Fourteenth ~ ~ 
Amendment.
1 ~ ...£~~~ __ . __ 
1 Uniformed State Police Officers are appointed under Mass. Gen. ~--
Laws Ann. c. 22, § 9A, which provides : JA ~ • -~ 
"§ 9A. Division of state police; additional appointments; rules and ~ ~ 
regulations; removals; training; expenditures 1"1) ·· 
"Whenever the governor shall deem it necessary to provide more ~  
effectively for the protection of persons and property and for the -
maintenance of law and order in the commonwealth, he may author- ~ ~ . " A 
ize the commissioner to make additional appointments to the division r -.~ J .. 
of state police, together with such other employees as the governor 
may deem necessary for the proper administration thereof. . . . 
Said additional officers shall have and exercise within the common- ~ • 
wealth all the powers of constables, except the service of civil process, ..lfl....-~ • 
and of police officers and watchmen . , . No person who has not r:::r;.. ._,_, 
reached his nineteenth birthday nor any person who has passed his rt S ~- _ 
thirtieth birthday shall be enlisted for the first time as an officer of 






2 MASSACHUSETTS BD. OF RETIREMENT v MURGIA 
Appellee Robert Murgia was an officer m the Uni-
formed Branch of the Massachusetts State Police. The 
Massachusetts Board of Retirement retired him upon his 
50th birthday Thereafter, appellee brought this civil 
action in the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Massachusetts, alleging that the operatiOn of 
§ 26 (3) (a) denied him equal protection of the laws and 
requesting the convening of a three-judge court under 
28 U. S. C. §§ 2281, 2284.2 The District Judge dis-
missed appellee's complaint on the ground that the 
complaint did not allege a substantial constitutional 
question. 345 F . Supp. 1140 (1972) , On appeal, the 
tion shall not apply in the case of the enlistment of any woman as 
such an officer . ... " 
In pertinent part§ 26 (3) provides : 
" (a) . . . Any . officer appomted under section nine A of chapter 
twenty-two .. who has performed service m the division of state 
police in the department of public safety for not less than twenty 
years, shall be retired by the state board of retirement upon his 
attaining age fifty or upon the exp1ratwn of such twenty years, 
whichever last occurs." 
" (b) Any . . officer ... who has performed service ... for not 
less than twenty years and who has not attamed . . age fifty in 
the case of an officer appomted under the smd sectwn nme A, shall 
be retired by the state board of retirement in case the rating board, 
after an exammatwn of such officer or mspector by a registered 
physician appomted by 1t, shall report m writmg to the state board 
of retirement that he IS physically or mentally incapacitated for the 
performance of duty and that such mcapacity is likely to be 
permanent." 
Since § 9A requires that new enlistees in the Uniformed Division 
be no more than 30 years of age, few retirements are delayed past 
50 until the exp1rat10n of 20 years' service 
2 .Junsdictwn was mvoked pursuant to 28 U S C. § 1343, 
and declaratory and InJunctive rehef was sought under 28 U. S C 
§§ 2201, 2202. The equal protectiOn denial was alleged to consti-
tuate a vwlatwn of 42 U S. C. § 1983 Appellee made no clmm 
under the Federal Age D1scnmmat10n m EmploymPnt Act of 1967, 
29 U S C § 621 pf' 8P(J 
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United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in 
an unreported memorandum, set aside the District Court 
judgment and remanded the case with direction to con-
vene a three-judge court. Upon a record consisting of 
depositions, affidavits and other documentary material 
submitted by the parties, the three-judge court filed an 
opinion that declared § 26 (3) (a) unconstitutional on 
the ground that "a classification based on age 50 alone 
lacks rational basis in furthering any substantial state 
interest," and enjoined enforcement of the statute. 
Murgia v. Massachusetts Board of Retirement, 376 F. 
Supp. 753, 754 (Mass. 1974). We noted probable juris-
diction of the Retirement Board's appeaL 421 U. S. 
974 (1975). We reverse. 
The primary function of the Uniformed Branch of the 
Massachusetts State Police is to protect persons and 
property and maintain law and order. Specifically, uni-
formed officers participate in controlling prison and civil 
disorders, respond to emergencies and natural disasters, 
patrol highways in marked cruisers, investigate crime, 
apprehend criminal suspects, and provide back-up sup-
port for local law enforcement personnel. As the Dis-
trict Court observed "service in this branch is, or can be, 
arduous. 1' 376 F. Supp., at 754. "[H]igh versatility is 
required, with few, if any, backwaters available for the par-
tially superannuated. 1' Ibid. Thus, "even [appellee's] 
experts concede that there is a general relationship be-
tween advancing age and decreasing physical ability to 
respond to the demands of the job." I d., at 755. 
These considerations account for the requirement that 
uniformed state officers pass a comprehensive physical 
examination biennially until age 40. After that, until 
mandatory retirement at age 50, uniformed officers must 
annually pass a more rigorous examination, including an 
electrocardiogram and tests for gastro-intestinal bleed.-· 
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ing. Appellee Murgia had passed such an examination 
four months before he was retired, and there is no dispute 
that when retired his excellent physical and mental 
health rendered him still capable of performing the duties 
of a uniformed officer. 
The record includes the testimony of three physicians : 
that of the State Police Surgeon, who testified to the 
physiological and psychological demands involved in the 
performance of uniformed police functions; that of an 
associate professor of medicine, who testified generally 
to the relationship between aging and the ability to per-
form under stress; and that of a surgeon, who also testi-
fied to aging and the ability safely to perform police 
functions. The testimony clearly established that the 
risk of physical failure, particularly in the cardiovascular 
system, increases with age, and that the number of indi-
viduals in a given age group incapable of performing 
stress functions increases with the age of the group. 
Appendix, at 77-78, 174-176. The testimony also recog-
nized that particular individuals over 50 could be capable 
of safely performing the functions of uniformed officers. 
The accociate professor of medicine, who was a witness 
for the appellee, further testified that evaluating the risk 
of cardiovascular failure in a given individual would 
require a detailed number of studies. !d., at 77-78. 
In assessing appellee's equal protection claim, the Dis-
trict Court found it unnecessary to apply a strict scrutiny 
test, see San Antonio Independent School District v. 
RodrigueJ_, 411 U. S. 1 (1973); Shapiro v. Thompson, 
3W U. S. 618 (1969), for it determined that the age 
classification established by the Massachusetts statutory 
scheme c uld not in any event wit stand a test of 
rati2.MJ.ity, see eed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 1 1971 . mce 
there had been no showing that reaching age 50 forecast 
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the District Court held that compulsory retirement at 
age 50 was irrational under a scheme that assessed the 
capabilities of officers individually by means of compre-
hensive annual physical examinations. We agree that 
rationality is the pro12.~ standard by which tote"St whether 
compUlsory retirement at age'"5o violates equal protection. 
We disagree, however, with the District Court's deter- , A .,J... 
IDination that tiie age 50 classification is not rationally ::;; ~ '\ 
related to furtherm ale 1timate state interest. 
e need only briefly state our reasons for agreeing 
that strict scrutiny is not the proper test for deter-
mining whether the mandatory retirement provision 
denied appellee equal protection. San Antonio Inde-
pendent School District v. Rodriguez, supra, reaffirmed 
that equal protection analysi; requires strict scrutiny of 
a legislative classification only when the classification 
impermissibly interfere with the exercise of a funda-
mental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage 
of a suspect class. Mandatory retirement at age 50 
under the Massachusetts statute involves neither 
situation. 
The requirement implicates no fundamental right of 
appellee. Although the "right to work for a living in 
the common occupations of the community is of the very 
essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that 
it was the purpose of the [Fourteenth] Amendment to 
secure," Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 41 ( 19,15), and 
although provision of due process procedural safeguards 
is often required as a condition to termination of gov-
ernment employment, Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134 
(1973), Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564 (1972) , 
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U. S. 474 (1959),8 the Court's 
decisions give no support to the proposition that the 
8 Appellee makes no claim of denial of procedural due process in 
the action of the Retirement Board. 
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\ Constitution guarantees a right of employment per se, --? '7 
d----.{invllinerable co u sory term1 10 a s es a " 
itimate governmental interes ee San Antonio In-
depen en Schoo Dtstrict v. Rodriguez, supra; Lindsey 
v. Normet, 405 U. S. 56 (1972), Dandridge v. Williams, 
397 U. S. 471 (1970) . Accordingly, we have expressly 
stated that a standard less than strict scrutiny "has con-
sistently been applied to state legislation restricting the 
availability of employment opportunities." Dandridge 
v. Williams, supra, at 485. 
Nor does the class of uniformed state police officers 
over 50 constitute a suspect class for purposes of equal 
protection analysis. Rodrigue~ observed that a su~t 
· class is one "saddled with such disabilities, or subjectea 
rc;-;uch a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or 
relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as 
to command extraordinary protection from the majori-
tarian political process." 411 U. S., at 28. While the 
history of the aged in this Nation is not wholly free of 
discrimination/ their influence in the political process tyv 
has brought them a high degree of success in making that 
process responsive to their needs. See, e. g., Pension Re-
form Act of 1970, 29 U. S. C. § 1001 et seq.; Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S. C. § 62i 
et seq., Older Americans Act of 1965, 42 U. S. C. /..:Sf, ~ he,.~ 
age discriminatiOn/ mcluding Massachusetts.6 The par- f? ve~"_1 · / 1 . IJ1A&J "\ l~t'stelP'-"1 Ter!J•Cb ../ 
4 Report of the Secretary of Labor, The Older American Worker : 
Age DiscnmmatJon m Employment (1965), Comment, 41 N. Y. 
U. L. Rev. 383, 383-388 (1966) . See also C. Townsend, Old Age . 
The Last SegregatiOn ( 1970) ; Symposmm · Law and the Aged, 17 
Ariz. L. Rev. 267 (1975) 
5 E. g., Cal. Unep. Ins. § 2070 et seq. (West 1972) ; Mich. Stat. 
Ann. ~§17.458(1), (3a) (1968), as amended (Supp.1975), NY. 
Human Rights Law §§ 290-301 (McKinney 1972), as amended 
(McKinney Supp 1975-1976) , Pa. Stat. Ann. tit, 43, §§ 951-963 
[Footnote 6 is on. p. ?'] 
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'ticipation of the aged in the functions of decisionmaking 
institutions at all levels and the continuing legislative 
concern at all levels for the problems of age discrimina-
tion and the elderly 7 demonstrate that the traditional 
political processes have not foundered, and thus classifi= 
cations based on age are not considered suspect,8 
(1964), as amended (Supp. 1975-1976) ; Tex. Rev, Civ. Stat. Ann. 
Art. 6252-14 (1970) . 
6 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 149, § 24A. Indeed, appellee asserts 
that the provisions of Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 32, § 26 (3) 
(a), do not comport with the State's statutory provisions against 
discrimination, ibid., cc. 149, 151B, and urges that "the Court must 
give weight to these legislative determinations" against discrimina-
tion. As to determmatwns under § 26 (3) (a), however, he makes 
no such contention, Brief for Appellee, at 59-61 
7 See, e. g., Senate SpeCial Committee on Aging, Developments in 
Aging : 1973 and January-March 1974, S. Rep. No 93-846, 93d 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) ; Senate Specml Committee on Aging, De-
velopments in Agmg. 1974 and January-Apnl 1975, S. Rep. No. 
94-250, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), Senate Specml Committee on 
Aging, Developments in Aging. 1972 and January-March 1973, S. 
Rep. No. 147, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) ; Senate Special Commit-
tee on Agmg, Developments in Agmg : 1971 and January-March 
1972, S. Rep. No. 92-784, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) , Hearings be-
fore the Subcommittee on Employment and Retirement of the Senate 
Special Committee on Agmg, 92d Cong. , 1st Sess. (1971), The Gov-
ernors Special Planmng CommisSIOn on Elderly Affairs, A Profile of 
Massachusetts Elderly (1971), Special Report of the Retirement 
Law CommiSSion, Mass. Leg. Doc., House No. 5900 (1973) . 
As appellee recognizes, the attitude of legislatures, including Massa-
chusetts', toward the problem of age discrimination in employment 
is one of favorable concern: 
"The thrust of the legislative policy as expressed in Congress and 
the state legislatures is to strike down classifications based upon 
generalized misconceptwns as to age, and to institute in their stead 
procedures to measure the individual's qualifications, abilities and 
needs, regardless of age." Bnef for Appellee, at 60. 
8 Johnson v. Robison, 415 U. S. 361 (1974), which sustained a 
federal legislative classificatton denying Veterans' educational bene--
l 
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We turn then to the inquiry appropriate in the absence 
of a need for strict scrutiny, that is, whether the classifi-
cation is "reasonable, not arbitrary, and ... rest [s] upon 
some ground of difference havin a fair and substantial 
re~ of th~ legislation. nson v. 
RObiso"ri,415"1t.' s. 361, 374 (19·74). See eber . Aetna 
Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U. S. 164 ; Reed v. 
Reed, supra. The substance of such inquiry is essentially 
whether the classification is reason~ly related to a leglli-
mate state objective. -
- '!'he n'assacfiusetts Legislature clearly identified a 
state interest to be promoted by the age 50 classi-
fication. Through mandatory retirement at age 50, 
the legislature sought to protect the public by assuring 
the physical preparedness of its uniformed police.9 The 
fits to conscientious objectors against a claim of denial of equal pro~ 
tection, stated: 
"Given the solicitous regard that Congress has manifested for con-
scientious objectors, it would seem presumptuous of a court to sub-
ject the educational benefits legislation to strict scrutiny on the 
basis of the 'suspect classificatiOn' theory, whose underlying rationale 
is that, where legishtion affects discrete and msular minorities, the 
presumptiOn of constitutiOnality fades because traditional political 
processes may have broken down." !d., at 375 n. 14 
9 A special legislative commission's report preceding the enact-
ment of the age 50 maximum for uniformed police stated: "The 
Division of State Police, by virtue of the work demanded of its 
members, undoubtedly requires comparatively young men of vigorous 
physique. The nature of the duties to be performed in all weathers 
is arduous in the extreme. . . , No argument is needed to demon-
strate that men above middle life are not usually physically able to 
perform such duties ." Mass. Leg. Doc., House No. 1582, at 8 
( 1938) . With these considerations in mind, the State's Commis-
sioner of Public Safety argued before the commission for provisions 
permitting retirement of State Police at 45. The commission ob-
served in response that it was "not prepared to say that the con-
tention of the CommissiOner of Public Safety, that [State Police] 
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legitimacy of this objective may not be gainsaid. See 
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479 (1960); Schware v, 
Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957). Appellee 
neither denies that this was the interest intended to be 
served nor disputes legitimacy.10 There remains then only 
the question whether mandatory retirement at age 50 
reasonably relates to the State's announced purpose. 
e are not unmindful that the age-based classifica-
tion here bears, in some important respects, a resem-
blance to the sex-based classification we invalidated as 
unreasonable inR eed v. Reed, supra. In Reed, as here, 
the classification was motivated by an overgeneralization 
as to the incompetence of a class to perform certain 
tasks. More significantly, age has some of the same 
characteristics attributed to sex in Frontiero v. Richard-
son, 411 U. S. 677 (1973), where another sex-based 
classification was invalidated: ~e, !£o, "is an immutable 
characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth,'Y 
matter of public policy." ld., at 8. The commission, however, de-
ferred the problem of setting retirement ages for the State Police 
to special study, their sole reason for not recommending age 45 being 
the anticipated pension costs to the State, not the reasonableness 
of the age with respect to job qualification. !d., at 7-9. Though 
the age 50 limitation was not specifically proposed by the commis-
sion, but was ultimately enacted by the legislature after further 
study, Act of Aug. 12, 1939, c. 503, § 3 (1939), Mass. Acts & Resolves 
737-738, it is apparent that the purpose of the limitation was to• 
protect the public by assuring the ability of State Police to respond 
to the demands of their jobs. See also Mass. Leg. Doc., House No. 
5316, at 16, 17 (1967), Mass. Leg. Doc., House No. 2500, at 21, 23-
25 (1955) . This purpose is also clearly imphed by the State's 
maximum age scheme which sets higher mandatory retirement ages 
for less demanding jobs. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 32, §§ 1, 3 
(2) (g), 26 (3) (a) (1966), as amended (Supp. 1975) . 
... 
1-'0 Brief for Appellee, at 20-23. The identification of this objec-
tive suffices to answer appellee's contention and makes unnecessary 
consideration whether prq,motion of the State's interest in providing 
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id., at 686, and "frequently bears no relation to ability 
to perform or contribute to society." Ibid. But in this 
case we deal with a classification affecting the interests 
of a group, which, in fact, clearly has considerable 
capacit for influencing policy decisions affectin their 
i~ewts. Tl;_us, un 1 e women, this is not a group that 
has been the _§_UQJ ect of conspiCUOUS a~rimination in 
that1's ";;,stly underrepresented_i!l 
his nation's decisionmaking councils." I d., at 6'"86 n. 17. 
t is in this regard that the s1£uah on in this case is unlike 
the situation in cases such as Johnson v. Robison, supra; 
James v. Strange, 407 U. S. 128; and Weber v. Aetna 
Casualty and Surety Co., supra. Accordrty ] great def-
erence is appropriately given to the leg1s a 1ve accommo~ 
dation!\ conflicting considerations relating to the State's 
announced purpose, and our inquiry ceases with a deter-
mination that the age 50 classification rationally relates 
to the furtherance of the State's announced objective. 
We turn to that deterl+liRation. 
Given that p~ysical ability generally declines with age, 
mandatory retirement at 50 does serve to remove from 
police service those whose fitness for uniformed police 
work has diminished with age and is, therefore, ration-
ally related to the State's objective.'-1. There is no indi-
11 Appellee seems to have suggested in oral argument that Mass. 
Gen. Laws Ann. §§ 1, 3 (2) (g), 26 (3) (a), also deny equal protection 
through the job classification established by them. Tr. of Oral Arg., 
at 14, 17-18. Any such argument, however, is unpersuasive. The 
sections do set a maximum retirement age for uniformed state 
officers which is less than that set for other law enforcement 
personnel. 
It has never been seriously disputed, if at all, however, that the 
work of state uniformed officers is more demanding than that of 
other state, or even municipal, law enforcement personnel. It is 
this difference in work demands that underlies the job classification. 
Mass. Leg Doc., House No. 2500, at 21-22 (1955) And it. is this 
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cation that § 26 (3)(a) has the effect of excluding from 
service so few officers who are in fact unqualified as to 
render age 50 a criterion "wholly unrelated to the objec-
tive of that statute." 12 Reed v. Reed, supra, at 75, 
That the State chooses not to determine fitness more 
precisely through individualized testing after age 50 is 
not to say that the State's purpose is not rationally fur-
thered by a maximum age limitation. It is only to say 
that with regard to the interests of all concerned, the 
State perhaps has not chosen the best means to accom-
plish its purpose.13 But where rationality is the test, a 
statute "does not violate the Equal Protection Clause 
merely because the classifications made by [it] 
perfect." Dandridge v. Williams, supra, at 485. 
' 0 
stitute our judgment for the legislature's, a result "far 
too reminiscent of an era when the Court thought the 
Fourteenth Amendment gave it power to strike down 
difference that renders the different employment requirements reason-
able and hence constitutional. 
12 Review of Massachusetts' maximum age limitations by state leg-
islative commissions has proceeded on the principle that "maximum 
retirement age for any group of employees should be that age at 
which the efficiency of a large majority of the employees in the 
group is such that it is in the public interest that they retire." 
Final Report of the Special Commission to Study and Revise the 
Laws Relating to Retirement Systems and Pensions, Mass. Leg. Doc., 
House No. 2500, at 7 (1955) . 
13 Indeed, were it not for the existing annual individual examina~ 
tions through age 50, appellee would concede the rationality of man-
datory retirement at 50. Tr. of Oral Arg., at 22-23. The introduc-
tion of individual examinations, however, hardly defeats the 
rationality of the State's scheme. In fact, it augments ration-
ality since the legislative judgment to avoid the risk posed by e.ven 
the healthiest fifty-year-old officers would be implemented by annual 
individual examinations between ages 40 and 50 which serve to 
eliminate those younger officers who are not at least as healthy as 
the best fifty-year-old officers. 
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state laws 'because they may be unwise, improvident, or 
out of harmony with a particular school of thought.' " 
Id., at 484. 
We do not make light of the substantial economic and 
psychological effects premature and compulsory retire-
ment can have on an individual, or of the stifled ability 
of the aged to contribute to society. These problems 
have been well documented and are beyond serious dis-
pute.14 But " [ w ]e do not decide today that the [Mas-
sachusetts statute] is wise, that it best fulfills the rele-
vant social and economic objectives that [Massachu-
setts] might ideally espouse, or that a more just and 
humane system could not be devised." Id., at 487. We 
decide only that the system enacted by the Massachu-
setts Legislature does not deny appellee equal protection 
of the law. 
The judgment is reversed. 
MR. JusTICE STEVENS took no part in the considera-
tion or decision of this case. 
14 E. g., M. Barron, The Aging American (1961); Cameron, Neu-
roses of Later Maturity, in Mental Disorders in Later Life 201 (2d 
ed. 0 . Kaplan 1956) , Senate Special Committee on Aging, 
Developments in Aging: 1971 and January-March 1972, S. Rep 
No. 92-784, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 48-53 (1972); Hearmgs before 
the Senate Subcommittee on Retirement and the Individual of the 
Senate Special Committee on Aging, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pts. 1 & 2. 
46-46, 87-101! 121-127, 212-217, 464-471 (1967) . 
CHAMBERS OF 
.:§u:prtlttt ~.c-url cf t!tt ~nittlt .;§fl:tf:tg 
~a:;!ringflt.tt.:!B. ~· 2.0,?'-1.;l 
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 
June 2, 1976 
Dear Bill: 
No. 74-1044 Massachusetts Board of 
Retirement v. Murgia 
Without addressing here some of our differing views as 
to how the standard of equal protection analysis should be 
framed, I write to clarify one point as to which there simply 
is a misunderstanding. 
The hypothetical Virginia statute, posed in your letter 
(pp. 14-17), rests on an assumption that I would require a 
single legislative purpose and that the challenged classifica-
tion be measured against the purpose of the statute as a 
whole. This is not my view. I would require that the means 
chosen by the legislature be rationally related to the 
purpose of the particular classification under attack. In 
addition a rational relationship to any one of several express 
or implicit purposes would be sufficient. 
In my view, the statute you describe would contain no 
constitutional infirmities. The grandfather clause would 
be rationally related to the purpose of avoiding immediate 
imposition of a financial burden on those who already have 
acquired and begun operating trucks without contemplating 
the requirements of the new statute. And the exception for 
agricultural equipment would be rationally related to the 
objective of encouraging (or not destroying) the business of 
agriculture. Ordinarilly the Court would not consider whether 
these provisions serve or undercut the overall purpose of the 
Act. 
I will clarify this point in any subsequent circulation 
of the memorandum. 
Sincerely, 




TO: Chris Whitman DATE: June 2, 1976 
F. Powell, Jr. 
Murgia 
this brief memorandum at home (Tuesday night) 
have found time - at long last - to read your memorandum 
commenting on Rehnquist's memo in Murgia. 
We have been under such pressure to meet the June 1 
"deadline" that I have not reported to you on my rather dis-
quieting talk with Justice Stewart. He is "hung up" as others 
have been, with our favorite paragraph on purpose. This is 
the same paragraph Justice Stewart wished us to take out, 
but Justice Brennan insists - at least until now - that we 
" retain. , 1.' .. 
Justice White conceded that he had told Bill Brennan 
he would join the draft. More careful study (and possibly 
Rehnquist's circulation) seem to have left Justice White 
undecided. He indicated that he might suggest some changes. 
' ,, 
I have been awaiting further word from him. . ' 
Although I am more than a little bit discouraged as to 
the prospect of holding four of us together, I do think it 
is desirable to correct Bill Rehnquist's misapprehension as 






'Ji_; .1'1 1 .. \. 
2. 
&ather than change the opinion itself without having 
heard from White, I would appreciate your drafting a letter 
to Rehnquist on this point, stating also that it will be 
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'. 
lfp/ss 6/4/76 Rider B, p. tO (Murgia) 
13. Of course, ascertainn~nt of purpose by a 
state court should be respected, and substantial weight 
also should be given to the interpretation by the 
administrative or executive agency charged with a statute's 
enforcement. 
We do note that the proper functioning of the political 
process usually is best served where the policies or 
objectives of the legislature are identified at the time 
of enactment. When legislation is enacted against such a 
background, there is greater assurance that the legislature 
has focused on the problem. 
lfp/ss ~ 14/76 Rider A, • 10 (Murgia) 
~ -
' 
Identification of the state purpose normally presents 
little difficulty. Although the purpose may not be imagined, 






"; uere is my r_revision of Murgia. 
'' I have omitted the discussion of purpose (p. 11) that 
Bill ~ennan and .... l liked, but that troubled several of you. 
:it,';\(( ' ~~~. ~· ;•. 
In my view, the memorandum reflects no change in ~ 
Equal Protection· doctrine. , .. l ·~t ~ , 
~ . . 
Although Bill 
to the Conference, 
opinion that omits 
discussion of 
88 
Brennan approves of my resubmitting this 
I understand that be will not join an 
- as this memorandum now does - the , 
referred to above. '' ' 
.~:·' .· ..... 






JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
.:§ltlfl"tmt <!fomt of tlrt 'J!;tnittb ;§tatts 
Jras4ittghm. ~. <!f. 2ll~Jl.~ 
June 9, 1976 
Re: No. 74-1044 - Massachusetts Bd of Retirement v. Murgia 
Dear Lewis: 
As you know, I have come full circle more than once 
in this case; and I apologize if I have wasted your and Bill 
Brennan's time, particularly since I now find that I much 
prefer to put aside any effort to pacify the law review 
critics or commentators and to attempt to clarify our equal 
protection standards for the benefit of the district judges 
and courts of appeals. 
One reason, among others, driving me in this direc-
tion is the fact that you have joined Ha~ry Blackrnun's 
opinions in Lucas, No. 75-88, and Norton, No. 74-6212. I 
had thought that your Murgia draft intended to redefine and 
somewhat stiffen the rationality test by requiring a demon-
stration that the classification bears a fair and substantial 
relationship to the ascertained purpose or purposes of the 
statute. Yet in Lucas and Norton, equal protection cases in 
which you would apply the fair and substantial relationship 
test, the sole justification for the classification appears 
to be administrative convenience which is no more than a 
secondary purpose at best. If this consideration alone 
satisfies the test, then it is even less help than the un-
adorned rationality standard. Rather than confuse the law 
further, I would prefer that Murgia be decided in the name 
of rationality only, as it easily could be. I am of the 
same opinion with respect to Lucas and Norton. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
~~ 
Copies to Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
;iuprtntt <I}O'ttrl d tlrt ~th .~ftdtg 
-u.lfittghm. ~. <!}. 211~~~ 
June 9, 1976 
Re: No. 74-1044 - Massachusetts Board of 
Retirement v. Murgia 
Dear Lewis: 
/ 
Your most recent draft in this case has accommodated 
many of the concerns I expressed as to the earlier draft, 
and with the end of the Term hopefully in view, I will try 
to do some accommodating of my own. I joined Harry's 
Mathews v. Lucas opinion notwithstanding my disagreement 
with some of the language relating to the Equal Protection 
Clause test, and I am willing to join your opinion on 
pretty much the same basis. That basis is that neither of 
these cases be treated as a definitive reassessment of the 
proper standard of review where only minimum scrutiny is 
to be applied. 
I fu11damentally disagree with your stress on "purpose", 
as if this were an element which could be wholly isolated 
from the enacted statute itself, with some "ends-means" test 
then being applied to see how good a job the legislature did 
in working from its purpose to the enactment of the law. I 
recognize, however, that there is language in some of our cases 
which can be read to support that sort of test. I also 
disagree with the language in your opinion which seems to 
restrict the ability of courts to uphold statutes ("purpose 
may not be imagined," p. 11), and with other language which 
- 2 -
seems to expand their authority to strike statutes down 
("distinction must be genuinely related to the state's 
purpose," p. 13). I will swallow my objections, however, 
if the resolution of this battle is by agreement to be 
left for another day. 
Because of all the internal exchanges that have 
taken place in this case, I think that if we are to 
agree on an opinion, and also to agree that the opinion 
is not to be a definitive restatement of the Equal 
Protection standard, that opinion ought to keep alive both 
sides of the doctrinal dispute. I can subscribe to an 
opinion containing your "purpose" analysis, even though I 
disagree with it, if you will include in some appropriate place 
in the opinion a quotation with approval of the standards set 
forth in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961). 
Admittedly this is inconsistent with your analysis, but it 
will not be the first time that an Equal Protection opinion 
has contained verbal inconsistencies. 
If, on the other hand, you feel strongly that this is 
a case in whichthe definitive reassessment ought to be made, 
I cannot join your opinion as it now stands, and due to the 




Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
,ju.prmtt <!fouri of tqt 'Jnittb ~btfts 
-.uftinghtn. ~. <!f. 2ll~~~ 
June 14, 1976 
/ 
Re: 74-1044 - Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia 
Dear Lewis: 
I remain of the view that McGowan v. Maryland is 
the sound test. I agree with Byron's memo of June 9 that 
federal judges are much confused and we owe an obligation 
to clarify, not rewrite, the ground rules. A McGowan 
reaffirmance will do that. 
Mr. Justice Powell 




No. 74-1044 Massachusetts Board v. MUrsia 
' ' 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
Here is a suggested Per Curiam that would dispose of 
Murgia. · 
It . is about as blandly written as one can write to 
dispose of the equal protection arguments advanced in this 
case. It leaves, I think, each of us free to "fight again 
another day" as to our respective perceptions of a proper 
formulation of equal protection analysis. . , 
Bill Brennan has seen this "bare-bones" draft, and 
subject to one relatively minor change - he thinks he could 
join it as a Per Curiam opinion. He does, however, have certain 
reservations that he will mention at Thursday's Conference. · 
Bill is not disposed to join even this Per Curiam if other 
Justices still wish to write. I have assured Bill my zeal 
for writing has been so thoroughly dampened by this spring's 
experience, that it may be sometime before l venture forth :,, .. 
again - although I suppose I will in due time. , 
Bill also bas Dukes in mind, and will discuss its posture 
in light of what we decide to do about Murfia. A possibility 
that I suggested to him is that we might d spose of Dukes in 
very much the same way, by a Per CUriam that leaves all options 
open. After all, Dukes is a "peewee". .. 
~ own view is that there~is much to be said for our 
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CHAM BER S OF" 
j;nprtmt {!ftrurl trf tlrt ~t~ j;tafts 
~rutfrittgLm. ~. <!f. 2llc?~.;l 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
June 16, 1976 
Re: No. 74-1044 - Massachusetts Board of Retirement 
v. Murgia 
Dear Lewis: 
I think you have done an admirable job at rewriting 
this opinion to satisfy the maximum possible number of your 
colleagues, and if you are willing to make two minor 
changes which I think are completely consistent with your 
own previous expressions on the subject, I shall be delighted 
to climb aboard. On page 9, the first two sentences in 
the paragraph beginning on that page now read: 
"That the State chooses not to determine 
fitness more precisely through individualized 
testing after age 50 is not to say that 
the State's is not rationally furthered 
by a maximum age imitation. ~Jls only 
to say that with re ard to the interests of 
all concerned, the ate perhaps has not 
chosen the to accomplish its 
purpose." 
Would you be willing bstitute for the phrase 
"State's purpose" in the first sentence, the phrase "objective 
y of Iaximizing physical prepare ness", and to substitute 
f for ~"its" in the sec nd sentence the word "this". 





allowance for the concept of secondary purposes which the 
legislature may have had in mind in enacting the statute, 
and I gather from your response to my hypothetical about 
the Virginia and West Virginia safety equipment statutes 
that you fully agree that secondary purposes are relevant 
in applying the standards you set forth. 
Sincerely~ 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copy to Mr. Justice Stewart~ 
J;u:p-rtmt <!fcurl cf t4t 'JI;lnitth J;tattg 
Jfagltittghtn. !9. <!f. 2llbiJ!.~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
June 16, 1976 
Re: No. 74-1044 - Massachusetts Board of 
Retirement v. Murgia 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to Conference 
/ 
CHAMBERS OF 
.ittpTtttu <!Joud of tqt ~nittb .itatta 
~aafrittgbm.18. <!J. 2llgt~~ 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
June 16, 1976 
No. 74-1044 - Massachusetts Board v. Murgia 
Dear Lewis, 
I agree with Bill Rehnquist' s suggested minor 
verbal change and hope you will see fit to make it. I 
would ask you also to delete the last sentence of fn. 8, 
since I cannot agree that whether something is constitu-
tional depends upon whether it is "reasonable't -- except 
perhaps in the Fourth Amendment area. 
If these very minor, and I hope noncontroversial, 
changes are made, I shall gladly join your proposed Per 
Curiam with no separate writing. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copy to Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
lfp/ss 6/16/76 
, -:. [6 'I Jl 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Chris Whitman DATE: June 16, 1976 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
' After this "circus" subsides with the end of the Term, 
and if you can bring yourself ever again to think about MUrgia, 
I would appreciate your putting our file in proper shape to 
go downstairs for permanent filing. 
Only you aa8 I possibly could be familiar with the 
gyrations through which this miserable case has passed, and 
sort out the drafts that should be retained (for a history 
of its checkered career) from those that are duplicates, or 
otherwise may be discarded. 
I particularly want the correspondence file to be complete, 
and in order. Also, w~ should have a copy of each of the 
various circulations. 
And, before you depart (sad thought!), please put my 
"· "equal protection" notebook in shape, including such Murgia 
data as you think appropriate. 
Maybe you will need a tranquilizeD before undertaking 





.iu.prtutt Q}O'Urlltf tlrt ~tb ~bdts 
-ulfinghm. ~. <If. 2llgt~' 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
June 16, 1976 
Re: No. 74-1044 - Massachusetts Board of Retirement 
v. Murgia 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, ~ 
~ 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
.iu:pTtmt (lfourt of tqt ~ttittb .imttg 
~agftinghm. ~. "f. 211gt~~ 
June 17, 1976 




I am glad to join the per curiam you have circulated 
in this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
~u:p-rtnu ~onrl ttf tqt 1Jtttitt~ ~fiifig 
~agltht¢tllt, ;!B. ~· 20.;tJ!..;J 
June l 7, l 9 7 6 
/ 
Re: No. 74-l 044 - Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. 
Mur ia 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me in the per curiam circulated June 15. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
•.·,,"' 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
,ju:.prtutt ~qttri l1f tlrt ~~ ,jtaftg 
:.u4htghtn. ~. ~· 2ll~,.~ 
June 1 7, 1 9 7 6 
Re: 74-1044 - Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia 
Dear Lewis: 
I join your per curiam of June 15. 
Regards, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
To: The Chief Justice 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Mr. Justice White 
Mr. Justice Blaokmun 
/ Mr. Justice Powell 
Mr. Justice Rehnquiat 
)(r. Justice Stevena 
From: Kr. Justice Marshall 
2nd DRAJT 
Circulated:-----
Reciroula ted: . \UN 2 1 197G 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAT:Im 
No, 74-1044 
Massachusetts Board of 
Retirement et al. , 
Appellants, 
v. 
Robert D. Murgia. 
On Appeal from the United 
States District Court for the 
District of Massachusetts. 
[April -, 1976] 
MR. JuSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting. 
Today the Court holds that it is permissible for the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts to declare that mem-
bers of its state police force who have been proven med-
ically fit for service are nonetheless legislatively unfit to 
be policemen and must be terminated-involuntarily "re-
tired"-because they have reached the age of 50. Al-
though we have called the right to work "of the very es-
sence of the personal freedom and opportunity that it 
was the purpose of the [Fourteenth] Amendment to se-
cure," Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 41 (1915), the Court ) 
finds that the right to work is not a fundamental right. 
And, while agreeing that "the treatment of the aged in 
this Nation has not been wholly free of discrimination," 
ante, a.t 6, the Court holds that the elderly are not a sus-
pect class. Accordingly, the Court undertakes the scru-
tiny mandated by the bottom tier of its two-tier equal 
protection framework, finds the challenged legislation / 
not to be "wholly unrelated" to its objective~ and holds, 
therefore, that it survives equal protection attack. l re~ 
spectfully dissent. 
I 
Although there are signs that its grasp on the law is: 
weakening, the rigid twa-tier model still holds sway as. 
74.-1044-DISSENT 
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the Court's articulated description of' the equal protection 
test. Again, I must object to its perpetuation. The 
model's two fixed modes of analysis, strict scrutiny and 
mere rationality, simply do not describe the inquiry the 
Court has undertaken-or should undertake-in equal 
protection cases. Rather, the inquiry has been much 
more sophisticated and the Court should admit as much. 
It has focused upon the character of the classification in 
question, the relative importance to individuals in the 
class discriminated against of the governmental benefits 
that they do not receive, and the state interests asserted 
in support of the classification. Marshall v. United 
States, 414 U.S. 417, 432-433 (1974) (MARSHALL, J., dis~ 
senting); San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 
U. S. 1, 98-110 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting); 
.Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S. 78, 90-91 (1971) (MAR~ 
SHALL, J., dissenting); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 
471, 519-530 (1970) (MARSHALL, J ., dissenting). See 
also City of Charlotte v. Local 660, Firefighters,- U. S. 
-, --, slip op., at 3 (1976); Memorial Hospital v .. 
Maricopa County, 415 U. S. 250, 253-254 (1974); Dunn 
v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 335 (1972); Kramer v. 
Union School Dist., 395 U. S. 621 , 626 ( 1969); Williams 
v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968). 
Although the Court outwardly adheres to the two-tier 
model, it has apparently lost interest in recognizing fur-
ther "fundamental" rights and "suspect" classes. See 
San Antonio School District v . .Rodriguez, supra (re .. . 
jecting education as a fundamental right); Frontiero v. 
Richardson, 411 U. S. 677 (1973) (declining to treat 
women as a suspect class) . In my view, this result is 
the natural consequence of the limitations of the Court's 
traditional equal protection analysis. If a statute in-
vades a "fundamental" right or discriminates against a 
1'suspect," class, it is subject to strict .scrutiny. If a stat ... 
·. 
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· ute is subject to strict scrutiny, the statute always, or 
1 nearly always, see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 
r 214 ( 1944)' is struck down. Quite obviously, the only 
critical decision is whether strict scrutiny should be in-
voked at all. It should be no surprise, then, that the 
Court is hesitant to expand the number of categories of 
rights and classes subject to strict scrutiny, when each 
expansion involves the invalidation of virtually every 
classification bearing upon a newly covered category.1 
But however understandable the Court's hesitancy to 
mvoke strict scrutiny, all remaining legislation should 
not drop into the bottom tier, and be measured by the 
mere rationality test. For that test, too, when applied 
as articulated, leaves little doubt about the outcome; 
the challenged legislation is always upheld. See New 
Orleans v. Dukes, - U. S. - (1976) (overruling 
Morey v. Doud, 354 U. S. 457 ( 1957), the only modern 
case in which this Court has struck down an economic 
classification as irrational). It cannot be gainsaid that 
there remain rights, not now classified as "fundamental," 
that remain vital to the flourishing of a free society, and 
classes, not now classified as "suspect," that are unfairly 
burdened by invidious discrimination unrelated to the 
individual worth of their members. Whatever we call 
1 Some classifications are so inv1dious that they should be struck 
down automatically absent the most compelling state intere::>t, and 
by suggesting the limitations of strict srruti11y analysis I do not 
mean to imply otherwise. The analysis should be accomplished, 
however, not by stratified notions of "suspect" classes and "funda-
mental" rights, but by individualized asset>sments of the partiCular 
classes and nghts involved in each case. Of course, the traditional 
suspect classes and fundamental rights would still rank at the top 
of the list of protected categories, so that in cases involving those· 
eategones analysis would be functionally eqmvalent to stnct scrutmy. 
Thus, the advantages of the approach I favor do not appPar in such 
eases, but rat1wr <'merge in those dealing w1th traditionally less; 
r.rotcctPd. classes and. rights. See pp. 5-13, infra 
. . · 
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these rights and classes, we simply cannot forgo all ju~ 
dicial protection against discriminatory legislation bear-
ing upon them, but for the rare instances when the legis-
lative choice can be termed "wholly irrelevant" to the 
legislative goal. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 
425 (1961) , 
While the Court's traditional articulation of the ra-
tional basis test does suggest just such an abdication, hap--
pily the Court's deeds have not matched its words. Time 
and again, met with cases touching upon the prized 
rights an,d burdened classes of our society, the Court 
has acted only after a reasonably probing look at the 
legislative goals and means, and at the significance of 
the personal rights and interests invaded. Stanton v. 
Stanton, 421 tJ. S. 7 (1975); Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 
420 U.S. 636 (1975); United States Dept. of Agriculture 
v. Moreno, 413 U. S. 528 (1973); Frontiero v. Richard-~ 
son, 411 U. S., at 691 (PowELL, J., concurring in the 
judgment); James v. Strange, 407 U. S. 128 (1972); 
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U. S. 
164 (1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438 (1972); 
Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71 (1971). See San An,.. 
tonio School Disftrict v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S., at 98-
110 (MARSHALL, J. , dissenting).2 These cases make clear 
that the Court has rejected, albeit sub silentio, its most 
deferential statements of the rationality standard in 
·assessing the validity under the Equal Protection Clause 
·of much noneconomic legislation, 
But there are problems with deciding cases based on 
factors not encompassed by the applicable standards. 
First, the approach is rudderless, affording no notice to 
interested parties of th~ standards governing particular 
2 See also Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, Foreword: 
In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court : A Model for .a. 
Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. l (1972) . 
.... · 
.. -' .. 
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cases and giving no firm guidance to judges who, as a 
consequence, must assess the constitutionality of legisla,.. 
tion before them on an ad hoc basis. Second, and not 
unrelatedly, the approach is unpredictable and requires 
holding this Court to standards it has never publicly 
adopted. Thus, the approach presents the danger that, as 
I suggest has happened here, relevant factors will be 
misapplied or ignored. All interests not "fundamental" 
and all classes not "suspect" are not the same; and it is 
time for the Court to drop the pretense that, for pur· 
poses of the Equal Protection Clause, they are. 
II 
The danger of the Court's verbal adherence to the rigid 
two-tier test, despite its effective repudiation of that test 
in the cases, is demonstrated by its efforts here. There is 
simply no reason why a statute that tells able-bodied 
police officers, ready and willing to work, that they no 
longer have the right to earn a living in their chosen 
profession merely because they are 50 years old should 
be judged by the same minimal standards of rationality 
that we use to test economic legislation that discrimi~ 
nates against business interests. See New Orleans v. 
Dukes, supra; Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 
483 (1955). Yet, the Court today not only ilFokes th~ 
minimal level of scrutiny, it wrongly adheres to it. Anal-
ysis of the three factors I have identified above-the 
importance of the governmental benefits denied, the char .. 
acter of the class, and the asserted state interests~ 
demonstrates the Court's error. 
Whether "fundamental" or not, "the right of the indi .. 
vidual .. . to engage in any of the common occupations 
of life" has been repeatedly recognized by this Court as 
falling within the concept of liberty guaranteed by the· 
Fourteenth Amendment, Board of Regents v. Roth, 40~ 
74-1044-DISSENT 
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U. S. 564, 572 (1972), quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262' 
U. S. 390, 399 (1923). As long ago as the Slaughter-
house Cases, Justice Bradley wrote that this right "is an 
inalienable right; it was formulated as such under theo 
phrase 'pursuit of happiness' in the Declaration of Inde-
pendence . . . . This right is a large ingredient in the 
civil liberty of the citizen." 111 U. S. 746, 762 (1884) 
(concurring opinion). And in Smith v. Texas, 233 U.S. 
630 (1914), in invalidating a law that criminally penal-
ized anyone who served as a freight train conductor with-
out having previously served as a brakeman, and that· 
thereby excluded numerous equally qualified employees 
from that position, the Court recognized that "all men 
are entitled to the equal protection of the law in their 
right to work for the support of themselves and families." 
ld., at 641. 
"In so far as a man is deprived of the right to• 
labor his liberty is restricted, his capacity to earn 
wa~s and acquire property is lessened, and he is· 
denied the protection which the law affords those·· 
who are permitted to work. Liberty means more · 
than freedom from servitude, and the constitutional 
guarantee is an assurance that the citizen shall be . 
protected in the right to use his powers of mind and' 
body in any lawful calling." !d., at 636. 
See also Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Perry 
v. Sinderman, 408 U. S. 593 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 40Z 
U. S. 535 (1971); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 
U. S. 589, 605-606 (1967); Schware v. Board of Bar Ex-
aminers, 353 U. S. 232, 238-239 (1957); Slochower v. 
Board of Higher Education, 350 U. S. 551 (1956); Wie-
man v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183 (1952); Truax v. Raich, 
239 U. S., at 41. Even if the right to earn a living does 
not include the right to work for the government/ it is; 
as ee BwrtiH oj Rei'!11bfs '\(.. Bot'h,.. 40S: U. S. 56A, 587 (1972.)'> 
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settled that because of the importance of the interest 
involved, we have always carefully looked at the reasons 
a.sserted for depriving a government employee of his job. 
While depriving any government employee of his job 
is a significant deprivation, it is particularly burdensome 
when the person deprived is an older citizen. Once ter-
minated, the elderly cannot readily find alternative em-
ployment. The lack of work is not only economically 
damaging, but emotionally and physically draining. 
Deprived of his status in the community anq of the 
opportunity for meaningful activity, fearful of becoming 
dependent on others for his support, and lonely in his 
new-found isolation, the involuntarily retired person is 
susceptible to physical and emotional ailments as a 
direct consequence of his enforced idleness.. . Ample 
clinical evidence supports the conclusion that mandatory 
retirement poses a direct threat to the healtp and life 
expectancy of the retired person/ and these cons!:lquences 
of termination for age are not disputed by appellant. 
Thus, an older person deprived of his job by the govern-
ment loses not only his right to earn a living, but, too 
often, his health as well, in sad contradiction of Brown-
ing's promise, "The best is yet to be/ The la.St of life, 
for which the first was made." 5 
Not only are the elderly denied important benefits 
when they are terminated on the basis of age, but the 
(MARSHALL, J ., dissenting). Appellee makes no such plaim; nor { 
does he allege that procedural due process requires that he be af8 
forded a hearing prior to termination. 
4 See American Medical Assn. (AMA) Comm. on Aging, Retire-
ment, A Medical Philosophy and Approach; M. Barron, The Aging 
American 76-86, and sources cited ( 1961) . Because, as one former 
AMA president bluntly put it, "Death comes at retirement," quoted 
in M. Barron, supra, at 76, the AMA has formally taken a position 
against involuntary retirement and has submitted an amicus brief 
in this case to inform us of the medical consequences of the practice. 
~ R. }l{ownin::, Rabbi Ben Ezra, St. l 
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classification of older workers is itself one that merits 
judicial attention. Whether older workers constitute a 
"suspect" class or not, it cannot be disputed that they 
eonstitute a Class subject to repeated and arbitrary dis-
crimination in employment. See U. S. Dept. of Labor, 
The Older American Worker : Age Discrimination in 
Employment (1965); M. Barron, The Aging Arfterican 
55-68 (1961). As Congress found in passing the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act in 1967, ' 
"[I] n the face of rising productivity and affiuence, 
older workers find themselves disadvantaged in their 
efforts to retain employment, and especially to re-
gain employment when displaced from jobs[.] 
"[T]he setting of arbitrary age limits reg~dle8s 
of potential for job performance has become a com-
mon practice, and certain otherwise desirable prac-
tices may work to the disadvantage of older 
persons[.] 
"[T] he incidence of unemployment, especially 
long-term unemployment with resultant deteriora-
. tion of skill, morale, and employer acceptability is, 
relative to the younger ages, high among older work-
ers; their numbers are great and growing; and their 
employment problems grave[ .]" 29 U. S. C. § 621 
(subsection numbers omitted) . 
See also ante, at 10 n. 1. 
Of course, the Court is quite right in suggesting that 
disinctions exist between the ·elderly and traditional sus-
pect classes such as Negroes, and between the elderly and 
"quasi-suspect" classes such as women or illegitimates. 
The elderly are protected not only by certain anti-dis-
crimination legislation, but by legislation that provides 
them with positive benefits not enjoyed by the public at 
large. Moreover, the elderly are not isolated in society, 
and discrimination against them is not pervasive but is 
7 4-1044-DISSENT 
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centered primarily in employment. The advants,ge of a 
flexible equal protection standard, however, is that it can 
readily accommodate such variables. The elderly are 
undoubtedly discriminated against, and when legislation 
denies them an important benefit-employment-! con-
clude that to sustain the legislation the Commonwealth 
must show a reasonably substantial interest and a 
scheme reasonably closely tailored to achieving that in-
terest. Cf. San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 
411 U. S., at 124-126 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). This 
inquiry, ultimately, is not markedly different from that 
undertaken by the Court in Reed v. Reed, supra. 
Turning, then, to the Commonwealth's arguments, I 
agree that the purpose of the mandatory retirement law 
is legitimate, and indeed compelling. The Common-
wealth has every reason to assure that its state police 
officers are of sufficient physical strength and health to 
perform their jobs. In my view,· however, the means 
chosen, the forced retirement of officers at age 50, is so 
overinclusive that it must fall. 
All potential officers must pass a rigorous physical ex-
amination. Until age 40, this same examination must be-
passed every two years-when the officer re-enlists-and,. 
a.fter age 40, every year. The Commonwealth has con-
ceded that "[w]hen a member passes his re-enlistment 
or annual physical, he is found to be qualified to per-
form all of the duties of the Uniformed Branch of the 
Massachusetts State Police." App. 43. See App. 52. 
lf a member fails the examination, he is immediately ter-
minated or refused re-enlistment. Thus, the only mem-
·bers of the state police still on the force at age 50 are' 
those who have been determined-repeatedly-by the 
'Commonwealth to be physica.lly fit for the job. Yet, alr 
of these physically fit officers are automatically termi-· 
·nated a.t age 50. The Commonwealth does not. 
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seriously assert that its testing is no longer effective 
at age 50,6 nor does it claim that continued testing would 
serve no purpose because officers over 50 are no longer 
physically able to perform their jobs.7 Thus the Com-
monwealth is in the position of already individually test-
ing its police officers for physical fitness, conceding that 
such testing it adequate to determine the psysical ability 
0 There may be an age at which passing a physical examination 
provides no substantial guarantee that the officer is fit for service 
for the coming yea.r. In that case, the test has lost its predictive 
ability. There is no showing that age 50 marks such a line-
although the Commonwealth asks us to hypothesize that it does-
and indeed the evidence seems contrary to that supposition. First, 
among officers aged 40-49, who undergo yearly examinations, there 
is no general trend of increasing rejections with age nor any sugges-
tion that those who passed the examination served in less than a sat-
isfactory manner. Murgia v. Massachusetts Board of Retirement, 
376 F. Supp. 753,756 (Mass. 1974) . 
This evidence presents no reason to assume that testing suddenly 
loses its predictive ability after age 50. The only relevant. studies 
presented are contrary to the Commonwealth's assumption. These 
studies support the conclusion that airline pilots should be termi-
nated at age 60 bec.o'\use after that age medical examinations lose 
their predictive ability. See Air Line Pilots Assn., Int'l v. Quesada, 
276 F. 2d 892 (CA2 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 962 (1961) , 
The suggestion that a.ge 50 is not the critical point for predictive 
ability is also supported by the national experience. Appellee has 
produced a study of the laws of the 50 States that shows that 
Massachusetts' 50-year-old retirement law IS the lowest in the 
Nation, and that no other State requires its state police to retire 
before age 55. Brief for Appellee, 37 n. 14. 
In short, I refuse to hypothesize that testing after age 50 loses 
its predictive ability when the Commonwealth has introduced abso-
lutely nothing that supports this position. 
7 Indeed, the Commonwealth has conceded that "[a]ny individual 
member of the Uniformed Branch ... whose age is 50 years or more 
may be capable of performing the physical activity required of the 
Uniformed Branch ... depending upon his individual physical con~ 
~dition." App, 44. See App. 52, 
74-1044-DISSENT 
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of an officer to continue on the job, and conceding that 
that ability may continue after age 50. In these circum-
stances, I see no reason at all for automatically termi-
nating those officers who reach the age of 50; indeed, 
that action seems the height of irrationality. 
Accordingly, I conclude that the Commonwealth's 
mandatory retirement law cannot stand when measured 
against the significant deprivation the Commonwealth's 
action works upon the terminated employees. I would 
affirm the judgment of the District Court.8 
8 The Court's conclusion today does not imply that all mandatory 
retirement laws are constitutionally valid. Here the primary state 
interest is in maintaining a physically fit police force, not a mentally 
alert or manually dexterous workforce. That the Court concludes 
it is rational to legislate on the assumption tha.t physical strength 
and well-being decrease significantly with age does not imply that 
it will reach the same conclusion with respect to legislation based 
on assumptions about mental or manual ability. Accordingly, a 
mandatory retirement law for all government. employees would stand 
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SUPBEME COURT OF THE UNITED STA~, 
No. 74-1044 
Massachusetts Board of 
Retirement et al., 
Appellants, 
v. 
Robert D. Murgia. 
On Appeal from the United 
States District Court for the 
District of Massachusetts. 
[February -, 1976] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL, memorandum. 
This case presents the question whether the provision 
of Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 32, § 26 (3)(a), that a uni~ 
formed State Police Officer "shall be retired ... upon his 
attaining age fifty," denies appellee police officer equal 
protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment,1 
1 Uniformed State Police Officers are appointed under Mass. Gen. 
Laws Ann. c. 22, § 9A, which provides: 
41Whenever the governor shall deem it necessary to provide more 
effectively for the protection of persons and property and for the 
maintenance of law and order in the commonwealth, he may author-
ize the commissioner to make additional appointments to the division 
of state police, together with such other employees as the governor 
may deem necessary for the proper administration thereof .... 
Said additional officers shall have and exercise within the common-
wealth all the powers of constables, except the service of civil process, 
and of police officers and watchmen. . . . No person who has not 
reached his nineteenth birthday nor any person who has passed his 
thirtieth birthday shall be enlisted for the first time as an officer of 
the division of state police, except that said maximum age qualifica-
tion shall not apply in the case of the enlistment of any woman as 
such an officer .... " 
In pertinent part§ 26 (3) provides: 
1
' (a) ... Any ... officer appointed under section nine A of chapter 
•• J • 
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Appellee Robert Murgia was an officer in the Uni-
formed Branch of the Massachusetts State Police. The 
Massachusetts Board of Retirement retired him upon his 
50th birthday. Thereafter, appellee brought this civil 
action in the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Massachusetts, alleging that the operation of 
§ 26 (3)(a) denied him equal protection of the laws and 
requesting the convening of a three-judge court under 
28 U. S. C. §§ 2281, 2284.2 The District Judge dis-
twenty-two . . . who has performed service in the division of state 
police in the department of public safety for not less than twenty 
years, shall be retired by the state board of retirement upon his 
attaining age fifty or upon the expiration of such twenty years, 
whichever last occurs." 
"(b) Any ... officer ... who has performed service ... for not 
less than twenty years and who has not attained . . . age fifty in 
the case of an officer appointed under the said section nine A, shall 
be retired by the state board of retirement in case the rating board, 
after an examination of such officer or inspector by a registered 
physician appointed by it, shall report in writing to the state board 
of retirement that he is physically or mentally incapacitated for the 
'performance of duty and that such incapacity is likely to be 
permanent." 
Since § 9A requires that new enlistees in the Uniformed Division 
be no more than 30 years of age, few retirements are delayed past 
50 until the expiration of 20 years' service. 
The question presented in this case was summarily treated in 
Cannon v. Guste, 423 U. S. 898, aff'g - F. Supp . . - (ED La, 
1975); Weisbrod v. Lynn, 420 U. S. 940 (1975), aff"g 383 F. Supp. 
933 (DC 1974); Mcilvaine v. Pennsylvania, 415 U. S. 986 (1974), 
dismissing appeal from 454 Pa. 129, 309 A. 2d 801 (1913). Our 
cursory consideration in those cases does not, of course, foreclose 
this opportunity to consider more fully that question. See Usery v. 
Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., - U. S. - (1976); Edelman v. 
Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 670-671 (1974). 
2 Jurisdiction was invoked pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1343, 
and declaratory and injunctive relief was sought under 28 U. S. C. 
§§ 2201, 2202. The equal protection denial was alleged to consti-
·tuate . a .viohttion of 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Appellee made no claim 
.. 
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missed appellee's complaint on the ground that the 
complaint did not allege a substantial constitutional 
question. 345 F. Supp. 1140 (1972), On appeal, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in 
an unreported memorandum, set aside the District Court 
judgment and remanded the case with direction to con-
vene a three-judge court. Upon a record consisting of 
depositions, affidavits and other documentary material 
sublr).itted by the parties, the three-judge court filed an 
opinion that declared § 26 (3)(a) unconstitutional on 
the ground that "a classification based on age 50 alone 
lacks rational basis in furthering any substantial state 
,interest," and enjoined enforcement of the statute. 
Murgia v. Massachusetts Board of Retirement, 376 F. 
Supp. 753, 754 (Mass. 1974). We noted probable juris-
diction of the Retirement Board's appeal. 421 U. S. 
974 (1975). We reverse. 
The primary function of the Uniformed Branch of the 
Massachusetts State Police is to protect persons and 
property and maintain law and order. Specifically, uni-
formed officers participate in controlling prison and civil 
disorders, respond to emergencies and natural disasters, 
patrol highways in marked cruisers, investigate crime, 
apprehend criminal suspects, and provide back-up sup~ 
port for local law enforcement personnel. As the Dis-
trict Court observed, "service in this branch is, or can be, 
arduous." 376 F. Supp., at 754. "[H]igh versatility is 
required, with few, if any, backwaters available for the par-
tially superannuated." Ibid. Thus, "even [appellee's] 
experts concede that there is a general relationship be-
tween advancing age and decreasing physical ability to 
respond to the demands of the job." I d., at 755. 
under the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 
29 U. S. C. § 621 et Meq. 
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These considerations prompt the requirement that 
uniformed state officers pass a comprehensive physical 
examination biennially until age 40. After that, until 
mandatory retirement at age 50, uniformed officers must 
pass annually a more rigorous examination, including an 
electrocardiogram and tests for gastro-intestinal bleed-
ing. Appellee Murgia had passed such an examination 
four months before he was retired, and there is no dispute 
that, when he retired, his excellent physical and mental 
health still rendered him capable of performing the duties 
of a uniformed officer. 
The record includes the testimony of three physicians: 
that of the State Police Surgeon, who testified to the 
physiological and psychological demands involved in the 
performance of uniformed police functions; that of an 
associate professor of medicine, who testified generally 
to the relationship between a.ging and the ability to per-
form under stress; and that of a surgeon, who also testi-
fied to aging and the ability safely to perform police 
functions. The testimony clearly established that the 
risk of physical failure, particularly in the cardiovascular 
system, increases with age, and that the number of indi-
viduals in a given age group incapable of performing-
stress functions increases with the age of the group. 
Appendix, at 77-78, 174--176. The testimony also recog-
nized that particular individuals over 50 could be capable 
of safely performing the functions of uniformed officers. 
The associate professor of medicine, who was a witness· 
for the appellee, further testified that evaluating the risk 
of cardiovascular failure in a given individual would' 
require a detailed number of studies. Id., at 77-78. 
In assessing appellee's equal protection claim, the Dis-
trict Court found it unnecessary to apply a strict scrutiny 
test, see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969), for · 
!t. determined that the age classification established by-
r• 
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the Massachusetts statutory scheme could not in any 
event withstand a test of rationality, see Dandridge v. 
Williams, 397 U. S. 471 ( 1970). Since there had been 
no showing that reaching age 50 forecast "imminent 
change" in an officer's physical condition, the Dis· 
trict Court held that compulsory retirement at age 
50 was irrational under a scheme that assessed the 
capabilities of officers individually by means of compre· 
hensive annual physical examinations. We agree that 
rationality is the proper standard by which to test whether 
compulsory retirement at age 50 violates equal protection. 
We disagree, however, with the District Court's deter-
mination that the age 50 classification is not rationally 
related to furthering a legitimate state interest. 
I 
We need state only briefly our reasons for agreeing 
that strict scrutiny is not the proper test for deter-
mining whether the mandatory retirement provision 
denies appellee equal protection. San Antonio Inde-
pendent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)~ 
reaffirm!')d that equal protection analysis requires strict 
scrutiny of a legislative Classification only when the classi-
fication impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a 
fundamental right 3 or operates to the peculiar disadvan-
tage of a suspect c1ass.4 Mandatory retirement at age 5() 
a E . g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973) (right of a uniquely 
private nature); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134 (1972) (right to· 
vote) ; Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969) (right of inter-
state travel); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23 (1968) (rights guar-
anteed by the First Amendment); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel .. 
Williamson , 316 U. S. 535 (1942) (right to procreate) . 
4 E . g., ·Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971) (alienage); 
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184 (1964) (race); Oyama v. 
California, 332 U. S. 633 (1947) (ancestry) . 
t' 
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under the Massachusetts statute involves neitheJ' 
~ituation. 
The requirement implicates no fundamental right of 
appellee. The determination whether an interest is fun~ 
damental "lies in assessing whether there is a right ... 
explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution." 
/d., at 33-34. Although the "right to work for a living in 
the common occupations of the community is of the very 
essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that 
it was the purpose of the [Fourteenth] Amendment to 
secure," Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 41 (1915), and 
although due process procedural safeguards are often 
required as a condition to termination of government 
employment, Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134 ( 1973), 
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564 ( 1972), 
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U. S. 474 ( 1959) ,S the Court's 
'decisions give no support to the prop~ition that the 
Constitution guarantees a right of governmental employ-
ment per se. See San Antonio Independent School Dis-
trict v. Rodriguez, supra; Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U. S. 
56 (1972), Dandridge v. Williams, supra. Accordingly, 
we have expressly stated that a standard less than strict 
scrutiny "has consistently been applied to state legis ... 
lation restricting the availability of employment op-
portunities." Dandridge v. Williams, supra, at 485. 
Nor does the class of uniformed state police officers 
'over 50 constitute a suspect class for purposes of equal 
protection analysis. Rodriguez, supra, at 28, observed 
that a suspect class is one "saddled with such disabilities, 
or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal 
treatment, or relegated to such a position of political 
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection 
5 Appellee makes no claim of denial of procedural due process in. 
'\he action of the R.etirement Board. 
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from the majoritarian political process." The aged have 
had a high degree of success in making the political 
process responsive to their needs. See, e. g., Pension Re· 
form Act of 1970, 29 U. S. C. § 1001 et seq.,· Age Dm. 
crimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S. C.§ 62i 
et seq.,· Older Americans Act of 1965, 42 U. S. C. 
§ 3001 et seq. Several States have legislation forbidding 
age discrirnination,6 including Massachusetts.7 The par-
ticipation of the aged in the functions of decisionmaking 
institutions at all levels and the continuing legislative 
concern at all levels for the problems of the elderly,8 
6 E. g., Cal. Unempl. Ins. § 2070 et seq. (West 1972); Mich. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 17.458 (1), (3a) (1968), as amended (Supp. 1975); N. Y. 
Human Rights Law §§ 290-301 (McKinney 1972), as amended 
(McKinney Supp. 1975-1976); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, §§ 951-963 
(1964), as amended (Supp. 1975-1976); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. 
Art. 6252-14 (1970). 
7 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 149, § 24A. Indeed, appellee asserts 
that the provisions of Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 32, § 26 (3) 
(a), do not comport with the State's statutory provisions against 
discrimination, ibid., cc. 149, 151B, and urges that "the Court must 
give weight to these legislative determinations" against discrimina-
tion. As to determinations under § 26 (3) (a), however, he makes 
no such contention, Brief for Appellee, at 59-61. 
8 See, e. g., Senate Special Committee on Aging, Developments in 
Aging: 1974 and January-April 1975, S. Rep. No. 94-250 (1975); 
Senate Special Committee on Aging, Developments in Aging: 1973 
and January-March 1974, S. Rep. No. 93-846 (1974); Senate Spe-
cial Committee on Aging, Developments in Aging: 1972 and January-
March 1973, S. Rep. No. 147, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); Senate 
Special Committee on Aging, Developments in Aging: 1971 and 
January-March 1972, S. Rep. No. 92-784 (1972); Hearings before 
the Subcommittee on Employment and Retirement of the Senate 
Special Committee on Aging, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); The Gov-
ernors Special Planning Commission on Elderly Affairs, A Profile of 
Massachusetts Elderly (1971); Special Report of the Retirement 
Law Commission, Mass. Leg. Doc., House No. 5900 (1973). 
As appellee recognizes, the actual attitude of legislatures, including: 
,.. 
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' 
including age discrimination, demonstrate that the trad!-: 
tional political processes have not foundered where in-
terests of the aged are at stake.9 
There is no indication in any of our cases, howeverl 
that evidence of high numerical representation in the 
state legislatures or the existence of a body of remedial 
legislation is alone sufficient to remove a group tha~ 
demonstrates the other indicia-of societally imposed 
special disabilities or a history of discriminatory treat... 
ment-from the category of suspect classes. An exemp-
tion from categorization as a suspect class based on the 
existence of remedial legislation, for example, could pe-
nalize those who properly seek legislative rather than 
judicial solutions to problems of discrimination. It also 
ignores the fact that state, as well as federal, legislatures 
have been responsive to the needs of Negroes, a class that 
few would contend is no longer in need of the special pro-
tection envisioned for them by the drafters of the Four-
Massachusetts', toward the problem of age discrimination in employ-
ment is one of favorable concern: 
"The thrust of the legislative policy as expressed in Congress and. 
the state legislatures is to strike down classifications based upon 
generalized misconceptions as to age, and to institute in their stead 
procedures to measure the individual's qualifications, abilities and 
needs, regardless of age." Brief for Appellee, at 00. 
9 Johnson v. Robison, 415 U. S. 361 (1974) , which sustained a 
federal legislative classification denying Veterans' educational bene-
fits to conscientious objectors against a claim of denial of equal pro-
tection, stated: 
"Given the solicitous regard that Congress has manifested for con-
scientious objectors, it would seem presumptuous of a court to sub-
ject the educational benefits legislation to strict scrutiny on the 
basis of the 'suspect classification' theory, whose underlying rationale· 
is that, where legislation affects discrete and insular minorities, the· 
presumption of constitutionality fades because traditional political 
~rocesses may have broken clown." !d., at 3'Z5 n. 14. 
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teenth Amendment. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 
u.s. 303 (1880). 
While the treatment of the aged in this Nation has not 
been wholly free of discrimination,lQ such persons, unlike, 
say, those who have been discriminated against on the 
basis of race or national origin, have not experienced a 
"history of purposeful unequal treatment" or been sub-
jected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped 
characteristics not truely indicative of their abili-
ties. When those factors are present, there is reason to 
scrutinize state classifications carefully to ensure that 
they are not influenced by unfounded assumptions about 
group characteristics that have no place in our consti-
tutional system. 
The class subject to the compulsory retirement feature 
of the Massachusetts statute consists of uniformed state 
police officers over the age of 50. It cannot be 
said to discriminate only against the elderly. Rather, it 
draws the line at a certain age in middle life. But even 
old age does not define a "discrete and insular" group, see 
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 
152-153, n. 4 (1938), in need of "extraordinary protec-
tion from the majoritarian political process." Instead, it 
marks a stage that each of us will reach if we live out 
our normal span. Even if the statute could be said to 
impose a penalty upon a class defined as the aged, it 
would not impose a distinction sufficiently akin to those 
classifications that we have found suspect to call for strict 
judicial scrutiny. There is no basis upon which to assume 
that state and federal legislatures will not deal fairly 
with persons as they age and be responsive to their needs. 
10 Report of the Secretary of Labor, The Older American Worker: 
Age Discrimination in Employment (1965); Comment, 41 N. Y. 
U. L. Rev. 383, 383-388 (1966). See also C. Townsend, Old Age: 
The Last Segregation (1970); Symposium: Law and the Aged, VT 
A:r.iz.. L. Rev. 267 (1975) . 
. . 
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Under the circumstances, it is unnecessary to subject 
the State's resolution of competing interests in this case 
to the degree of critical examination that our cases under 
the Equal Protection Clause recently have characterizeq 
11s "strict judicial scrutiny." 
II 
We turn then to examine this state classification under 
the rational basis standard. This inquiry employs a rei~ 
11tively relaxed standard reflecting the Court's awareness 
that the drawing of lines that create distinctions is pecu-
liarly a legislative task and an unavoidable one. Perfec-
tion in making the necessary classifications is neither 
possible nor necessary. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S., 
at 485. Such action by a legislature is presumed to be 
valid.11 Yet, even relaxed review of presumptively valid. 
legislative classifications must have substance if the 
Equal Protection Clause is to have meaning. 
Although the language used to formulate the rational 
basis standard or test has varied/2 more recently we have: 
indicated that a State's classification does not create an 
.invidious discrimination where it rationally furthers some 
identifiable legitimate state purpose. See San Antonio• 
School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S., at 17. 
11 See, e. g., San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, supra, at 
40-41; Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940); Lindsley v. 
Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911). This pre-
sumption is particularly strong in areas of economics, taxation, and 
allocation of necessarily limited state resources. See, e. g., Jefferson 
v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S .. 
78, 81 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S., at 484. 
12 The variety of our formulations and their application has 
given rise to considerable discussion in the literature. One finds 
a number of creative ideas. E. g., Wilkinson, The Supreme Court1 
the Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of Constitutional 
Equality, 61 Va. L. Rev. 945 (1975). 
"'·\!· 
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Identification of the state purpose normally presents 
little difficulty. We do require that the purpose be 
capable of discernment by some means short of hypothe .. 
sizing by a court or a lawyer in the course of litigation 
concerning the constitutionality of the statute. See, e. g., 
U. S. D. A. v. M arena, 413 U. S. 528, 536-538 ( 1973); 
NlcGinnis v. Royster, 410 U. S. 263, 270 (1973). That 
is, it must either be articulated by the legislature, appar-
ent from the legislative history, or clearly implicit in the 
statutory scheme.13 The great deference to which legis-
lative accommodation of conflicting interests is entitled 
under this scrutiny rests upon the assumption that the 
political process is most sensitive to the wishes of the 
people in a majoritarian democracy. It does not follow 
from this assumption, however, that it is appropriate for 
a court to devise or imagine policy where none has been 
indicated by the legislature or is clearly implicit from the 
action taken. The proper functioning of the political 
process is best served where the State bears the respon-
sibility of enacting legislation that is designed to serve 
identifiable policies or objectives. When legislation is 
enacted against such a background, the Court has some 
guarantee that the legislature has focused on the prob-
lem and also that its decision has received a public air-
13 This is not to say that the Constitution requires the States to 
articulate, in a preamble or otherwise, the purpose of every legis-
lative enactment. Although the inclusion of such preambles is help-
ful, and is a policy adopted by legislative bodies with increasing 
frequency, it is neither required or even desirable with respect to 
every piece of legislation. The purpose of most statutes is clearly 
apparent from the face of the enactment. Substantial weight' 
may be given to the contemporaneous interpretation by the admin-
istrative or executive agencies charged with a statute's enforcement. 
But where interpretation by administrative or executive agencies 
occurs first in the course of litigation care must be taken that such 
interpretation is not in effect hypothesizing by a lawyer. 
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ing.14 In such circumstances, deference to the decision 
of the State is not only appropriate, but required by the 
demands of our democratic system. 
The term "legitimate" state purpose does not suggest 
that the Court is required to engage in a substantive re-
view of the permissibility of a State's objectives. Indeed, 
an inquiry of this sort is one of the factors that distin-
guish rational basis scrutiny under the Equal Protection 
Clause from the more searching review appropriate when 
a suspect classification is involved. See, e. g., In re Grif-
fiths, 413 U. S. 717, 721-722 (1973). The requirement 
that a State's purpose be "legitimate" indicates only that 
the purpose must fall within the very broad range of pow-
ers entrusted the state legislatures and that it must not 
14 See Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing· 
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 
44 (1972). The principle that the Equal Protection Clause should' 
be applied so as to facilitate the functioning of our democratic 
processes is not novel. See Railway Express Agency v. New York,. 
336 U. S. 106, 112-113 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring): 
"Invocation of the equal protection clause, on the other hand·, 
does not disable any governmental body from dealing with the sub-· 
ject at hand. It merely means that the prohibition or regulation· 
must have a broader impact. I regard it as a salutary doctrine· 
that cities, states and the Federal Government must exercise powers 
so as not to discriminate between their inhabitants except upon 
some reasonable differentiation fairly related to the object of regula-
tion. This equality is not merely abstract justice. The framers of · 
the Constitution knew, and we should not forget today, that there · 
is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and un-
reasonable government than to require that the principles of law 
which officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed · 
generally. Conversely, nothing opens the door to arbitrary action 
so effectively as to allow those officials to pick and choose only a 
few to whom they will apply legislation and thus to escape the · 
political retribution that might be visited upon them if larger num-
bers were affected. Courts can take no better measure to assure · 
that laws will be just than to require that laws be equal in t 
operation." 
. ' 
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i11dependently violate other constitutional requirements. 
At the same time, the State's purpose asserted as justify-
ing the classification must not be illusory, a mere facade 
concealing the existence of an objective that is illegiti-
mate in this very narrow sense. See U. S. D. A. v. 
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973); McGinnis v. Royster, 410 
u. s. 263, 276 ( 1973). 
The Massachusetts Legislature clearly has identified a 
legitimate state purpose to be promoted by the age 50 
classification. Through mandatory retirement at age 50, 
the legislature seeks to protect the public by assuring 
the physical prepa.redness of its uniformed police.15 The 
15 A special legislative commission's report preceding the enact-
ment of the age 50 maximum for uniformed police stated: "The 
Division of State Police, by virtue of the work demanded of its 
members, undoubtedly requires comparatively young men of vigor-
ous physique. The nature of the duties to be performed in all 
weathers is arduous in the extreme. . . . No argument is needed to 
demonstrate that men above middle life are not usually physically 
able to perform such duties." Mass. Leg. Doc., House No. 1582, 
at 8 (1938) . With these considerations in mind, the State's Com-
missioner of Public Safety argued before the commission for pro-
visions permitting retirement of State Police at 45. The commission 
observed in response that it was "not prepared to say that the 
contention of the Commissioner of Public Safety, that [State Police} 
over age forty-five should be eligible to retirement, is unsound as a 
matter of public policy." !d., at 8. The commission, however, 
deferred the problem of setting retirement ages for the State Police 
to special study, their sole reason for not recommending age 45 
being the anticipated pension costs to the State, not the reasonable-
ness of the age with respect to job qualification. !d., at 7-9. 
Though the age 50 limitation was not specifically proposed by the 
commission, but was ultimately enacted by the legislature after 
further study, Act of Aug. 12, 1939, c. 503, § 3 (1939) , Mass. Acts & 
Resolves 737-738, it is apparent that the purpose of the limitation 
was to protect the public by assuring the ability of State Police to 
respond to the demands of their jobs. See also Mass. Leg. Doc., 
House No. 5316, at 16, 17 (1967); Mass. Leg. Doc., House No. 2500, 
at 21, 23-25 (1955) . This purpose is also clearly implied by th~ 
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legitimacy of this objective cannot be doubted. See 
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479 (1960); Schware V; 
Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957). Appellee 
neither denies that this was the interest intended to be 
served nor disputes its legitimacy.16 
Once an identifiable legitimate state purpose has been 
discerned, it remains necessary to evaluate the relation-
ship that the challenged classification bears to that pur-
pose. Indeed, this is usually the primary inquiry, as 
in most cases a legitimate purpose is readily identifiable. 
The making of value judgments as to the wisdom or de-
sirability of legislative purposes is not within the role 
of the Judicial Branch. But the means employed to at-
tain a purpose, the grouping or classification of persons, 
presents the focal point of inquiry under equal protection 
analysis. See Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine 
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Pro-
tection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1 ( 1972). The test under 
this standard of review is not whether the means 
selected were necessary or whether less drastic means 
may have achieved the legislative purpose; rather, the 
test is whether the means chosen are rational and bear 
"a fair and substantial relation" to that purpose. Roy- . 
ster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412, 415 (1920). 1 
Although the need for legislative accommodations must 
be respected, the distinctions made by a classification 
must be genuinely related to the State's purpose in en-
acting the legislation in question. Thus, in Johnson v.
1 
Robison, 415 u'. S., at 382-383, we found it significant 
State's maximum-age scheme, which sets higher mandatory retir&-
ment ages for lass demanding jobs. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 32, 
§§ 1, 3 (2) (g), 26 (3) (a) (1966), as amended (Supp. 1975). 
16 Brief for Appellee, at 20-23. The identification of this ob-
jective as one legitimate state purpose suffices. We need not con-
sider the further assertion that the retirement plan also promotes the · 
S_tat.e!s- intet:est in P.roviding economic security for its employees~. 
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that the "inclusion of one group promotes a legitimate 
governmental purpose, and the addition of other groups 
would not." See also Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715, 
723-730 (1972).17 
In this case, the Massachusetts statute clearly meets 
the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause. Since 
physical ability generally declines with age, mandatory 
retirement at 50 serves to remove from police service 
those whose fitness for uniformed work presumptively 
has diminished with age. This clearly is rationally re-
lated to the State's objective.18 There is no indication 
that § 26 (3)(a) has the effect of excluding from service 
so few officers who are in fact unqualified as to render age 
50 a criterion wholly unrelated to the objective of the 
statute.19 
17 Of course, the relationship may not be trivial or illogical, 
as this would fail to comport with the requirement of rationality and 
may indicate that the defined purpose actually masks an improper 
(for example, racially discriminatory) purpose. 
18 Appellee seems to have suggested in oral argument that Mass. 
Gen. Laws Ann. c. 32, §§ 1, 3 (2) (g), 26 (3) (a), also deny equal pro-
tection through the job classification established by them. Tr. of Oral 
Arg., at 14, 17-18. Any such argument, however, is unpersuasive. 
The sections do set a maximum retirement age for uniformed state 
officers which is less than that set for other law enforcement 
personnel. It has never been seriously disputed, if at all, however, that 
the work of state uniformed officers is more demanding than that of 
other state, or even municipal, law enforcement personnel. It is 
this difference in work demands that underlies the job classification. 
Mass. Leg. Doc., House No. 2500, at 21-22 (1955). And it is this 
difference that renders the different employxpent requirements reason-
able and hence constitutional. .. ~ 
lU Review of Massachusetts' maximum are limitations by state leg- <J 
islative commissions has proceeded on the principle that "maximum 
retirement age for any group of employees should be that age at 
which the efficiency of a large majority of the employees in the 
group is such that it is in the public interest that they retire." 
Final Report of the Special Commission to Study and Revise the 
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That the State chooses not to determine fitness 
more precisely through individualized testing after age 50 
is not to say that the State's purpose is not rationally fur-
thered by a maximum age limitation. It is. only to say 
that with regard to the interests of all concerned, the 
State perhaps has not chosen the best means to accom-
plish its purpose.20 But where rationality is the test, a 
statute "does not violate the Equal Protection Clause 
merely because the classifications made by [it] are im-
perfect." Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S., at 485. 
We do not make light of the substantial economic and 
·psychological effects premature and compulsory retire-
ment can have on an individual; nor do we denigrate the 
ability of elderly citizens to continue to contribute to 
society. The problems of retirement have been well doc-
umented and are beyond serious dispute.21 But "[w]e 
do not decide today that the [Massachusetts statute] is 
wise, that it best fulfills the relevant social and economic 
Laws Relating to Retirement Systems and Pensions, Mass. Leg. Doc., 
House No. 2500, at '7 (1955). 
20 Indeed, were it not for the existing annual individual examina-
tions through age 50, appellee ·would concede the rationality of man-
·datory retirement at 50. Tr. of Oral Arg., at 22-23. The introdue-
tion of individual examinations, 'however, hardly defeats the 
·rationality of the State's scheme. In fact, it augments ration-
ality since the legislative judgment to avoid the risk posed by e:ven 
the healthiest fifty-year-old officers would be implemented by annual 
individual examinations between ages 40 and 50 which serve to 
eliminate those younger officers who are not at least as healthy as 
the best fifty-year-old officers. 
21 E. g., M. Barron, The Aging American (1961); Cameron, Neu-
·roses of Later Maturity, in Mental Disorders in Later Life 201 (2d' 
ed. 0. Kaplan 1956); Senate Special Committee on Aging, . 
Developments in Aging: '1971 and January~March ' 1972, S. Rep .. 
No. 92-784, pp. 48-53 (1972); Hearings before the Senate Sub-
committee on Retirement and the IndiVidual of the Senate Special 
·committee on Aging, 90th Cong., 1st Sess ., pts.l & 2, 36-46, 87-10~ 
'1.71.:-1,;27, 212-21.7, 464-471. (1967). 
'• 
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objectives that [Massachusetts] might ideally espouse, 
or th~:~-t a more just and humane system could not be de-
vised." /d., at 487. We decide only that the system 
enacted by the Massachusetts Legislature does not deny 
appellee equal protection of the 1aw. 
The judgment is reverBed. 
Ma. JusTICE STEVENS took no part in the considera-
tion or decision of this case. 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, memorandum. 
This case presents the question whether the provision 
of Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 32, § 26 (3) (a), that a uni-
formed State Police Officer "shall be retired ... upon his 
attaining age fifty," denies appellee police officer equal 
protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment,1 
1 Uniformed State Police Officers are appointed under Mass. Gen. 
Laws Ann. c. 22, § 9A, which provides : 
"Whenever the governor shall deem it necessary to provide more 
effectively for the protection of persGns and property and for the 
maintenance of law and order m the commonwealth, he may author-
ize the commissioner to make additional appointments to the division 
of state police, together with such other employees as the governor 
may deem necessary for the proper administration thereof .... 
Said additional officers shall have and exercise within the common-
wealth all the powers of constables, except the service of civil process, 
and of police officers and watchmen. . . . No person who has not 
reached his nineteenth birthday nor any person who has passed his 
thirtieth birthday shall be enlisted for the first time as an officer of 
the division of state police, except that said maximum age qualifica-
tion shall not apply in the case of the enlistment of any woman as 
such an officer .... " 
In pertinent part§ 26 (3) provides : 
" (a) •.. Any ... officer appointed under section nine A of cha,Pter 
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Appellee Robert Murgia was an officer in the Uni-
formed Branch of the Massachusetts State Police. The 
Massachusetts Board of Retirement retired him upon his 
50th birthday. Thereafter, appellee brought this civil 
action in the United States District Court for the -Dis-
trict of Massachusetts, alleging that the operation of 
§ 26 (3) (a) denied him equal protection of the· laws and 
requesting the convening of a three-judge court under 
28 U. S. C. §§ 2281, 2284.2 · The District Judge dis .. 
twenty-two ... who has performed service in the division of state 
police in the department of public safety for not less than twenty 
years, shall be retired by the state board of retirement upon his 
attaining age fifty or upon the expiration of such twenty years, 
whichever last occurs." 
" (b) Any . . . officer ... who has performed service .. . for not 
less than twenty years and who has not attained . . . age fifty in 
the case of an officer appointed under the said section nine A, shall 
be retired by the state board of retirement in case the rating board, 
after an examination of such officer or inspector by a registered 
physician appointed by it, shall report in writing to the state board 
of retirement that he is physically or mentally incapacitated for the 
performance of duty and that such incapacity is likely to be 
permanent." 
Since § 9A requires that new enlistees in the Uniformed Division 
be no more than 30 years of age, few retirements are delayed past 
"50 until the expiration of 20 years' service. 
The question presented in this case was summarily treated in 
Cannon v. Guste, 423 U. S. 898, aff'g - F. Supp. - (ED La. 
1975); Weisbrod v. Lynn, 420 U. S. 940 (1975), aff'g 383 F. Supp. 
·933 (DC 1974) ; Mcilvaine v. Pennsylvania, 41.5 U. S. 986 (1974), 
dismissing a.ppeal from 454 Pa. 129, 309 A. 2d 801 (1973). Our 
cursory consideration in those cases does not, of course, foreclose 
this opportunity to consider more fully that question. See Usery v. 
Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., - U. S. - (1976) ; Edelman v . 
. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 670-671 (1974) . 
2 Jurisdiction was invoked pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1343, 
and declaratory and injunctive relief was sought under 28 U. S. C. 
§§ 2201, 2202. The equal protection denial was alleged to consti-
tl,l.a,te a ~iola~ion of 42 U. S. C. § !983. Appellee roa«1e ~o claim 
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missed appellee's complaint on the ground that the 
complaint did not allege a substantial constitutional 
question. 345 F. Supp. 1140 (1972). On appeal, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in 
an unreported memorandum, set aside the District Court 
judgment and remanded the case with direction to con-
vene a three-judge court. Upon a record consisting of 
depositions, affidavits and other documentary material 
submitted by the parties, the three-judge court filed an 
opinion that declared § 26 (3) (a) unconstitutional on 
the ground that "a classification based on age 50 alone 
lacks rational basis in furthering any substantial state 
interest," and enjoined enforcement of the statute. 
Murgia v. Massachusetts Board of Retirement, 376 F. 
Supp. 753, 754 (Mass. 1974) . We noted probable juris-
diction of the Retirement Board's appeal. 421 U. S. 
974 (1975) . We reverse. 
The primary function of the Uniformed Branch of the 
Massachusetts State Police is to protect persons and 
property and maintain law and order. Specifically, uni-
formed officers participate in controlling prison and civil 
disorders, respond to emergencies and natural disasters, 
patrol highways in marked cruisers, investigate crime, 
apprehend criminal suspects, and provide back-up sup-
port for local law enforcement personnel. As the Dis-
trict Court observed, "service in this branch is, or can be,. 
arduous." 376 F . Supp., at 754. "[H]igh versatility is 
required, with few, if any, backwaters available for the par-
tially superannuated." Ibid. Thus, "even [appellee's] 
experts concede that there is a general relationship be-
tween advancing age and decreasing physical ability to 
respond to the demands of the job." Id., at 755. 
under the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1961,. 
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These considerations prompt the requirement that 
'uniformed state officers pass a comprehensive physical 
examination biennially until age 40. After that, until 
mandatory retirement at a.ge 50, uniformed officers must 
pass annually a more rigorous examination, inCluding an 
electrocardiogram and tests for gastro-intestinal bleed-
ing. Appellee Murgia had passed such an examination 
four months before he was retired, and there is no dispute 
that, when he retired, his excellent physical and menta:l 
health still rendered him capable of performing the duties 
of a uniformed officer. 
The record includes the testimony of three physicians: 
that of the State Police Surgeon, who testified to ·the 
physiological arid psychological demands involved in the 
performance of uniformed police functions; that of an 
associate professor of medicine, who testified generally 
to the relationship-between aging and the ability to per-
form under stress; and that of a surgeon, who also testi· 
fied to aging and the ability safely to perform police· 
functions. The testimony clearly established that the 
risk of physical failure, particularly in the cardiovascular 
system, increases with age, and that the number of indi-
viduals in a given age group incapable of performing 
stress functions increases with the age of -the group. 
'Appendix, at 77-18, 174--176. The testimony also recog-
nized that particular individuals over"50 could be capable 
of safely performing the functions of unifoifmed officers. 
The associate professor of medicine, who was a witness 
for the appellee, further testified that evaluating the risk 
of cardiovascular failure in a given individual would 
require a detailed numoer of studies. Id., at 17-78. 
In assessing appellee's equal protection claim, the Dis-
trict Court found it unnecessary to apply a strict scrutiny 
test, see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 ( 1969), for· 
"it determined that the age classification established ~by· 
• .. 
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the Massachusetts statutory scheme could not in any 
event withstand a test of rationality, see Dandridge v. 
Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970). Since there had been 
no showing that reaching age 50 forecast "imminent 
change" in an officer's physical condition, the Dis-
trict Court held that compulsory retirement at age 
50 was irrational under a scheme that assessed the 
capabilities of officers individually by means of compre-
hensive annual physical examinations. We agree that 
rationality is the proper standard by which to test whether 
compulsory retirement at age 50 violates equal protection. 
We disagree, however, with the District Court's deter-
mination that the age 50 classification is not rationally 
related to furthering a legitimate state interest. 
I 
We need state only briefly our reasons for agreeing 
that strict scrutiny is not the proper test for deter-
mining whether the mandatory retirement provision 
denies appellee equal protection. San Antonio Inde-
pendent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), 
reaffirmed that equal protection analysis requires strict 
scrutiny of a legislative classification only when the classi-
fication impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a 
fundamental right 3 or operates to the peculiar disadvan-
tage of a suspect class.4 Mandatory retirement at age 50 
3 E. g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973) (right of a uniquely 
private nature); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134 (1972) (right to 
vote); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969) (right of inter-
state travel); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23 (1968) (rights guar-
anteed by the First Amendment); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. 
Williamson, 316 U. S. 535 (1942) (right to procreate) . 
1 E . g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971) (alienage') ; 
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184 (1964) (race'); Oyama w. 
Califorma, 332 U. S. 633 (1947) (ancestry) . 
. ' 
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under the Massachusetts statute involves neither 
situation. 
The requirement implicates no fundamental right of 
appellee. The determination whether an interest is fun-
damental "lies in assessing whether there is a right ... 
explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.'' 
!d., at 33-34. Although the "right to work for a living in 
· the common occupations of the community is of the very 
essence of the personal freedom and opportunity · that 
it was the purpose of the [Fourteenth] Amendment to 
secure," Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 41 (1915), and 
although due process procedural safeguards are often 
required as a condition to termination of government. 
employment, Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134 (1973), 
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564 (1972), 
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U. S. 474 (1959), 5 the Court's 
. decisions give no ·support' to the prop08ition· that the 
Constitution guarantees a right of governmental employ-
ment per se. See San Antonio Independent School Dis-
trict v. Rodriguez, supra; Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U. S. 
56 (1972), Dandridge v. Williams, supra. Ac~ordingly, 
we have expressly stated that a standard less than strict 
scrutiny "has consistently been applied to state legis-
lation restricting the availability ·of employment · op-
portunities." Dandndge v. Williams, supra, at 485. 
Nor does the · class of uniformed ~tate police officers 
' over 50 constitute a suspect class for purposes of equal 
protection analysis. Rodriguez, supra, at 28, observed 
that a suspect class is one "saddled with such disabilities, 
or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal 
treatment, or relegated to such a position of political 
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection 
5 Appellee makes no claim of denial of procedutal 'due process in 
'the action of the Retirement ~rd . 
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from the majoritarian political process." The aged have 
had a high degree of success in making the political 
process responsive to their needs. See, e. g., Pension Re· 
form Act of 1970, 29 U. S. C. § 1001 et seq.,· Age Dis· 
crimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U. S. C. § 62i 
et seq.; Older Americans Act of 1965, 42 U. S. C. 
§ 3001 et seq. Several States have legislation forbidding 
age discrimination,6 including Massachusetts.7 The par-
ticipation of the aged in the functions of decisionmaking 
institutions at all levels and the continuing legislative 
concern at all levels for the problems of the elderly,8 
6 E. g., Cal. Unempl. Ins. § 2070 et seq. (West 1972); Mich. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 17.458 (1), (3a) (1968), as amended (Supp. 1975); N. Y. 
Human Rights Law §§ 290-301 (McKinney 1972), as amended 
(McKinney Supp. 1971}-1976); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, §§ 951-963 
(1964), as amended (Supp. 1971}-1976); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. 
Art. 6252-14 (1970). 
7 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 149, § 24A. Indeed, appellee asserts 
that the provisions of Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 32, § 26 (3) 
(a), do not comport with the State's statutory provisions against 
discrimination, ibid., cc. 149, 151B, and urges that "the Court must 
give weight to these legislative determinations" against discrimina-
tion. As to determinations under § 26 (3)(a), however, he makes 
no such contention, Brief for Appellee, at 59-61. 
8 See, e. g., Senate Special Committee on Aging, Developments in 
Aging: 1974 and January-April 1975, S. Rep. No. 94-250 (1975); 
Senate Special Committee on Aging, Developments in Aging: 1973 
and January-March 1974, S. Rep. No. 93-846 (1974); Senate Spe-
cial Committee on Aging, Developments in Aging: 1972 and January-
March 1973, S. Rep. No. 147, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); Senate 
Special Committee on Aging, Developments in Aging: 1971 and 
January-March 1972, S. Rep. No. 92-784 (1972); Hearings before 
the Subcommittee on Employment and Retirement . of the Senate 
Special Committee on Aging, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); The Gov-
ernors Special Planning Commission on Elderly Affairs, A Profile of 
Massachusetts Elderly (1971); Special Report of the Retirement 
Law Commission, Mass. Leg. Doc., House No. 5900 (1973). 
Ail appellee recognizes, the actual attitude of legislatures, including 
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including age discrimination, demonstrate that the tradi .. 
tional political processes have not foundered where in-
terests of the aged are at stake.9 
There is no indication in any of our cases, howeve,r, 
that evidence of high numerical representation in the 
state legislatures or the existence of a body of remedial 
'legislation is alone sufficient ·to .remove a group th&t 
demonstrates the other indicia-of societally imposed 
special disabilities or a history of discriminatory treat,. 
ment-from the category of suspect classes. An exemp,. 
tion from categorization as a suspect class based on the 
existence of remedial legislation, for example, could pe,.. 
nalize those who properly seek legislative rather than 
judicial solutions to problems of discrimination. It a1s() 
ignores the fact that state, as well as federal, legislatures 
have been responsive to the needs of Negroes, a class that 
few would contend is no longer in need of the special pro-
tection envisioned for them by the drafters of the Four~ 
Massachusetts', toward the problem of age discrimination in employ-
ment is one of favorable concern: 
"The thrust of the legislative policy as expressed in Congress and 
the state legislatures is to strike down classifications based upon 
generalized misconceptions as to age, and to institute in their stead 
procedures to measure the individual's qualifications, abilities and 
needs, regardless of age:)) Brief for Appellee, at ~0. 
9 Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974), which sustained a 
federal legislative classification denyin~ Veterans' educational bene-
fits to conscientious objectors a~ainst a claim: of denial of equal pro-
tection, stated: 
"Given the solicitous regard that ·congress has manifested for con-
scientious objectors, it would seem presUlnptuous of a court to sub-
ject the educational benefits legislation to strict scrutiny on the 
basis of the 'suspect classification' theory, whose underlying rationale 
is that, where legislation affects discrete and insular minorities, the 
presumption of constitutionality fades because traditienal political 
:processes may have broken -down." J.d., at 375 n. 14. 
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teenth Amendment. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 
u.s. 303 (1880). 
While the treatment of the aged in this Nation has not 
been wholly free of discrimination,'0 such persons, unlike, 
say, those who have been discriminated against on the 
basis of race or national origin, have not experienced a 
"history of purposeful unequal treatment" or been sub-
jected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped 
characteristics not truely indicative of their abili-
ties. When those factors are present, there is reason to 
scrutinize state classifications carefully to ensure that. 
they are not influenced by unfounded assumptions about 
group characteristics that have no place in our consti-
tutional system. 
The class subject to the compulsory retirement feature· 
of the Massachusetts statute consists of uniformed state· 
police officers over the age of 50. It cannot be 
said to discriminate only against the elderly. Rather, it. 
draws the line at a certain age in middle life. But even 
old age does not define a "discrete and insular" group, see 
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 
152-153, n. 4 (1938), in need of "extraordinary protec-
tion from the majoritarian political process." Instead, it 
marks a stage that each of us will reach if we live out 
our normal span. Even if the statute could be said to 
impose a penalty upon a class defined as the aged, it 
would not impose a distinction sufficiently akin to those 
classifications that we have found suspect to call for strict 
judicial scrutiny. There is no basis upon which to assume 
that state and federal legislatures will not deal fairly 
with persons as they age and be responsive to their needs .. 
10 Report of the Secretary of Labor, The Older American Worker : 
Age Discrimination in Employment (1965); Comment, 41 N. Y. 
U. L. Rev. 383, 383-388 (1966). See also C. Townsend, Old Age: 
The Last Segregation (1970); Symposium: !Law and t'he A,ged, .ll'.i' 
Aria. L .. Rev. 267 (1975} . 
'· 
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Under the circumstances, it is unnecessary to subje9t 
the State's resolution of competing interests in this case 
to the degree of critical examination that our cases under 
the Equal Protection Clause recently have characterized 
as "strict judicial scrutiny." 
II 
We turn then to examine this state classification under 
the rational basis standard. This inquiry employs a rel-
atively relaxed standard reflecting the Court's awareness 
that the drawing of lines that create distinctions is pecu-
liarly a legislative task and an unavoidable one. Perfec-
tion in making the necessary classifications is neither 
possible nor necessary. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S., 
. at 485. Such action by a legislature is presumed to be 
valid.11 Yet, even relaxed review of presumptively valid 
legislative classifications must have substance if the 
Equal Protection Clause is to have meaning. 
Although the language used to formulate the r~tional 
basis standard or test has varied/2 more recently we have 
indicated that a State's classification does not create an 
invidious discrimination where it rationally furthers some 
identifiable legitimate state purpose. See San Antonio 
School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S., at 17. 
1 l See, e. g., San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, supra, at 
40-41; Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U. 8. 83; 88 (1940); Lindsley v. 
Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911). This pte-
!i\Imption is particularly ~trong in areas of economics, taxation, and 
allocation of necessarily limited state resources . See, e. g., Jefferson 
v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535 (1972) ; Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S. 
78, 81 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S., at 484. 
12 The variety of our formulations and their application has 
given rise to considerable discussion in the literature. One finds 
a number of creative ideas. E. g., Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, 
the Equrtl Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of Constitutional 
Equality, 61 Va. L. Rev. 945 (1975) . 
74-1044-MEMO 
MASSACHUSETTS BD. OF RETIREMENT v. MURGIA 11 
Identification of the state purpose normally presents 
little difficulty. We do require that the purpose be 
capable of discernment by some means short of hypothe-
sizing by a court or a lawyer in the course of litigation 
concerning the constitutionality of the statute. See, e. g., 
U. S. D. A. v. Moreno, 413 U. S. 528, 536--538 (1973); 
McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U. S. 263, 270 (1973). That 
is, it must either be articulated by the legislature, appar-
ent from the legislative history, or clearly implicit in the 
statutory scheme.13 The great deference to which legis-
lative accommodation of conflicting interests is entitled 
under this scrutiny rests upon the assumption that the 
political process is most sensitive to the wishes of the 
people in a majoritarian democracy. It does not follow 
from this assumption, however, that it is appropriate for 
a court to devise or imagine policy where none has been 
indicated by the legislature or is clearly implicit from the 
action taken. The proper functioning of the political 
process is best served where the State bears the respon-
sibility of enacting legislation that is designed to serve 
identifiable policies or objectives. When legislation is 
enacted against such a background, the Court has some 
guarantee that the legislature has focused on the prob-
lem and also that its decision has received a public air-
13 This is not to say that the Constitution requires the States to 
articulate, in a preamble or otherwise, the purpose of every legis-
lative enactment. Although the inclusion of such preambles is help-
ful, and is a policy adopted by legislative bodies with increasing 
frequency, it is neither required or even desirable with respect to 
every piece of legislation. The purpose of most statutes is clearly 
apparent from the face of the enactment. Substantial weight 
may be given to the contemporaneous interpretation by the admin-
istrative or executive agencies charged with a statute's enforcement. 
But where interpretation by administrative or executive agencies 
occurs first in the course of litigation care must be taken that sucb 
interpretation is not in effect hypothesizing by a lawyer. 
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ingY In such circumstances, deference to the decision 
of the State is not only appropriate, but required by the 
demands of our democratic system. 
The term "legitimate" state purpose does not suggest 
·that the Court is required to engage in a substantive re-
view of the permissibility of a State's objectives. Indeed, 
an inquiry of this sort is one of the ·factors that distin-
guish rational basis scrutiny under the Equal Protection 
Clause from the more searching review appropriate when 
a suspect classification is involved. See, e. g., In re Grif-
fiths, 413 U. S. 717, 721-722 (1973). The requirement 
that a State's purpose be 11legitimate" indicates only that 
the purpose must fall within the very broad range of pow-
ers entrusted the state legislatures and that it must not 
14 See Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing 
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 
44 (1972). The principle that the Equal Protection Clause should 
be applied so as to facilitate the functioning of our democratic 
processes is not novel. See Railway Express Agency v. New York, 
336 U. S. 106, 112-113 (1949) (Jackson,· J., concurring): 
"Invocation of the equal protection clause, on the other hand, 
does not disable any governmental body from 'dealing with the sub-
ject at hand. It merely means that the prohibition or ·regulation 
must have a broader impact. I regard it as a salutary doctrine 
that cities, states :md the Federal Government must exercise powers 
so as not to discriminate between 'their inhabitants except upon 
some reasonable differentiation fairly related to the object of regula-
tion. This equality is not merely abstract justice. The framers of 
the Constitution knew, and we should not forget · today, that there 
is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and un-
reasonable government than to require that the principles of law 
which officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed 
generally. Conversely, nothing opens the door to arbitrary action 
so effectively as to allow those officials to pick and choose only a 
few to whom they will apply legislation and thus to escape the 
political retnbution that might be visited upon them if larger num-
bers were affected. Courts can take no better measure to assure · 
that laws will be just than to :tequire that. laws be eq).lal im 
operation.~'· 
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independently violate other constitutional requirements. 
At the same time, the State's purpose asserted as justify-
ing the classification must not be illusory, a mere facade 
concealing the existence of an objective that is illegiti-
mate in this very narrow sense. See U. S. D. A. v. 
M arena, 413 U. S. 528 ( 1973); McGinnis v. Royster, 410 
u.s. 263,276 (1973). 
The Massachusetts Legislature clearly has identified a 
legitimate state purpose to be promoted by the age 50 
classification. Through mandatory retirement at age 50, 
the legislature seeks to protect the public by assuring 
the physical preparedness of its uniformed police.15 The 
15 A special legislative commission's report preceding the enact-
ment of the age 50 maximum for uniformed police stated: "The 
Division of State Police, by virtue of the work demanded of its 
members, undoubtedly requires comparatively young men of vigor-
ous physique. The nature of the duties to be performed in ail 
weathers is arduous in the extreme. . . . No argument is needed to 
demonstrate that men above mirldle life are not usuaily physicaily 
able to perform such duties." Mass. Leg. Doc., House No. 1582, 
at 8 (1938). With these considerations in mind, the State's Com-
missioner of Public Safety argued before the commission for pro-
visions permitting retirement of State Police at 45. The commission 
observed in response that it was "not prepared to say that the 
contention of the Commissioner of Public Safety, that [State Police] 
over age forty-five should be eligible to retirement, is unsound as a 
matter of public policy." Id., at 8. The commission, however, 
deferred the problem of setting retirement ages for the State Police 
to special study, their sole reason for not recommending age 45 
being the anticipated pension costs to the State, not the reasonable-
ness of the age with respect to job qualification. Id., at 7-9. 
Though the age 50 limitation was not specificaily proposed by the 
commission, but was ultimately enacted by the legislature after 
further study, Act of Aug. 12, 1939, c. 503, § 3 (1939), Mass. Acts & 
Resolves 737-738, it is apparent that the purpose of the limitation 
was to protect the public by assuring the ability of State Police to 
respond to the demands of their jobs. See also Mass. Leg. Doc., 
House No. 5316, at 16, 17 (1967); Mass. Leg. Doc., House No. 2500, 
at 2'1, 23-25 (1955) . This purpose is also clearly implied by the 
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legitimacy of this objective cannot be doubted. See 
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479 ( 1960); Schware v. 
Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U. S. 232 ( 1957). Appellee 
neither denies that this was the interest intended to be 
served nor disputes its legitimacy.'6 
Once an identifiable legitimate state purpose has been 
discerned, it remains necessary to evaluate the relation-
ship that the challenged classification bears to that pur-
pose. Indeed, this is usually the primary inquiry, as 
in most cases a legitimate purpose is readily identifiable. 
The making of value judgments as to the wisdom or de-
sirability of legislative purposes is not within the role 
of the Judicial Branch. But the means employed to at-
tain a purpose, the grouping or classification of persons, 
presents the focal point of inquiry under equal protection 
analysis. See Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine 
on a Changing Court: A Model for a. Newer Equal Pro-
tection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1972). The test under 
this standard of review is not whether the means 
selected were necessary or whether less drastic means 
may have achieved the legislative purpose; rather, the 
test is whether the means chosen are rational and bear 
"a fair and substantial relation" to that purpose. Roy-
ster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412, 415 ( 1920). 
Although the need for legislative accommodations must 
be respected, the distinctions made by a classification 
must be genuinely related to the State's purpose in en-
acting the legislation in question. Thus, in Johnson v. 
Robison, 415 U. S., at 382-383, we found it significant 
State's max1mum-age scheme, which sets higher mandatory retire-
ment ages for lass dt>manding jobs. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 32, 
§§ 1, 3 (2) (g), 26 (3) (a) (1966) , as amended (Supp. 1975). 
10 Brief for Appellee, at 20-23. The identification of this ob-
jective as one legitimate state purpose suffices. We need not con-
sider the further assertion that the retirement plan also promotes the 
State's interest in providmg economic security for its employees. 
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that the "inclusion of one group promotes a legitimate 
governmental purpose, and the addition of other groups 
would not." See also Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715, 
723-730 (1972) .17 
In this case, the Massachusetts statute clearly meets 
the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause. Since 
physical ability generally declines with age, mandatory 
retirement at 50 serves to remove from police service 
those whose fitness for uniformed work presumptively 
has diminished with age. This clearly is rationally re-
lated to the State's objective.18 There is no indication 
that § 26 (3) (a) has the effect of excluding from service 
so few officers who are in fact unqualified as to render age 
50 a criterion wholly unrelated to the objective of the 
statute.19 
17 Of course, the relationship may not Be trivial or illogical, 
as this would fail to comport with the requirement of rationality and 
may indicate that the defined purpose actually masks an improper 
(for example, racially discriminatory) purpose. 
18 Appellee seems to have suggested in oral argument that Mass. 
Gen. Laws Ann. c. 32, §§ 1, 3 (2) (g), 26 (3) (a), also deny equal pro-
tection through the job classification established by them. Tr. of Oral 
Arg., at 14, 17-18. Any such argument, however, is unpersuasive. 
The sections do set a maximum retirement age for uniformed state 
officers which is less than that set for other law enforcement 
personnel. It has never been seriously disputed, if at all, however, that 
the work of state uniformed officers is more demanding than that of 
other state, or even municipal, law enforcement personnel. It is 
this difference in work demands that underlies the job classification. 
Mass. Leg. Doc., House No. 2500, at 21-22 (1955). And it is this 
difference that renders the different employment requirements reason-
able and hence constitutional. 
19 Review of Massachusetts' maximum are limitations by state leg-
islative commissions has proceeded on the principle that "maximum 
retirement age for any group of employees should be that age at 
which the efficiency of a large majority of the employees in the 
group is such that it is in the public interest that they retire." 
Final Report of the Special Commission to Study and Revise ther 
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That the St~te chooses not to determine fitness 
more precisely through individualized testing after age 50 
is not to say that the State's purpose is not rationally fur-
th~red by a maximum age limitation. It is only to say 
that with regar~ to the intel"ests of all concerned, the 
State perhaps has not chos~m the best means to accom-
plish its purpose.20 But where rationality is the test, a 
statute "does not ~violate the Equal Protection Clause 
merely because the classjfications made by '[it] are im-
perfect." Dandrid_ge v. Williams, 397 U. S., at 485. 
We do not make light of the supstantial economic and 
psychological effects premature and compulsory retire-
ment can have on an individual; nor do we denigrate the 
ability of elderly citizens to continue to contribute to 
society. The problems of retirement have been well doc-
umented and are beyond serious dispute.21 But " [ w] e 
do not decide today that the [Massachusetts statute] is 
wise, that it best fulfills the relevant social and economic 
Laws Relating to Retirement Systems and Pensions, Mass. Leg. Doc., 
House No. 2500, at 7 (1955). 
20 Indeed, were it not for the existing annual individual examina-
tions through age 50, appeilee would concede the rationality of man-
datory retirement at 50. Tr. of Oral Arg., at 22-23. The introduc-
tion of individual examinations, however, hardly defeats the 
rationality of the State's scheme. In fact, it augments ration-
ality since the legislative judgment to avoid the risk posed by even 
the healthiest fifty-year-old officers would be implemented by annual 
individual examinations between ages 40 and 50 which serve to 
eliminate those younger officers who are not at least ·as healthy as 
the best fifty-year-old officers. 
21 E. g., M. Barron, The Aging American (1961); Cameron, Neu-
roses of Later Maturity, in Mental Disorders in Later Life 201 (2d 
ed. 0. Kaplan 1956) ; Senate Special Committee on Aging, 
Developments in Aging: 1971 and Januacy-March 1972, S. Rep. 
No. 92-784, pp. 48-53 (1972); Hearings before the Senate Sub-
committee on Retirement and the Individual of the Senate Special 
Committee on Aging, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pts. 1 & 2, 36-46,87-101, 
l l21-127,.21Z...:217, 464--471 (1967). 
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Qbjectives that [Massachusetts] might ideally espouse, 
pr that a mor.e just and humane system could not be de~ 
vised." !d. , at 487. We decide only that the system 
~nacted by the Massachusetts Legislature does not deny 
appellee equal protection of the law. 
The judgment i8 reversed. 
MR. JusTICE STEVENS took no part in the considera• 
tion ·or decision of this case. 
I•, II, /'3.1'/ To: The Chief Justice Mr. Justlco Brennan 
Mr . Ju~~icc St~1~rt 
Hr. Jtl', i.; ir~.~ '!!'lite 
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Robert D. Murgia. 
On Appeal from the United 
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[May -, 1976] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL, memorandum. 
This case presents the question whether the provision 
of Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 32, § 26 (3) (a), that a uni-
formed State Police Officer "shall be retired ... upon his 
attaining age fifty," denies appellee police officer equal 
protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.1 
1 Uniformed State Police Officers are appointed under Mass. Gen. 
Laws Ann. c. 22, § 9A, which provides : 
"Whenever the governor shall deem it necessary to provide more 
effectively for the protection of persons and property and for the 
maintenance of law and order in the commonwealth, he may author-
ize the commissioner to make additional appointments to the division 
of state police, together with such other employees as the governor 
may deem necessary for the proper administration thereof. . . . 
Said additional officers shall have and exercise within the common-
wealth all the powers of constables, except the service of civil process, 
and of police officers and watchmen. . . . No person who has not 
reached his nineteenth birthday nor any person who has passed his 
thirtieth birthday shall be enlisted for the first time as an officer of 
the division of state police, except that said maximum age qualifica-
tion shall not apply in the case of the enlistment of any woman as 
such an officer .. .. " 
In pertinent part § 26 (3) provides : 
41 (a) •. . Any ... officer appointed under section nine A of chapter 
--·--·----
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Appellee Robert Murgia was an officer in the Uni-
formed Branch of the Massachusetts State Police. The 
Massachusetts Board of Retirement retired him upon his 
50th birthday. Thereafter, appellee brought this civil 
action in the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Massachusetts, alleging that the operation of 
§ 26 (3) (a) denied him equal protection of the laws and 
requesting the convening of a three-judge court under 
28 U. S. C. §§ 2281, 2284.2 The District Judge dis-
twenty-two ... who has performed service in the division of state 
police in the department of public safety for not less than twenty 
years, shall be retired by the state board of retirement upon his 
attaining age fifty or upon the expiration of such twenty years, 
whichever last occurs." 
" (b) Any . . . officer . . . who has performed service . . . for not 
less than twenty years and who has not attained ... age fifty in 
the case of an officer appointed under the said section nine A, shall 
be retired by the state board of retirement in case the rating board, 
after an examination of such officer or inspector by a registered 
physician appointed by it, shall report in writing to the state board 
of retirement that he is physically or mentally incapacitated for the 
performance of duty and that such incapacity is likely to be 
permanent." 
Since § 9A requires that new enlistees in the Uniformed Division 
be no more than 30 yrars of age, few retirements are delayed past 
50 until the expiration of 20 years' serviCe. 
The question presented in this case was summarily treated in 
Cannon v. Guste, 423 U. S. 898, aff'g - F. Supp. - (ED La,, 
1975) ; Weisbrod v. Lynn, 420 U. S. 940 (1975), aff'g 383 F. Supp. 
933 (DC 1974); Mcilvaine v. Pennsylvania, 415 U.S. 986 (1974), 
dismissing appeal from 454 Pa. 129, 309 A. 2d 801 (1973). Our 
cursory consideration in those cases dO<'s not, of course, foreclose 
this opportunity to cons1der more fully that question. See Usery v. 
Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., - U. S. - (1976); Edelman v. 
Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 670-671 (1974). 
2 Jurisdiction was invoked pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1343, 
and declaratory and injunctive relief was sought under 28 U. S. C . 
§-§ 2201 , 2202. The equal protection denial was alleged to consti-
tuate a vi.olati.on of 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Appellee made no claim 
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missed appellee's complaint on the ground that the 
complaint did not allege a substantial constitutional 
question. 345 F. Supp. 1140 (1972). On appeal, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in 
an unreported memorandum, set aside the District Court 
judgment a.nd remanded the case with direction to con-
vene a three-judge court. Upon a record consisting of 
depositions, affidavits and other documentary material 
submitted by the parties, the three-judge court filed an 
opinion that declared § 26 (3)(a) unconstitutional on 
the ground that "a classification based on age 50 alone 
lacks rational basis in furthering any substantial state 
interest," and enjoined enforcement of the statute. 
Murgia v. Massachusetts Board of Retirement, 376 F. 
Supp. 753, 754 (Mass. 1974). We noted probable juris-
diction of the Retirement Board's appeal. 421 U. S. 
974 (1975). We reverse. 
The primary function of the Uniformed Branch of the 
Massachusetts State Police is to protect persons and 
property and maintain law and order. Specifically, uni-
formed officers participate in controlling prison and civil 
disorders, respond to emergencies and natural disasters, 
patrol highways in marked cruisers, investigate crime, 
apprehend criminal suspects, and provide back-up sup-
port for local law enforcement personnel. As the Dis-
trict Court observed, "service in this branch is, or can be, 
arduous." 376 F. Supp., at 754. "[H]igh versatility is 
required, with few, if any, backwaters available for the par-
tially superannuated." Ibid. Thus, "even [appellee's] 
experts concede that there is a general relationship be-
tween advancing age and decreasing physical ability to 
respond to the demands of the job." Id., at 755. 
under the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act Qf 196'Z,, 
29 U. S. C. § 621 et seq. 
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These considerations prompt the requirement that 
uniformed state officers pass a comprehensive physical 
examination biennially until age 40. After that, until 
mandatory retirement at age 50, uniformed officers must 
pass annually a more rigorous examination, including an 
electrocardiogram and tests for gastro-intestinal bleed-
ing. Appellee Murgia had passed such an examination 
four months before he was retired, and there is no dispute 
that, when he retired, his excellent physical and mental 
health still rendered him capable of performing the duties 
of a uniformed officer. 
The record includes the testimony of three physicians: 
that of the State Police Surgeon, who testified to the 
physiological and psychological demands involved in the 
performance of uniformed police functions; that of an 
associate professor of medicine, who testified generally 
to the relationship between aging and the ability to per-
form under stress; and that of a surgeon, who also testi-
fied to aging and the ability safely to perform police 
functions. The testimony clearly established that the 
risk of physical failure, particularly in the cardiovascular 
system, increases with age, and that the number of indi-
viduals in a given age group incapable of performing 
stress functions increases with the age of the group. 
Appendix, at 77-78, 174-176. The testimony also recog-
nized that particular individuals over 50 could be capable 
of safely performing the functions of uniformed officers. 
The associate professor of medicine, who was a witness 
for the appellee, further testified that evaluating the risk 
of cardiovascular failure in a given individual would 
require a detailed number of studies. Id., at 77-78. 
In assessing appellee's equal protection claim, the Dis-
trict Court found it unnecessary to apply a strict scrutiny 
test, see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), for 
'it. determined that the age classification established by 
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the Massachusetts statutory scheme could not in any 
event withstand a test of rationality, see Dandridge v. 
Williams, 397 U. S. 471 ( 1970). Since there had been 
no showing that reaching age 50 forecast "imminent 
change" in an officer's physical condition, the Dis-
trict Court held that compulsory retirement at age 
50 was irrational under a scheme that assessed the 
capabilities of officers individually by means of compre-
hensive annual physical examinations. We agree that 
rationality is the proper standard by which to test whether 
compulsory retirement at age 50 violates equal protection. 
We disagree, however, with the District Court's deter-
mination that the age 50 classification is not rationally 
related to furthering a legitimate state interest. 
I 
We need state only briefly our reasons for agreeing 
that strict scrutiny is not the proper test for deter-
mining whether the mandatory retirement provision 
denies appellee equal protection. San Antonio Inde-
pendent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), 
reaffirmed that equal protection analysis requires strict 
scrutiny of a legislative classification only when the classi-
fication impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a 
fundamental right 8 or operates to the peculiar disadvan-
tage of a suspect class.4 Mandatory retirement at age 50 
3 E. g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973) (right of a uniquely 
private nature); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134 (1972) (right to 
vote); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right of inter-
staJe travel); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (rights guar-
anteed by the First Amendment); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. 
Williamson, 316 U. S. 535 ( 1942) (right to procreate). 
4 E. g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971) (alienage); 
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184 (1964) (race); O·yama v. 
California, 332 U.S. 633 (1947) (ancestry) . 
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under the Mass~chusetts statute involves neithep 
~ituation. 
The requirement implicates no fundamental right of 
appellee. The determination whether an interest is fun'" 
damental "lies in assessing whether there is a right . .. 
explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution." 
!d., at 33-34. Although the "right to work for a living in 
the common occupations of the community is of the very 
essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that 
it was the purpose of the [Fourteenth] Amendment to 
secure," Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 41 (1915), and 
although due process procedural safeguards are often 
required as a condition to termination of government 
employment, Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134 (1973), 
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564 (1972), 
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U. S. 474 (1959),5 the Court's 
decisions give no support to the proposition that the 
Constitution guarantees a right of governmental employ~ 
ment per se. See San Antonio Independent School Dis-
trict v. Rodriguez, supra ; Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U. S. 
56 ( 1972), Dandridge v. Williams, supra. Accordingly, 
we have expressly stated that a standard less than strict 
scrutiny "has consistently been applied to state legis~ 
iation restricting the availability of employment op~ 
portunities." Dandridge v. Williams, supra, at 485. 
Nor does the class of uniformed state police officers 
over 50 constitute a suspect class fot purposes of equai 
protection analysis. Rodriguez, supra, at 28, observed 
that a suspect class is one "saddled with such disabilities, 
or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal 
treatment, or relegated to such a position of political 
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection 
~ Appellee makes no claim of denial of procedtiral due process in 
the action of the Retirement Board. 
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from the majoritarian political process." The aged have 
had a high degree of success in making the political 
process responsive to their needs. See, e. g., Pension Re-
form Act of 1970, 29 U. S. C. § 1001 et seq.; Age Dis~ 
.crimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U. S. C. § 621 
et seq.; Older Americans Act of 1965, 42 U. S. C. 
§ 3001 et seq. Several States have legislation forbidding 
age discrimination,6 including Massachusetts.7 The par-
ticipation of the aged in the functions of decisionmaking 
institutions at all levels and the continuing legislative 
concern at all levels for the problems of the elderly,8 
6 E. g., Cal. Unempl. Ins. § 2070 et seq. (West 1972); Mich. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 17.458 (1), (3a) (1968), as amended (Supp. 1975); N. Y. 
Human Rights Law §§ 290-301 (McKinney 1972), as amended 
(McKinney Supp. 1975-1976); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, §§ 951-963 
(1964), as amended (Supp. 1975-1976); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. 
Art. 6252-14 (1970) . 
7 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 149, § 24A. Indeed, appellee asserts 
that the provisions of Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 32, § 26 (3) 
{a), do not comport with the State's statutory provisions against 
discrimination, ibid., cc. 149, 151B, and urges that "the Court must 
give weight to these legislative determinations" against discrimina-
tion. As to determinations under § 26 (3) (a), however, he makes 
no such oontention. Brief for Appellee, at 59-61. 
8 See, e. g., Senate Special Committee on Aging, Developments in 
Aging: 1974 and January-April 1975, S. Rep. No. 94-250 (1975); 
Senate Special Commit, tee on Aging, Developments in Aging: 1973 
and January-March 1974, S. Rep. No. 93-846 (1974) ; Senate Spe-
cial Committee on Aging, Developments in Aging: 1972 and January-
March 1973, S. Rep. No. 147, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) ; Senate 
Special Committee on Aging, DevelopmE'nts in Aging: 1971 and 
January-March 1972, S. Rep. No. 92-784 (1972); Hearings before 
the Subcommittee on Employment and Retirement of the Senate 
Special Committee on Aging, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); The Gov-
ernors Special Planning Commission on Elderly Affairs, A Profile of 
Massachusetts Elderly ( 1971) ; Special Report of the Retirement 
Law Commission, Mass. Leg. Doc., House No. 5900 (1973) . 
As appellee recognizes, the· actual attitude of legislatures, including 
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including age discrimination, demonstrate that the tr:adi. 
tional political processes have not foundered where in-
terests of the aged are at stake.9 
There is no indication in any of our cases, however, 
that evidence of high numerical representation in the 
state legislatures or the existence of a body of remedial 
legislation is alone sufficient to remove a group that 
demonstrates the other indicia-of societally imposed 
special disabilities or a history of discriminatory treat-
ment-from the category of suspect classes. An exemp-
tion from categorization as a suspect class based on the 
existence of remedial legislation, for example, could pe-
nalize those who properly seek legislative rather than 
judicial solutions to problems of discrimination. It also 
ignores the fact that state, as well as federal, legislatures 
have been responsive to the needs of Negroes, a class that 
few would contend is no longer in need of the special pro-
tection envisioned for them by the drafters of the Four-
Massachusetts', toward the problem of age discrimination in employ-
ment is one of favorable concern: 
"The thrust of the legislative policy as expressed in Congress and 
the state legislatures is to strike down classifications based upon 
generalized misconceptions as to age, and to institute in their stead 
procedures to measure the individual's qualifications, abilities and 
needs, regardless of age. 11 Brief for Appellee, at 60. 
9 Johnson v. Robison, 415 U. S. 361 (1974), which sustained a 
federal legislative classification denying Veterans' educational bene-
fits to conscientious objectors against a claim of denial of equal pro-
tection, stated: 
"Given the solicitous regard that Congress has manifested for con-
scientious objectors, it would seem presumptuous of a court to sub-
ject the educational benefits legislation to strict scrutiny on the 
basis of the 'suspect classification' theory, whose underlying rationale 
is that, where legislation affects discrete and insular minorities, the 
presumption of constitutionafity fades because traditional political 
processes may have broken down.'' I d., at 375 n 14, 
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teenth Amendment. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 
U.S. 303 (1880). 
While the treatment of the aged in this Nation has not. 
been wholly free of discrimination/0 such persons, unlike, 
say, those who have been discriminated against on the 
basis of race or national origin, have not experienced a. 
"history of purposeful unequal treatment" or been sub-
jected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped 
characteristics not truely indicative of their abili-
ties. When those factors are present, there is reason to 
scrutinize state classifications carefully to ensure that 
they are not influenced by unfounded assumptions about 
group characteristics that have no place in our consti-
tutional system. 
The class subject to the compulsory retirement feature· 
of the Massachusetts statute consists of uniformed state 
police officers over the age of 50. It cannot be 
said to discriminate only against the elderly. Rather, it. 
draws the line at a certain age in middle life. But even 
old age does not define a "discrete and insular" group, see 
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 
152-153, n. 4 ( 1938), in need of "extraordinary protec-
tion from the majoritarian political process." Instead, it 
marks a stage that each of us will reach if we live out 
our normal span. Even if the statute could be said to• 
impose a penalty upon a class defined as the aged, it. 
would not impose a distinction sufficiently akin to those· 
classifications that we have found suspect to call for strict 
judicial scrutiny. There is no basis upon which to assume 
that state and federal legislatures will not deal fairly· 
with persons as they age and be responsive to their needs. 
10 Report of the Secretary of Labor, The Older Amencan Worker: 
Age Disrrimination in Employment (1965) ; Comment, 41 N. Y. 
U. L. Rev. 383, 383-388 (1966). See also C. Townsend, Old Age: 
The Last Segregation (1970); Symposium: Law and the Ag~d, ]'Z' 
Aiiiz. L. Rev. 267 (1915) .. 
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Under the circumstances, it is unnecessary to subject 
the State's resolution of competing interests in this case 
to the degree of critical examination that our cases under 
the Equal Protection Clause recently have characterized 
as "strict j udicia1 scrutiny." 
II 
We turn then to examine this state classification under 
the rational basis standard. This inquiry employs a rel-
atively relaxed standard reflecting the Court's awareness 
that the drawing of lines that create distinctions is pecu-
liarly a legislative task and an unavoidable one. Perfec-
tion in making the necessary classifications is neither 
possible nor necessary. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S., 
at 485. Such action by a legislature is presumed to be 
valid.11 This presumption is particularly strong in areas 
of economics, taxation, and allocation of necessarily 
limited state resources. See, e. g., Jefferson v. Hackney, 
406 U.S. 535 (1972); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 
81 (1971). Yet, even relaxed review of presumptively 
valid legislative classifications must have substan~e if 1 J 
the Equal Protection Clause is to have meaning. 
Although the language used to formulate the rational 
basis standard or test has varied,12 we have indicated 1 
that a State's classification does not create an invid-
ious discrimination where it rationally furthers some 
identifiable legitimate state purpose. See San Antonio 
School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S., at 17. Our 
11 See, e. g., San Antonio School Distnct v. Rodriguez, supra, at 
40-41; Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83,88 (1940); Lindsley v. 
Natural Carbonic Gas Co ., 220 U. S. 61, 78-79 (1911). 
12 The variPty of our forrpulations and their application has 
given rise to considerable discussion in the literature. One finds 
a number of crpative ideal:!. E. g., Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, 
the Equrrl Protection Clause, and the ThrPP Faces of Constitutional 
Equality, 61 Va. L. Rev. 945 (1975). 
1./~~V· r~, 
1/IJ- u.s. s- l--f/ 
5'31 (If'"). 
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inquiry under this test is concerned with the purpose 
of the particular classification under challenge, rather 
than with the overall purpose of the legislation as a 
whole. And, of course, the classification may further 
more than one legislative purpose. Identification of the 
state purpose or purposes normally presents little diffi-
culty. Although the purpose may not be imagined, it 
usually is apparent from the face ob the statute and its 
legislative history.18 
The term "legitimate" state purpose does not suggest 
that the Court is required to engage in a substantive re-
view of the permissibility of a State's objectives. Indeed, 
an inquiry of this sort is one of the factors that distin-
guish rational basis scrutiny under the Equal Protection 
Clause from the more searching review appropriate when 
a suspect classification is involved. See, e. g., In re Grif-
fiths, 413 U. S. 717, 721-722 (1973). The requirement 
that a State's purpose be "legitimate" indicates only that 
the purpose must fall within the very broad range of pow-
ers entrusted the state legislatures and that it must not 
independently violate other constitutional requirements. 
At the same time, the State's purpose or purposes asserted 
as justifying the classification must not be illusory, a mere 
13 Of course, ascertainment of purpose by a state court should 
be respected, and substantial weight also should be given to the 
interpretation by the administrative or executive agency charged 
with a statute's enforcement. 
We do note that the proper functioning of the political process 
usually is best served where the policies or objectives of the legisla-
ture are identified at the time of enactment. When legislation is 
rnacted against such a background, there is greater assurance that 
the legislature has focused on the proble~ 
~ Gunther, In Search of Evo'!Ving Doctrmr on a Changing 
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 
44 (1972). See also Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 
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facade concealing the existence of an objective that is 
illegitimate in this very narrow sense. See U.S. D. A. v. 
Moreno, 413 U. S. 528 ( 1973); McGinnis v. Royster, 410 
U.S. 263. 276 ( 1973). 
The Massachusetts Legislature clearly has identified a 
legitimate state purpose to be promoted by the age 50 
classification. Through mandatory retirement at age 50, 
the legislature seeks to protect the public by assuring 
the physical preparedness of its uniformed police.15 The 
15 A special legislative commission's report preceding the enact-
ment of the age 50 maximum for uniformed police stated: "The 
Division of State Policr, by virtue of the work demanded of its 
members, undoubtedly requires comparatively young men of vigor-
ous physique. The nature of the duties to be performed in all 
weathers is arduous in the extreme. . . . No argument is needed to 
demonstrate that men above middle life are not usually physically 
able to perform such duties." Mass. Leg. Doc., House No. 1582, 
at 8 (1938). With these considerations in mind, the State's Com-
missioner of Public Safety argued before the commission for pro-
visions permitting retirement of State Police at 45. The commission 
observed in response that it was "not prepared to say that the 
contention of the Commissioner of Public Safety, that [State Police] 
over age forty-five should be eligible to retirement, is unsound as a 
matter of public policy." !d., at R. The commission, however, 
deferred the problem of setting retirement ages for the State Police 
to sperm! ,stud~· . their solr reason for not recommending age 45 
being the antiripated pen;:ion costs to the State, not the reasonable-
ness of thr age with rr;;pect to job qualification. !d., at 7-9. 
Though t hr agt' 50 limitation was not specifically proposed by the 
commission. but was ultimatrly enacted by the legislature after 
further study, Act of Aug. 12,1939, c. 503, §3 (1939), Mass. Acts & 
Rcso]vet; 7:37-738. it is apparent that the purpost' of the limitation 
was to protect tht' public b~· assuring tht' ability of State Police to 
reRpond to thr demandR of their jobs. See also Mass. Leg. Doc., 
House No. 5316, ttt 16, 17 (1967); Mass. LPg. Doc., House No. 2500, 
at 21, 23-25 (1955). This pnrpost' is also clearly implied by the 
State's maximum-age schemr. which set;.; h1gher mandatory retire-
ment ageR for ]a;:s dt>manding jobs. See Ma:ss. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 32, 
§§ 1, 3 (2) (g), 26 (3) (a) (1966), as amended (Supp. ·197~). 
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legitimacy of this objective cannot be doubted. See 
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479 (1960); Schware v. 
Board of Bar Examiner8, 353 U.S. 232 (1957). Appellee 
neither denies that this was the interest intended to be 
served nor disputes its legitimacy.16 
Once one or more identifiable legitimate state purposes 
have been discerned, it remains necessary to evaluate the 
relatiouship that the challenged classification bears to 
those purposes. Indeed, this is usually the primary in-
quiry, as in most cases a legitimate purpose is readily 
identifiable. The making of value judgments as to the 
wisdom or desirability of legislative purposes is not within 
the role of the Judicial Branch. But the means employed 
to attain a purpose, the rationality of the grouping or cl~ 
sification of persons, presents the focal point of inquiry un-
der equal protection analysis. The test under the rational 
basis standard of review is not whether the means 
selected were necessary or whether less drastic means 
may have achieved the legislative purpose. SeeM at hews 
v. Lucas, - U. S. - (June -, 1976). Rather, the 
test is whether the means chosen bears "a fair and sub-
stantial relation" to that purpose. Royster Guano Co, 
v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412, 415 (1920). See also Estelle 
v. Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534, 539 (1975); Johnson v. Robi~ 
son, 415 U. S., at 374-375. Although the need for legis. 
lative accommodations must be respected, the distinc-
tions made must be genuinely related to the State's 
purpose. Thus, in Johnson v. Robison, id., at 382-383, 
we found it significant that the "inclusion of one group 
promotes a legitimate governmental purpose, and the 
16 Brief for Appellee, at 20--23. The identification of this ob-
jective as one legitimate state purpose suffices. We need not con-
sider the further assertion that the retiremC'nt plan also promotes the 
State's ~nterest in providing economic security for its employees. 
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addition of other groups would not." See also Jackson v 
v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715, 723-730 (1972).17 
In this case, the Massachusetts statute clearly meets 
the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause. Since 
physical ability generally declines with age, mandatory 
retirement at 50 serves to remove from police service 
those whose fitness for uniformed work presumptively 
has diminished with age. This clearly is rationally re-
lated to the State's objective.18 There is no indication 
that § 26 (3) (a) has the effect of excluding from service 
so few officers who are in. fact unqualified as to render age 
50 a criterion wholly unrelated to the objective of the 
·statute.l.9 
17 Of coursP, the relationship may not be trivial or illogical, 
as this would fail to comport with the requirement of rationality and 
·may indicate that the defined purpose actually masks an improper 
(for example, racially discriminatory) purpose. 
u Appellee seems to have suggested in oral argument that Mass. 
'Gen. Laws Ann. c. 32, §§ 1, 3 (2) (g), 26 (3) (a), also deny equal pro-
tection through the job classification established by them. Tr. of Oral 
Arg., at 14, 17-18. Any such argument, however, is unpersuasive. 
· The sections do set a maximum retirement age for uniformed state 
officers which is less than that set for other law enforcement 
personnel. It has never been seriously disputed, if at all, however, that 
the work of state uniformed officers is more demanding than that of 
·other state, or even municipal, law enforcement personnel. It is 
this difference in work demands that underlies the job classification. 
Mass. Leg. Doc., House No. 2500, at 21-22 (1955). And it is this 
' difference that renders the different employment requirements reason-
able and hence constitutional. 
10 Review of Massachusetts' maximum are limitations by state leg-
islative commissions has proceeded on the principle that "maximum 
retirement age for any group of employees should be that age at 
which the efficiency of a large majority of the employees in the 
group is such that it is in the public interest that they retire." 
Final Report of the Special Commission to Study and Revise the 
Laws Relating to Retirement Systems and Pensions, Mass. Leg. Doc., 
House No 2500, at 7 (1955). 
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That the State chooses not to determine fitness 
more precisely through individualized testing after age 50 
is not to say that the State's purpose is not rationally fur-
thered by a maximum age limitation. It is only to say 
that with regard to the interests of all concerned, the 
State perhaps has not chosen the best means to accom-
plish its purpose.20 But where rationality is the test, a 
statute "does not violate the Equal Protection Clause 
merely because the classifications made by [it] are im-
perfect." Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S., at 485. 
We do not make light of the substantial economic and 
psychological effects premature and compulsory retire-
ment can have on an individual; nor do we denigrate the 
ability of elderly citizens to continue to contribute to 
society. The problems of retirement have been well doc-
umented and are beyond serious dispute. 21 But " [ w] e 
do not decide today that the [Massachusetts statute] is 
wise, that it best fulfills the relevant social and economic 
objectives that [Massachusetts] might ideally espouse, 
20 Indeed, were it not for the existing annual individual examina--
tions through age 50, appellee would concede the rationality of man-
datory retirement at 50. Tr. of Oral Arg., at 22-23. The introduc-
tion of individual examinations, however, hardly defeats the 
rationality of the State's scheme. In fact, it augments ration-
ality since the legislative judgment to avoid the risk posed by even 
the healthiest fifty-year-old officers would be implemented by annual 
individual examinations between ages 40 and 50 which serve to 
eliminate those younger officers who are not at least as healthy as 
the best fifty-year-old officers. 
21 E. g., M. Barron, The Aging American (1961); Cameron, Neu-
roses of Later Maturity, in Mental Disorders in Later Life 201 (2d 
ed. 0 . Kaplan 1956); Senate Special Committee on Aging, 
Developments in Aging: 1971 and January-March 1972, S. Rep. 
No. 92-784, pp. 48-53 (1972) ; Hearings before the Senate Sub-
committee on Retirement and the Individual of the Senate Special 
Committee on Aging, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pts. 1 & 2, 36-46, 87-101, 
121-127, 212-217, 464-471 (1967) . 
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or that a more just and humane system could not be de-
vised." !d., at 487. We decide only that the system 
enacted by the Massachusetts Legislature does not deny 
appellee equal protection of the law. 
The judgment is reversed. 
MR. JusTICE STEVENS took no part in the considera-
tion or decision of this case. 
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PER CuRIAM, 
This case presents the question whether the provision 
of Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 32, § 26 (3)(a), that a uni-
formed State Police Officer "shall be retired ... upon his 
attaining age fifty," denies appellee police officer equal 
protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.1 
1 Uniformed State Police Officers are appointed under Mass. Gen. 
Laws Ann. c. 22, § 9A, which provides: 
"Whenever the governor shall deem it necessary to provide more 
effectively for the protection of persons and property and for the 
maintenance of law and order in the commonwealth, he may author-
ize the commissioner to make additional appointments to the division 
of state police, together with such other employees as the governor 
may deem necessary for the proper administration thereof. . . . 
Said additional officers shall have and exercise within the common-
wealth all the powers of constables, except the service of civil process., 
and of police officers and watchmen. . . . No person who has not 
reached his nineteenth birthday nor any person who has passed his 
thirtieth birthday shall be enlisted for the first time as an officer of 
the division of state police, except that said maximum age qualifica-
tion shall not apply in the case of the enlistment of any woman as 
such an officer .... " 
In pertinent part § 26 (3) provides : 
·"(a) •.. Any ... officer appointed under section nine A of chapte,: 
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Appellee Robert Murgia was an officer in the Uni-
formed Branch of the Massachusetts State Police. The 
Massachusetts Board of Retirement retired him upon his 
50th birthday. Thereafter, appellee brought this civil 
action in the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Massachusetts, alleging that the operation of 
§ 26 (3) (a) denied him equal protection of the laws and 
requesting the convening of a three-judge court under 
28 U. S. C. §§ 2281, 2284. 2 The District Judge dis-
twenty-two ... who has performed service in the division of state 
police in the department of public safety for not less than twenty 
years, shall be retired by the state board of retirement upon his 
attaining age fifty or upon the expiration of such twenty years, 
whichever last occurs." 
" (b) Any . . . officer . . . who has performed service . . . for not 
less than twenty years and who has not attained ... age fifty in 
the case of an officer appointed under the said section nine A, shall 
be retired by the state board of retirement in case the rating board, 
after an examination of such officer or inspector by a registered 
physician appointed by it, shall report in writing to the state board 
of retirement that he is physically or mentally incapacitated for the 
performance of duty and that such incapacity is likely to be 
permanent." 
Since § 9A requires that new enlistees in the Uniformed Division 
be no more than 30 years of age, few retirements are delayed past 
50 until the expiration of 20 years' service. 
The qurstion presented in this case was summarily trrated in 
Cannon v. Guste, 423 U. S. 898, aff'g- F. Supp. - (ED La. 
1975); W"isbrod v. Lynn, 420 U. S. 940 (1975), aff'g 383 F. Supp. 
933 (DC 1974); Mcilvaine v. Pennsylvania, 415 U. S. 986 (1974), 
dismissing appeal from 454 Pa. 129, 309 A. 2d 801 (1973). Our 
cursory consideration in those ca"c' does not, of course, foreclose 
this opportunity to consider more fully that queb'tion. See Usery v. 
Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., - U. S. - (1976); Edelman v. 
Jordan , 415 U.S. 651, 670-671 (1974). 
2 Jurisdiction was invoked pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1343, 
and declaratory and injunctive relief was sought under 28 U. S. C. 
§§ 2201, 2202. 'The equal protection denial was alleged to consti-
tuate a violation of 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Appellee made no claim 
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m1ssed appellee's complaint on the ground that the 
complaint did not allege a substantial constitutional 
question. 345 F. Supp. 1140 (1972). On appeal, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in 
an unreported memorandum, set aside the District Court 
judgment and remanded the case with direction to con-
vene a three-judge court. Upon a record consisting of 
depositions, affidavits and other documentary material 
submitted by the parties, the three-judge court filed an 
opinion that declared § 26 (3) (a) unconstitutional on 
the ground that "a classification based on age 50 alone 
lacks rational basis in furthering any substantial state 
interest," and enjoined enforcement of the statute. 
Murgia v. Massachusetts Board of Retirement, 376 F. 
Supp. 753, 754 (Mass. 1974). We noted probable juris-
diction of the Retirement Board's appeal. 421 U. S. 
974 (1975). We reverse. 
The primary function of the Uniformed Branch of the 
Massachusetts State Police is to protect persons and 
property and maintr1n law and order. Specifically, uni-
formed officers participate in controlling prison and civil 
disorders, respond to emergencies and natural disasters, 
patrol highways in marked cruisers, investigate crime, 
apprehend criminal suspects, and provide back-up sup-
port for local law enforcement pJrsonnel. As the Dis-
trict Court observed, "service in this branch is, or can be,. 
arduous." 376 F. Supp., at 754. "[H] igh versatility is 
required, with few, if any, backwaters available for the par-
tially superannuated." Ibid. Thus, "even [appellee's] 
experts concede that there is a general relationship be-
tween advancing age and decreasing physical ability to 
respond to the demands of tl:e job." !d., at 755. 
under the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,. 
29 U. S. C. § 621 et seq. 
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These considerations prompt the requirement that 
uniformed state officers pass a comprehensive physical 
examination biennially until age 40. After that, until 
mandatory retirement at age 50, uniformed officers must 
pass annually a more rigorous examination, including an 
electrocardiogram and tests for gastro-intestinal bleed-
ing. Appellee Murgia had passed such an examination 
four months before he was retired, and there is no dispute 
that, when he retired, his excellent physical and mental 
health still rendered him capable of performing the duties 
of a uniformed officer. 
The record includes the testimony of three physicians: 
that of the State Police Surgeon, who testified to the 
physiological and psychological demands involved in the 
performance of uniformed police functions; that of an 
associate professor of medicine, who testified generally 
to the relationship between aging and the ability to per-
form under stress; and that of a surgeon, who also testi-
fied to aging and the ability safely to perform police 
functions. 'The testimony clearly established that the 
risk of physical failure, particularly in the cardiovascular 
system, increases with age, and that the number of indi-
viduals in a given age group incapable of performing 
stress functions increases with the age of the group. 
Appendix, at 77-78, 174-176. The testimony also recog-
nized that particular individuals over 50 could be capable 
of safely performing the functions of uniformed officers. 
The associate professor of medicine, who was a witness 
for the appellee, further testified that evaluating the risk 
of cardiovascular failure in a given individual would 
require a detailed number of studies. ld., at 77-78. 
In assessing appellee's equal protection claim, the Dis-
trict Court found it unnecessary to apply a strict scrutiny 
test, see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), for-
it determined that the age classification established by· 
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the Massachusetts statutory scheme could not in any 
event withstand a test of rationality, see Dandridge v. 
Williams, 397 U. S. 471 ( 1970). Since there had been 
no showing that reaching age 50 forecast "imminent 
change" in an officer's physical condition, the Dis-
trict Court held that compulsory retirement at age 
50 was irrational under a scheme that assessed the 
capabilities of officers individually by means of compre-
hensive annual physical examinations. We agree that 
rationality is the proper standard by which to test whether 
compulsory retirement at age 50 violates equal protection. 
We disagree, however, with the District Court's deter-
mination that the age 50 classification is not rationally 
related to furthering a legitimate state interest. 
I 
We need state only briefly our reasons for agreeing 
that strict scrutiny is not the proper test for deter-
mining whether the mandatory retirement provision 
denies appellee equal protection. San Antonio Inde-
pendent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 ( 1973), 
reaffirmed that equal protection analysis requires strict 
scrutiny of a legislative classification only when the classi-
fication impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a 
fundamental right 3 or operates to the peculiar disadvan-
tage of a suspect class.4 Mandatory retirement at age 50 
3 E. g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973) (right of a uniquely 
private nature); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134 (1972) (right to 
vote); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969) (right of inter-
state travel); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23 (1968) (rights guar-
anteed by the First Amendment); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. 
Williamson, 316 U. S. 535 ( 1942) (right to procreate). 
4 E. g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971) (alienage); 
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184 (1964) (race); Oyama v. 
California, 332 U. S. 633 (1947) (ancestry). .. 
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\ • i...... ~ ' ' • "" I ~ ' 
under the MassachuseHs statute involves neithep 
situatiqn: 
The requirement implicates no funqamental right of 
appellee. The determination whether an interest is fun ... 
damental "lies in assessing whether there is a right ... 
explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution." 
I d., at 33-34. The Cour~ecisions give no support /C-t. 
to the proposition that the Constitution guarantees a 
right of governmental employment per se. See San 
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 
supra; Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U. S. 56 (1972), Dand-
ridge v. Williams, supra. Accordingly, we have ex-
pressly stated that a standard less than strict scrutiny 
"has consistently been applied to state legislation re-
stricting the availability of employment opportunities." 
Dandridge v. Williams, supra, at 485. 
Nor does the class of uniformed state police officers 
over 50 constitute a suspect ciass for purposes of equai 
protection analysis. Rodriguez, supra, at 28, observed 
that a suspect class is one "saddled with such disabilities, 
or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal 
treatment, or relegated to such a position of political 
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection 
from the majoritarian political process." While the 
treatment of the aged in this Nation has not been 
wholly free of discrimination, such persons, unlike, 
say, those who have been discriminated against on the 
basis of race or national origin, have not experienced a 
"history of purposeful unequal treatment" or been sub-
jected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped 
characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities. 
The class subject to the compulsory retirement feature 
of the Massachusetts statute consists of uniformed state 
police officers over the age of 50. It cannot be 
sai'd to discriminate only against the elderly, Rather, it 
74-1044---PER CURIAM 
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draws the line at a certain age in middle life. But even 
old age does not define a "discrete and insular" group, see 
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 
152-153, n. 4 (1938), in need of "extraordinary protec-
tion from the majoritarian political process." Instead, it 
marks a stage that each of us will reach if we live out 
our normal span. Even if the statute could be said to 
impose a penalty upon a class defined as the aged, it 
would not impose a distinction sufficiently akin to those 
classifications that we have found suspect to call for strict 
judicial scrutiny. 
Under the circumstances, it is unnecessary to subject 
the State's resolution of competing interests in this case 
to the degree of critical examination that our cases under 
the Equal Protection Clause recently have characterized 
as "strict judicial scrutiny." 
II 
We turn then to examine this state classification under 
the rational basis standard. This inquiry employs a rel-
atively relaxed standard reflecting the Court's awareness; 
that the drawing of lines that create distinctions is pecu-
liarly a legislative task and an unavoidable one. Perfec-
·tion in making the necessary classifications is neither 
possible nor necessary. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S., 
at 485. Such action by a legislature is presumed to be 
valid.5 
In this case, the Massachusetts statute clearly meets 
the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause, for the 
State's classification rationally furthers the purpose iden-
tified by the State: (l Through mandatory retirement at 
5 See, e. g., San Antonio SchooL District v. Rodriguez, supra, at 
40-41; Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940); Lindsley ·v .. 
Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61 , 78-79 (1911). 
6 See San Antonio School District v Rodlriguez, supra, at ·n. 
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age 50, the legislature seeks to protect the public by as-
suring physical preparedness of its uniformed police. 7 
Since physical ability generally declines with age, manda· 
tory retirement at 50 serves to remove from police service 
those whose fitness for uniformed work presumptively 
has diminished with age. This clearly is rationally re-
lated to the State's objective.8 There is no indication 
7 A special legislative commission's report preceding the enact-
ment of the age 50 maximum for uniformed police stated: "The 
Division of State Police, by virtue of the work demanded of its 
members, undoubtedly requires comparatively young men of vigor-
ous physique. The nature of the duties to be performed in all 
weathers is arduous in the extreme. . . . No argument is needed to 
demonstrate that men above middle life are not usually physically 
able to perform such duties." Mass. Leg. Doc., House No. 1582, 
at 8 (1938). With these considerations in mind, the State's Com-
missioner of Public Safety argued before the commission for pro-
visions permitting retirement of State Police at 45. The commission 
observed in response that it was "not prepared to say that the 
contention of the Commissioner of Public Safety, that [State Police] 
over age forty-five should be eligible to retirement, is unsound as a 
matter of public policy." /d., at 8. The commission, however, 
deferred the problem of setting retirement ages for the State Police 
to special study, their sole reason for not recommending age 45 
being the anticipated pension costs to the State, not the reasonable-
ness of the age with respect to job qualification. /d., at 7-9. 
Though the age 50 limitation was not specifically proposed by the 
commission, but was ultimately enacted by the legislature after 
further study, Act of Aug. 12, 1939, c. 503, § 3 (1939), Mass. Acts & 
Resolves 737-738, it is apparent that the purpose of the limitation 
was to protect the public by assuring the ability of State Police to 
respond to the demands of their jobs. See also Mass. Leg. Doc., 
House No. 5316, at 16, 17 (1967); Mass. Leg. Doc., House No. 2500, 
at 21, 23-25 (1955). This purpose is also clearly implied by the 
State's maximum-age scheme, which sets higher mandatory retire-
ment ages for lass demanding jobs. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 32, 
§§ 1, 3 (2) (g), 26 (3) (a) (1966), as amended (Supp. 1975). 
8 Appellee seems to have suggested in oral argument that Mass. 
·Gen. Laws Ann. c. 32, §§ 1, 3 (2) (g), 26 (3) (a) , also deny equ.al pro-
74-1044-PER CURIAM 
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that § 26 (3) (a) has the effect of excluding from service 
so few officers who are in fact unqualified as to render age 
50 a criterion wholly unrelated to the objective of the 
statute.9 
That the State chooses not to determine fitness 
more precisely through individualized testing after age 50 
is not to say that the State's purpose is not rationally fur-
thered by a maximum age limitation. It is only to say 
that with regard to the interests of all concerned, the 
State perhaps has not chosen the best means to accom-
plish its purpose.10 But where rationality is the test, a 
tection through the job classification established by them. Tr. of Oral 
Arg., at 14, 17-18. Any such argument, however, is unpersuasive. 
The sections do set a maximum retirement age for uniformed state 
officers which is less than that set for other law enforcement 
personnel. It has never been seriously disputed, if at all, however, that 
the work of state uniformed officers is more demanding than that of 
other state, or even municipal, law enforcement personnel. It is 
this difference in work demands that underlies the job classification. 
Mass. Leg. Doc., House No. 2500, at 21-22 (1955). And it is this 
difference that renders the different employment requirements reason-
able and hence constitutional. ~ 
u Review of Massachusetts' maximum ac(iimitations by state leg- 0 
islative commissions has proceeded on the principle that "maximum 
retirement age for any group of employees should be that age at 
which the efficiency of a large majority of the employees in the 
group is such that it is in the public interest that they retire." 
Final Report of the Special Commission to Study and Revise the 
Laws Relating to Retirement Systems and Pensions, Mass. Leg. Doc., 
House No. 2500, at 7 (1955). 
1" Indred, were it not for the existing annual individual examinar 
tions through age 50, appellee would concede the rationality of man-
datory retirement at 50. Tr. of Oral Arg., at 22-23. The introduc-
tion of individual examinations, however, hardly defeats the 
rationality of the State's scheme. In fact, it augments ration-
ality since the legislative judgment to avoid the risk posed by even 
the healthiest fifty-year-old officers would be implemented by annual 
.individual examinations between ages 40 and 50 which serve tp 
74-.1044---PER CURIAM 
10 MASSACHUSETTS BD. OF RETIREMENT v. MURGIA 
statute "does not violate the Equal Protection Clause 
merely because the classifications made by [it] are im-
perfect." Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S., at 485. 
We do not make light of the substantial economic and 
psychological effects premature and compulsory retire-
ment can have on an individual; nor do we denigrate the 
ability of elderly citizens to continue to contribute to 
society. The problems of retirement have been well doc-
umented and are beyond serious dispute.11 But "[w]e 
do not decide today that the [Massachusetts statute] is 
wise, that it best fulfills the relevant social and economic 
objectives that [Massachusetts] might ideally espouse, 
or that a more just and humane system could not be de-
vised." !d., at 487. We decide only that the system 
enacted by the Massachusetts Legislature does not deny 
appellee equal protection of the law. 
The judgment is reversed. 
MR. JusTICE STEVENS took no part in the considera-
, tion or decision of this case. 
eliminate those younger officers who are not at least as healthy as 
the best fifty-year-old officers. 
11 E. g., M. Barron, The Aging American (1961) ; Cameron, Neu-
roses of Later Maturity, in Mental Disorders in Later Life 201 (2d 
ed. 0 . Kaplan 1956) ; Senate Special Committee on Aging, 
Developments in Aging : 1971 and January-March 1972, S. Rep. 
No. 92-784, pp. 48-53 (1972) ; Hearings before the Senate Sub-
committee on Retirement and the Individual of the Senate Special 
Committee on Aging, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pts. 1 & 2, 36-46, 87- 101, 
121- 127, 212-217, 464-471 (1967). 
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PER CuRIAM •. 
This case presents the question whether the provision 
of Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 32, § 26 (3) (a), that a uni .. 
formed State Police Officer "shall be retired . . . upon his 
attaining age fifty," denies appellee police officer equal 
protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.1 
1 Uniformed State Police Officers are appointed under Mass. Gen. 
Laws Ann. c. 22, § 9A, which provides : 
"Whenever the governor shall deem it necessary to provide more 
effectively for the protection of persons and property and for the 
maintenance of law and order in the commonwealth, he may author-
ize the commissioner to make additional appointments to the division 
of state police, together with such other employees as the governor 
may deem necessary for the proper administration thereof. . . . 
Said additional officers shall have and exerc1se within the common-
wealth all the powers of constables, except the service of civil process, 
and of police officers and watchmen. . . . No person who has not 
reached his nineteenth birthday nor any person who has passed his 
thirtieth birthday shall be enlisted for the first time as an officer of 
the division of state police, except that said maximum age qualifica-
tion shall not apply in the case of the enlistment of any woman as 
such an officer .... " 
In pertinent part§ 26 (3) provides : 
" (a) •.• Any ... officer appointed under section nine A of chapter 
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Appellee Robert Murgia was an officer in the Uni-
formed Branch of the Massachusetts State Police. The 
Massachusetts Board of Retirement retired him upon his 
50th birthday. Thereafter, appellee brought this civil 
action in the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Massachusetts, alleging that the operation of 
§ 26 (3) (a) denied him equal protection of the laws and 
requesting th.e convening of a three:judge court under 
28 U. S. C. §§ 2281, 2284.2 The District Judge dis-
twenty-two ... who has performed service in the division of state 
pollee in the department of pubhc safety for not less than twenty 
years, shall be retired by the state board of retirement upon his 
attaining age fifty or upon the expiration of such twenty years, 
whichever last occur~." 
" (b) Any ... officer ... who has performed service ... for not 
less than twenty years and who has not attained . . . age fifty in 
the case of an officer appointed under the said section nine A, shall 
be retired by the state board of retirement in case the rating board, 
after an examination of such officer or· inspector by a registered 
physician appointed by it, shall report in writing to the state board 
of retirement that he is physically or mentally incapacitated for the 
performance of duty and that such incapacity is 'likely to be 
permanent." 
Since § 9A requires · that new enlistees in the Uniformed Division 
be no more than 30 years of age, few retirements are delayed past 
50 until the expiration of 20 years' service. 
,, The question presented in this case was summarily treated in 
Cannon v. Guste, 423 U. S. 898, aff'g - F. Supp. - (ED La. 
1975) ; Weisbrod v. Lynn, 420 U. S. 940 (1975), aff'g 383 F. Supp. 
933 (DC 1974) ; Mcilvaine v. Pennsylvania, '415 U. S. 986 (1974), 
' dismissing a.ppeal from 454 Pa. 129, 309 A. 2d 801 (1973). Our 
cursory consideration in those cases does not, of course, foreclose 
th1s opportunity to consider more fully that question. See Usery v. 
Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., - U. S. - (1976); Edelman v. 
Jordan , 415 U.S. 651, 670-671 (1974) . 
2 JurisdictiOn was invoked pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1343, 
and declaratory and injunctive relief was sought under 28 U. S. C. 
§§ 2201, 2202. The equal protection denial was alleged to consti-
:tuate a violation of 42 U. S. C.· § 1983 Appellee made no claim 
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missed appellee's complaint on the ground that the 
complaint did not allege a substantial constitutional 
question. 345 F. Supp. 1140 (1972). On appeal, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in 
an unreported memorandum, set aside the District Court 
judgment and remanded the case with direction to con-
vene a three-judge court. Upon a record consisting o£ 
depositions, affidavits and other documentary material 
submitted by the parties, the three-judge court filed im 
opinion that declared § 26 (3)(a) unconstitutional on 
the ground that "a classification based on age 50 alone 
lacks rational basis in furthering any substantial state 
mterest," and enjoined enforcement of the statute. 
Murgia v. Massachusetts Board of Retirement, 376 F. 
Supp. 753, 754 (Mass. 1974). We noted probable juris-
diction of the Retirement Board's appeal. 421 U. S. 
974 (1975). We reverse. 
The primary function of the Uniformed Branch of the 
Massachusetts State Police is to protect persons and 
property and maintain law and order. Specifically, uni-
formed officers participate in controlling prison and civil 
disorders, respond to emergencies and natural disasters, 
patrol highways in marked cruisers, investigate crime, 
apprehend criminal suspects, and provide back-up sup-
port for local law enforcement personnel. As the Dis-
trict Court observed, "service in this branch is, or can ber 
arduous." 376 F. Supp., at 754. "[H] igh versatility is 
required, with few, if any, backwaters available for the par-
tially superannuated." Ibid. Thus, "even [appellee's] 
experts concede that there is a general relationship be-
tween advancing age and decreasing physical ability to 
respond to the demands of the job." l d., at 755. 
under the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 
29 U S.IC. § 621 et Beq 
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These considerations prompt the requirement that 
uniformed state officers pass a comprehensive physical 
examination biennially until age 40. After that, until 
mandatory retirement at age 50, uniformed officers must 
pass annually a more rigorous examination, including an 
electrocardiogram and tests for gastro-intestinal bleed-
ing. Appellee Murgia had passed such an examination 
four months before he was retired, and there is no dispute 
'that, when he retired, his excellent physical and mental 
health still rendered him capable of performing the duties 
of a uniformed officer. 
The record includes the testimony of three physicians: 
that of the State Police Surgeon, who testified to the 
physiological and psychological demands involved in the 
performance of uniformed police functions; that of an 
associate professor of medicine, who testified generally 
to the relationship between aging and the ability to per-
form under stress; and that of a surgeon, who also testi-
'fied to aging and the ability safely to perform police 
functions. The testimony clearly established that the 
risk of physical failure, particularly in the cardiovascular 
system, increases with age, and that the number of indi-
viduals in a given age group incapable of performing 
stress functions increases with the age of the group. 
Appendix, at 77-78, 174-176. The testimony also recog-
nized that particular individuals over 50 could be capable 
of safely performing the functions of uniformed officers. 
"The associate professor of medicine, who was a witness 
for the appellee, further testified that evaluating the risk 
of cardiovascular failure in a given individual would 
require a detailed number of studies. Id., at 77-78. 
In assessing appellee's equal protection claim, the Dis-
trict Court found it unnecessary to apply a strict scrutiny 
test, see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969), for 
it determined that the age classification established by 
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the Massachusetts statutory scheme could not in any 
event withstand a test of rationality, see Dandridge v. 
Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970). Since there had been 
no showing that reaching age 50 forecast "imminent 
change" in an officer's physical condition, the Dis-
trict Court held that compulsory retirement at age 
50 was irrational under a scheme that assessed the 
capabilities of offioers individually by means of compre-
hensive annual physical examinations. We agree that 
rationality is the proper standard by which to test whether 
compulsory retirement at age 50 violates equal protection. 
We disagree, however, with the District Court's deter .. 
mination that the age 50 classification is not rationally 
related to furthering a legitimate state interest. 
I 
We need state only briefly our reasons for agreeing 
that strict scrutiny is not the proper test for deter-
mining whether the mandatory retirement provision 
denies appellee equal protection. San Antonio Inde-
pendent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 ( 1973), 
reaffirmed that equal protection analysis requires strict 
scrutiny of a legislative classification only when the classi ... 
fication impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a 
fundamental right 3 or operates to the peculiar disadvan .. 
tage of a suspect class.~ Mandatory retirement at age 50 
3 E. g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973) (right of a uniquely 
pnvate nature); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134 (1972) (right to 
vote); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969) (right of inter-
state travel}; Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23 (1968) (rights guar-
anteed b~· the First Amendment); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. 
Willia1flsun, 316 U. S. 535 ( 1942) (right to procreate). 
4 E . g. , Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971) (alienage); 
McLaughlzn v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184 (1964) (race); Oyama ,v. 
1Ca/ifornia, 332 U. S. 633 (19'47) (ancestry) . . 
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' 
under the Massachusetts statute involves neither . . 
situation, '.(~ 
This Court's deciswns give no support to the proposi-~ 
tioll that a right of governmental employment per se 
is fundamental. See San Antonio Independent School 
District v. Rodriguez, supra, Lindsey v. Normet, 405 
l' S. 56 (1972), Dandridge v. Williams, supra. Accord-
ingly, we have expressly stated that a standard less 
tha11 strict scrutiny "has consistently been applied to 
state legislation restricting the availability of employ-
ment opportunities." Dandridge v. Williams, supra, at 
485. 
Nor does the class of uniformed state police officers 
over 50 constitute a suspect class for purposes of equ9-l 
protection analysis. Rodriguez, supra, at 28, observed 
that a suspect class is one "saddled with such. disabilities, 
or subjected to such a history of purposefpl unequttl 
treatment, or relegated to such a position of politic~ 
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection 
from the majoritarian political process." While the 
treatment of the aged in this Nation has not been 
wholly free of discrimination, such persons, unlike,. 
say, those who have been discriminated against on the 
basis of race or national origin, have not experienced a 
"history of purposeful unequal treatment" or been sub-
jected to unique disabilities on the· basis of stereotyped. 
characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities. 
The class subject to the compulsory retirement feature 
of the Massachusetts statute consists of uniformed state 
police officers over the age of 50. It cannot be 
said to discriminate only against the elderly. Rather, it. 
·draws the line at a certain age in middle life. But even 
old age does not define a udiscrete and insular" group, see 
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144,. 
' 1.52-153, n 4 (1938), in need of "extraordinary protec-
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tion from the majoritarian political process." Instead, it 
marks a stage that each of us will reach if we live out 
our normal span. Even if the statute could be said to 
impose a penalty upon a class defined as the aged, it 
would not impose a distinction sufficiently akin to those 
classifications that we have found suspect to call for strict 
judicial scrutiny. 
Under the circumstances, it is unnecessary to subject 
the State's resolution of competing interests in this case 
to the degree of critical examination that our cases under 
the Equal Protection Clause recently have characterized 
as "strict judicial scrutiny," 
II 
We turn then to examine this state classification under 
the rational basis standard. This inquiry employs a rel-
atively relaxed standard reflecting the Court's awareness 
that the drawing of lines that create distinctions is pecu-
liarly a legislative task and an unavoidable one. Perfec-
tion in making the necessary classifications is neither 
possible nor necessary. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S., 
at 485. Such action by a legislature is presumed to be 
vahd.5 
In this case, the Massachusetts statute clearly meets 
the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause, for the 
State's classification rationally furthers the purpose iden-
tified by the State: " Through mandatory retirement at 
age 50, the legislature seeks to protect the public by as-
suring physical preparedness of its uniformed police.7 
r. See, e. g., San Antonio School Dtstnct v. Rodriguez, supra, at 
40-41 ; Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U. S. 83, 88 (1940); Lindsley v. 
Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78-79 (1911) . 
0 See San Antonio School District v Rodriguez, supra, at 17. 
7 A spec~al legislative commission's report preccdmg the enact-
ment of the age 50 maximum for uniformed police stated: "The 
D1vision of State Poltce, by virtue of the work demanded of its 
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Since physical ability generally declines with age, manda· 
tory retirement at 50 serves to remove from police service 
those whose fitness for Uniformed .work presumptively 
has diminished with age. This clearly is rationally re~ 
lated to the State's objective.8 There is no indication 
members, undoubtedly requires comparatively young men of vigor-
ous physique. The nature of the duties to be performed in all 
weathers is arduous in the extreme. . . . No argument is needed to 
demonstrate that men !1bove middle life are not usually physically 
able to perform such duties." Mass. Leg. Doc., House No. 1582, 
at 8 (1938). With these considerations in mind, the State's Com-
missioner of Public Safety argued before the commission for pro-
visions permitting retirement of State Police at 45. The commission 
observed in response that it was "not prepared to say that the 
contention of the Commissioner of Public Safety, that [State Police] 
over age forty-five should be eligible to retirement, is unsound as a 
matter of public policy." /d., at 8. The commission, however, 
deferred the problem of setting retirement ages for the State Police 
to special study, their sole reason for not recommending age 45 
being the anticipated pension costs to the State, not the reasonable-
ness of the age with respect to job qualification. /d., at 7-9. 
Though the age 50 limitation was not specifically proposed by the 
commission, but was ultimately enacted by the legislature after 
further study, Act of Aug. 12, 1939, c. 503, § 3 (1939), Mass. Acts & 
Resolves 737-738, it is apparent that the purpose of the limitation 
was to protect the public by assuring the ability of State Police to 
respond to the demands of their JObs. See also Mass. Leg. Doc., 
House No. 5316, at 16, 17 (1967); Mass. Leg. Doc., House No. 2500, 
at 21, 23-25 (1955). This purpose is also clearly implied by the 
State's maximum-age scheme, which sets higher mandatory retire-
ment ages for lass demanding jobs. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 32, 
§§ 1, 3 (2) (g), 26 (3) (a) (1966), as amended (Supp. 1975) . 
8 Appellee seems to have suggested m oral argument that Mass. 
Gen. Laws Ann. c. 32, §§ 1, 3 (2) (g), 26 (3) (a), also deny equal pro-
tection through the job classification established by them. Tr. of Oral 
Arg., at 14, 17-18. Any such argument, however, is unpersuasive. 
The sections do set a maximum retirement age for uniformed state 
officers which is less than that set for other law enforcement 
personnel. It has never been seriously disputed, if at all, however, that 
the work of state uniformed officers is more demanding than that of 
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that § 26 (3)(a) has the effect of excluding from service 
so few officers who are in fact unqualified as to render age 
50 a criterion wholly unrelated to the objective of the 
statute.9 
That the State chooses not to determine fitness 
more precisely through individualized testing after age 50 
IS not to say that the State's objective of assuring l 
physical fitne~s is not rationally furthered by a maxi-
mum age limitation. This is only to say that with 
regard to the interest of all concerned, the State per-
haps has not chosen the best means to accomplish its 
purpose.10 But where rationality is the test, a statute 
"does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely 
because the classifications made by [it] are imperfect." 
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. , at 485. 
We do not make light of the substantial economic and 
psychological effects premature and compulsory retire-
other state, or even municipal, law enforcement personnel. It is 
this difference in work demands that underlies the job classification. • · 
Mass. Leg. Doc., House No. 2500, at 21-22 (1955). .( ~
u Review of Massachusetts' maximum age limitations by state leg-
islative commissions has proceeded on the principle that "maximum 
retirement age for any group of employees should be that age at 
which the efficiency of a large majority of the employees in the 
group is such that it is in the public interest that they retire." 
Final Report of the Special Commission to Study and Revise the 
Laws Relating to Retirement Systems and Pensions, Mass. Leg. Doc., 
House No. 2500, at 7 (1955) . 
10 Indeed, were it not for the ex1stmg annual mdividual examina-
tions through age 50, appellee would concede the rationality of man-
datory retirement at 50. Tr. of Oral Arg., ·at 22-23. The introduc-
tion of individual examinations, however, hardly defeats the 
rationality of the State's scheme. In fact, it augments ration-
ality since the legislative judgment to avoid the risk posed by even 
the healthiest fifty-year-old officers would be implemented by annual 
individual examinations between ages 40 and 50 which serve to 
eliminate those younger officers who are not at least as healthy as 
tbe best fifty-year-old officers. 
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ment can have on an individual; nor do we denigrate thq 
ability of elderly citizens to continue to contribute to 
society. The problems of retirement have been well doc-
umented and are beyond serious dispute.11 But "[w]e 
do not decide today that the [Massachusetts statute] is 
wise, that it best fulfills the relevant social and economic 
objectives that [Massachusetts] might ideally espouse, 
or that a more just and humane system could not be de-
vised." /d., at 487. We decide only that the system 
enacted by the Massachusetts Legislature does not deny 
appellee equal protection of the law. 
The judgment is reversed. 
MR. JusTICE STEVENS took no part in the considera-
tion or decision of this case. 
11 E. g., M. Barron, The Aging American (1961) ; Cameron, Neu-
roses of Later Maturity, in Mental Disorders in Later Life 201 (2d 
ed. 0. Kaplan 1956); Senate Special Committee on Aging; 
Developments in Aging: 1971 and January-March 1972, S. Rep .. 
No. 92-784, pp. 48-53 (1972); Hearings before the Senate Sub-
committee on Retirement and the Individual of the Senate Special 
Committee on Aging, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.1 pts. 1 & 2, 36-46, 87-101;. 
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PER CuRIAM. 
This case presents the question whether the provision 
of Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 32, § 26 (3) (a), that a uni-
formed State Police Officer 11shall be retired ... upon his 
attaining age fifty," denies appellee police officer equal 
protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.1 
1 Uniformed State Police Officers are appointed under Mass. Gen. 
Laws Ann. c. 22, § 9A, which provides: 
"Whenever the governor shall deem it necessary to provide more 
effectively for the protection of persons and property and for the 
maintenance of law and order in the commonwealth, he may author-
ize the commissioner to make additional appointments to the division 
of state police, together with such other employees as the governor 
may deem necessary for the proper administration thereof. . . . 
Said additional officers shall have and exercise within the common-
wealth all the powers of constables, except the service of civil process, 
and of police officers and watchmen. . . . No person who has not 
reached hi~ twenty-first birthday nor any person who has passed his 
thirtieth birthday shall be enlisted for the first time as an officer of 
the division of state police, except that said maximum age qualifica-
tion shall not apply in the case of the enlistment of any woman as 
l!Uch an officer .. .. " 
In pertinent part§ 26 (3) provides: 
"(a) . .. Any ... officer appointed under section nine A of chapter 
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Appellee Robert Murgia was an officer in the Uni-
formed Branch of the Massachusetts State Police. The 
Massachusetts Board of Retirement retired him upon his 
50th birthday. Appellee brought this civil action 
in the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Massachusetts, alleging that the operation of 
§ 26 (3) (a) denied him equal protection of the laws and 
requesting the convening of a three-judge court under 
28 U. S. C. §§ 2281, 2284. 2 The District Judge dis-
twenty-two ... who has performrd srrvire in the division of state 
police in the department of public safety for not less than twenty 
years, shall be retired by the stnte board of retirement upon his 
attaining age fifty or upon the expiration of such twenty years, 
whichever last occurs." 
" (b) Any . . . officer . . . who has performed service . . . for not 
less than twenty years and who has not attained ... age fifty in 
the case of an officer appointrd under the said section nine A, shall 
be retired by the state board of retirement in case the rating board, 
after an examination of such officer or inspector by a registered 
physician appointed by it, shall report in writing to the st.ate board 
of retirement that he is physically or mentally incapacitated for the 
performance of duty and that such incapacity is likely to be 
permanent." 
Since § 9A requires that new enlistees in the Uniformed DiYision 
be no more than 30 years of age, few retirements are delayrd past 
50 until the expiration of 20 years' :-ervice. 
The question pre~entrd in thiR ra~e wa.~ summaril~· treated in 
Ca·nnon v. Gu.ste, 423 U. S. 898, aff'g - F. Supp. - (ED La. 
1975); Weisbrod v. Lynn, 420 U. S. 940 (1975), nff'g 383 F. Supp. 
933 (DC 1974); Mcllvaine v. Pennsylvania, 415 U. S. 986 (1974), 
dismissing nppenl from 454 Pn. 129, 309 A. 2d 801 (1973). Our 
curf'ory consideration in tho~e ca.Rcs docs not, of cour~'<e, foreclose 
thiR opportunity to rollsider more fully ihat question. Sec, e. g., 
Bclelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,670-671 (1974). 
2 .Jurisdiction was invoked pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 13~3. 
and declaratory and injunctive relief was sought under 28 U. S. C.' 
§§ 2201, 2202. The equal protection denial wns alleged to consti-
tuate a violation of 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Appellee made no claim 
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missed appellee's complaint on the ground that the 
complaint did not allege a substantial constitutional 
question. 345 F. Supp. 1140 (1972). On appeal, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in 
an unreported memorandum, set aside the District Court 
judgment and remanded the case with direction to con-
vene a three-judge court. Upon a record consisting of 
depositions, affidavits and other documentary material 
submitted by the parties, the three-judge court filed an 
opinion that declared § 26 (3) (a) unconstitutional on 
the ground that "a classification based on age 50 alone 
lacks a rational basis in furthering any substantial state 
interest," and enjoined enforcement of the statute. 
Murgia v. Massachusetts Board of R etirement, 376 F. 
Supp. 753, 754 (Mass. 1974) . We noted probable juris-
diction of the Retirement Board's appeal. 421 U. S. 
974 (1975). We reverse. 
The primary function of the Uniformed Branch of the 
Massachusetts State Police is to protect persons and 
property and maintain law and order. Specifically, uni-
formed officers participate in controlling prison and civil 
disorders, respond to emergencies and natural disasters, 
patrol highways in marked cruisers, investigate crime, 
apprehend criminal suspects , and provide back-up sup-
port for local law enforcement personnel. As the Dis-
trict Court observed, "service in this branch is, or can be, 
arduous." 376 F. Supp. , at 754. "[H]igh versatility is 
required, with few , if any, backwaters available for the par-
tially superannuated." Ibid. Thus, "even [appellee's] 
experts concede that there is a general relationship be-
tween advancing age and decreasing physical ability to 
respond to the demands of the job." Id., at 755. 
under the federal Age Discrimina tion in Emplo~•ment Act of 19(17 , 
29 U. S. C. § 621 et seq . 
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These considerations prompt the requirement that 
uniformed state offirers pass a comprehensive physical 
examination biennially until age 40. After that, until 
mandatory retirement at age 50, uniformed officers must 
pass annually a more rigorous examination, including an 
electrocardiogram and tests for gastro-intestinal bleed-
ing. Appellee Murgia had passed such an examination 
four months before he was retired. and there is no dispute 
that, when he retired, his excellent physical and mental 
health still renderPd him capable of performing the duties 
of a uniformed officer. 
The record includes the testimony of three physicians: 
that of the State Police Surgeon, who testified to the 
physiological and psychological demands involved in the 
performance of uniformed police functions; that of an 
associate professor of medicine, who testified generally 
to the relationship between aging and the ability to per-
form under stress; and that of a surgeon, who also testi-
fied to aging and the ability safely to perform police 
functions. The testimony clearly established that the 
risk of physical failure, particularly in the cardiovascular 
system, increases with age, and that the number of indi-
viduals in a given age group incapable of performing 
stress functions increases with the age of the group. 
Appendix, at 77-78, 174-176. The testimony also recog-
nized that particular individuals over 50 could be capable 
of safely performing the functions of uniformed officers. 
The associate professor of medicine, who was a witness 
for the appellee, further testified that evaluating the risk 
of cardiovascular failure in a given individual would 
require a detailed number of studies. /d., at 77- 78. 
In assessing appellee's equal protection claim, the Dis-
trict Court found it unnecessary to apply a strict scrutiny 
tf'st, see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969), for 
it determined that the age classification established by 
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the Massachusetts statutory scheme could not in any 
event withstand a test of rationality, see Dandridge v. 
Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970). Since there had been 
no ~bowing that reaching age 50 forecast even "imminent 
change" in an officer's physical condition, the Dis-
trict Court held that compulsory retirement at age 
50 was irrational under a scheme that assessed the 
capabilities of officers individually by means of compre-
hensive annual physical examinations. We agree that 
rationality is the proper standard by which to test whether 
compulsory retirement at age 50 violates equal protection. 
We disagree, however, with the District Court's deter-
mination that the age 50 classification is not rationally 
related to furthering a legitimate state interest. 
I 
We need state only briefly our reasons for agreeing 
that strict scrutiny is not the proper test for deter-
mining whether the mandatory retirement provision 
denies appellee equal protection. San Antonio Independ-
ent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 16 ( 1973) , 
reaffirmed that equal protection analysis requires strict 
scrutiny of a legislative classification only when the classi-
fication impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a 
fundamental right 3 or operates to the peculiar disadvan-
tage of a suspect class! Mandatory retirement at age 50 
3 E . g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973) (right of a uniquely 
private nature); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134 (1972) (right to 
vote) ; Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969) (right of inter-
state t ravel); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23 ( 1968) (rights guar-
anteed by the First Amendment ) ; Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel . 
Williamson, 316 U. S. 535 (1942) (right to procreate). 
" E. g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971) (aliena ge) ; 
J.v! cLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184 (1964) (race ) ; Oyama v. 
California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (ancestry). 
J .. ·, 
r ' 
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under the Massachusetts statute involves neither 
situation. 
This Court's decisions give no support to the proposi-
tion that a right of governmental employment per se 
is fundamental. See San Antonio Independent School 
District v. Rodriguez, supra; Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 
56, 73 ( 1972) ; Dandridge v. Williams, supra, at 485. Ac-
cordingly, we have expressly stated that a standard less 
than strict scrutiny "has consistently been applied to 
state legislation restricting the availability of employ-
ment opportunities." Ibid. 
Nor does the class of uniformed state police officers 
over 50 constitute a suspect class for purposes of equal 
protection analysis. Rodriguez, supra, at 28, observed 
that a suspect class is one "saddled with such disabilities, 
or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal 
treatment, or relegated to such a position of political 
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection 
from the majoritarian political process." While the 
treatment of the aged in this Nation has not been 
wholly free of discrimination, such persons, unlike, 
say, those who have been discriminated against on the 
basis of race or national origin, have not experienced a 
"history of purposeful unequal treatment" or been sub-
jected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped 
characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities. 
The class subject to the compulsory retirement feature 
of the Massachusetts statute consists of uniformed state 
police officers over the age of 50. It cannot be 
said to discriminate only against the elderly. Rather, it 
draws the line at a certain age in middle life. But even 
old age does not define a "discrete and insular" group, 
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 
152-153, n. 4 ( 1938), in need of "extraordinary protec-
tion from the majoritarian political process." Instead, it 
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marks a stage that each of us will reach if we live out 
our normal span. Even if the statute could be said to 
impose a penalty upon a class defined as the aged, it 
would not impose a distinction sufficiently akin to those 
classifications that we have found suspect to call for strict 
judicial scrutiny. 
Under the circumstances, it is unnecessary to subject 
the State's resolution of competing interests in this case 
to the degree of critical examination that our cases under 
the Equal Protection Clause recently have characterized 
as "strict judicial scrutiny." 
II 
We turn then to examine this state classification under 
the rational basis standard. This inquiry employs a rel-
atively relaxed standard reflecting the Court's awareness 
that the drawing of lines that create distinctions is pecu-
liarly a legislative task and an unavoidable one. Perfec-
tion in making the necessary classifications is neither 
possible nor necessary. Dandridge v. W'aliarns, supra, 
at 485. Such action by a legislature is presumed to be 
valid." 
In this case, the Massachusetts statute clearly meets 
the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause, for the 
fltate's classification rationally furthers the purpose iden-
tified by the State: 6 Through mandatory retirement at 
age 50. the legislature sPeks to protect the public by as-
suring physical preparedness of its uniformed poJicc.7 
5 Sec, e. g., San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, supra, at 
40-41; Madden v. Kent1tclcy, 309 U. S. 83, 88 (1940); Lindsley v. 
Natural Carbon1:c Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911). 
G See San Antm1io School Distrir·t v. Rodriguez, supm, at 17. 
7 A s]wcial legislrttive commission's report precrding 1 he cnnrt-
ment of the age 50 maximum for uniformed police strrted: "The 
Division of Stfttc Policr, by Yirtuc of the nature of the work de-
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Since physical ability generally declines with age, manda-
tory retirement at 50 serves to remove from police serviee 
those whose fitness for uniformed work presumptively 
has diminished with age. This clearly is rationally re-
latrd to the State's objective . .q There is no indication 
mandcd of its members, nndoubledly rcqnire::; rompnrn I ivcly young 
mrn of vigorous physiqnr. The nalure of the duties to be Ilcrformed 
in all weathers is arduous in thr cxi,rcme. . . . No argument i~ 
necdrd to demonstrate that men above middle life are not usually 
ph?sically able to perform such duti<'s." Mnss. Leg. Dar., Honse 
No. 1582, nt 8 (1938). With thrso considE'n1tions in mind, the Stntc's 
Commissioner of Public Snfet~r nrgucd brfore the commis~ion for pro-
Yisions permitting retirement of State Police at 45. The commission 
observed in response that it was "not prepared to say that the 
contention of the Commis8ioner of Public Safety, that [State Police] 
over age forty-five should be eligible to retirement, is unsound as n 
matler of public policy." !d., at 8.' The commission, however, 
deferred the problem of setting retirement nges for the State Policc 
1o special study, their sole reason for not recommending agr 45 
being the anticipated pension costs to the State, not the rrasonable-
ness of the age with respect to job qualification. /d., nt 7-9. 
Though the age 50 limitation was not specifically proposed b~· thr 
rommission, but was ultimately enactE'd by the legisla turc nfter 
further study, Act of Aug. 12, 1939, c. 503, § 3 (1939), Mass. Aets & 
Resolves 737-738, it is apparent thnt the pnrpose of the limit:1tion 
was to protect the public by as~uring the ability of State Polirr to 
respond to the demands of their jobR. See also Mass. Leg. Doc., 
House No. 5316, at 16, 17 (1967); Mass. Leg. Doc., House No. 2.')00, 
at 21, 23-25 (1955). This purpose is also clearly implied by the 
State's maximum-nge scheme, which sets higher mandatory rrtire-
ment ages for less demanding jobs. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. r. :~2, 
§§ 1, 3 (2) (g), 26 (3) (a) (1966), as amended (Supp. 1975). 
R Appellee seems to have suggested in oral argument that Mass. 
Gen. Laws Ann. c. 32, §§ 1, 3 (2) (g), 26 (3) (a), also deny equal pro-
tection through the job classification established by them. Tr. of Oral 
Arg., at 14, 17-18. Any such argument , however, is unper~uasive. 
The sections do set a maximum retirement age for uniformed state 
officers which is less than that set for other law enforcement 
per~onnel. It has never been seriously disputed, if at all, however, that 
the work of state uniformed officers is more demanding than that of 
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that § 26 (3) (a) has the effect of excluding from service 
so few officers who are in fact unqualified as to render age 
50 a criterion wholly unrelated to the objective of the· 
statute.9 
That the State chooses not to determine fitness 
more precisely through individualized testing after age 50> 
is not to say that the objective of assuring physical fit-
ness is not rationally furthered by a maximum age 
limitation. It is only to say that with regard to the 
interest of all concerned, the State perhaps has not 
chosen the best means to accomplish this purpose.10 
But where rationality is the test , a State "does not viola.te 
the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classi-
fications made by its laws are imperfect." Dandridge v. 
Williams, 397 U. S., at 485. 
We do not make light of the substantial economic and 
psychological effects premature and compulsory retire-
other state, or even municipal, law enforcement personnel. It is 
this difference in work demands that underlies the job classification. 
Mass. Leg. Doc., House No. 2500, at 21-22 ( 1955). 
fl Review of Massachusetts' maximum age limitations by st:cte leg-
islative commissions has proceeded on the principle that "maximum 
retirement age for any group of employees should be that age at 
which the efficiency of a large majority of the employees in the 
group is such that it is in the public interest that they retire." 
Final Report of the Special Commission to Study and Revise the 
Laws Relating to Retirement Systems and Pensions, Mass. Leg. Doc., 
House No. 2500, at 7 (1955). 
1 u Indeed, were it not for the existing annual individual cxnmina-
tions through age 50, appellee would concede the rationality of man-
datory retirement at 50. Tr. of Oral Arg., at 22-23. The introduc-
tion of individual examinations, however, hardly defeats the 
rationality of the State's scheme. In fact, it augments ration-
ality since the legislative judgment to avoid the risk posed by even 
the healthiest fifty-year-old officers would be implemented by annual 
individual examinations between ages 40 and 50 which serve to 
eliminate those younger officers who are not at least as healthy as 
the best fifty-year-old officers. 
' , 
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ment can have on an individual; nor do we denigrate the 
ability of elderly citizens to continue to contribute to 
society. The problems of retirement have been well doc-
umented and are beyond serious dispute.11 But " [ w] e 
do not decide today that the [Massachusetts statute] is 
wise, that it best fulfills the relevant social and economic 
objectives that [Massachusetts] might ideally espouse, 
or that a more just and humane system could not be de-
vised." Id., at 487. We decide only that the system 
enacted by the Massachusetts Legislature does not deny 
appellee equal protection of the law. 
The judgment is reversed. 
MR. JusTICE STEVENS took no part in the considera-
tion or decision of this case. 
11 E. g., M . Barron, The Aging American (1961) ; Cameron, Neu-
roses of Later Maturity, in Mental Disorders in Later Life 201 (2d 
ed. 0. Kaplan 1956); Senate Special Committee on Aging, 
Developments in Aging: 1971 and January-March 1972, S. Rep. 
No. 92-784, pp. 48-53 (1972); Hearings before the Senate Sub-
committee on Retirement and the Individual of the Senate Special 
Committee on Aging, 90th Cong., 1st Scss., pts . 1 & 2, 36-46, 87-101, 
121-127, 212-217, 464-471 (1967) . 
.. '"; 
NOTICE : This opinion Is subject to formal revision before publication 
In the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are re· 
quested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the 
United Stntes, Washington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other 
formal errors, In order that corrections may be made before the pre-
liminary print goes to press. · 
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PER .CURIAM. 
This case presents the question whether the provision 
of Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 32, § 26 (3) (a), that a uni .. 
formed State Police Officer "shall be retired .. . upon his 
attaining age fifty,." denies appellee police officer equal 
protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.1 
1 Uniformed State Police Officers are appointed under Mass. Gen. 
Laws Ann. c. 22, § 9A, which provides : 
"Whenever the governor shall deem it necessary to provide more 
effectively for the protection of persons and property and for the 
maintenance of law and order in the commonwealth, he may author-
ize the commissioner to make additional appointments to the division 
of state police, together with such other employees as the governor 
may deem necessary for the proper administration thereof. . . . 
Said additional officers shall have and exercise within the common-
wealth all the powers of constables, except the service of civil process, 
and of police officers and watchmen. . . . No person who has not 
reached his twenty-first birthday nor any person who has passed his 
thirtieth birthday shall be enlisted for the first time as an officer of 
the division of state police, except that said maximum age qualifica-
tion shall not apply in the case of the enlistment of any woman as 
such an officer .... " 
In pertinent part § 26 (3) provides : 
"(a) 0 0 • Any ... officer appointed under section nine A of chapter.-
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Appellee Robert Murgia was an officer in the Uni-
formed Branch of the Massachusetts State Police. The 
Massachusetts Board of Retirement retired him upon his 
50th birthday. Appellee brought this civil action 
in the United States District Court for the Dis-
Lrict of Massachusetts, alleging that the operation of 
~ 26 (3) (a) denied him equal protection of the laws and 
requesting the convening of a three-judge court under 
28 U. S. C. §§ 2281, 2284.2 The District Judge dis-
twenty-two ... who has performed service in the division of state 
police in the department of public safety for not less than twenty 
years, shall be retired by the state board of retirement upon his 
attaining age fifty or upon the expiration of such twenty years, 
whichever last occurs." 
" (b) Any . . . officer . . . who has performed service ... for not 
less than twenty years and who has not attained . . . age fifty in 
the case of an officer appointed under the said section nine A, shall 
be retired by the state board of retirement in case the rating board, 
after an examination of such officer or inspector by a registered 
physician appointed by it, shall report in writing to the state board 
of retirement that he is physically or mentally incapacitated for the 
performance of duty and that such incapacity is likely to be 
permanent." 
Since § 9A requires that new enlistees in the Uniformed Division 
be no more than 30 years of age, few retirements are delayed past 
50 until the expiration of 20 years' service. 
The question presented in this case was summarily treated in 
Cannon v. Guste, 423 U. S. 898, aff'g - F. Supp. - (ED La. 
1975); Weisbrod v. Lynn, 420 U. S. 940 (1975), aff'g 383 F. Supp. 
933 (DC 1974); Mcilvaine v. Pennsylvania, 415 U. S. 986 (1974), 
dismissing a.ppeal from 454 Pa. 129, 309 A. 2d 801 (1973). Our 
cursory consideration in those cases does not, of course, foreclose 
this opportunity to consider more fully that question. See, e. g., 
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,670-671 (1974). 
2 .Jurisdiction was invoked pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1343, 
and declaratory and injunctive relief was sought under 28 U. S. C. 
§§ 2201, 2202. The equal protection denial was alleged to consti-
tuate a violation of 42. U. S. C. § 1983. Appellee made no claim. 
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missed appellee's complaint on the ground that the 
complaint did not allege a substantial constitutional 
question. 345 F. Supp. 1140 (1972) . On appeal, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in 
an unreported memorandum, set aside the District Court 
judgment and remanded the case with direction to con-
vene a three-judge court. Upon a record consisting of 
depositions, affidavits and other documentary material 
submitted by the parties, the three-judge court filed an 
opinion that declared § 26 (3) (a) unconstitutional on 
the ground that ''a classification based on age 50 alone 
lacks a rational basis in furthering any substantial state 
interest," and enjoined enforcement of the statute. 
Murgia v. Massachusetts Board of Retirement, 376 F . 
Supp. 753, 754 (Mass. 1974). We noted probable juris-
diction of the Retirement Board's appeal. 421 U. S. 
974 (1975). We reverse. 
The primary function of the Uniformed Branch of the 
Massachusetts State Police is to protect persons and 
property and maintain law and order. Specifically, uni-
formed officers participate in controlling prison and civil 
disorders, respond to emergencies and natural disasters, 
patrol highways in marked cruisers, investigate crime, 
apprehend criminal suspects, and provide back-up sup-
port for local law enforcement personnel. As the Dis-
trict Court observed, "service in this branch is, or can be, 
arduous." 376 F. Supp., at 754. "[H]igh versatility is 
required, with few, if any, backwaters available for the par-
tially superannuated." Ibid. Thus, "even [appellee's] 
experts concede that there is a general relationship be-
tween advancing age and decreasing physical ability to 
respond to the demands of the job." Id., at 755. 
under the fedrral Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 
29 U. S. C. § 621 et Beq. 
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These considerations prompt the requirement that 
uniformed state officers pass a comprehensive physical 
examination biennially until age 40. After that, until 
mandatory retirement at age 50, uniformed officers must 
pass annually a more rigorous examination, including an 
electrocardiogram and tests for gastro-intestinal bleed-
ing. Appellee Murgia had passed such an examination 
four months before he was retired, and there is no dispute 
that, when he retired, his excellent physical and mental 
health still rendered him capable of performing the duties 
of a uniformed officer. 
The record includes the testimony of three physicians : 
that of the State Police Surgeon, who testified to the 
physiological and psychological demands involved in the 
performance of uniformed police functions; that of an 
associate professor of medicine, who testified generally 
to the relationship between aging and the ability to per-
form under stress; and that of a surgeon, who also testi-
fied to aging and the ability safely to perform police 
functions. The testimony clearly established that the 
risk of physical failure, particularly in the cardiovascular 
system, increases with age, and that the number of indi-
viduals in a given age group incapable of performing 
stress functions increases with the age of the group. 
Appendix, at 77-78, 174-176. The testimony also recog-
nized that particular individuals over 50 could be capable 
of safely performing the functions of uniformed officers. 
'The associate professor of medicine, who was a witness 
for the appellee, further testified that evaluating the risk 
of cardiovascular failure in a given individual would 
require a detailed number of studies. !d., at 77-78. 
In assessing appellee's equal protection claim, the Dis-
trict Court found it unnecessary to apply a strict scrutiny 
test, see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969), for· 
it determined that the age classification established by 
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the Massachusetts statutory scheme could not in any 
event withstand a test of rationality, see Dandridge v. 
Williams, 397 U. S. 471 ( 1970). Since there had been 
no showing that reaching age 50 forecast even "imminent 
change" in an officer's physical condition, the Dis-
trict Court held that compulsory retirement at age 
50 was irrational under a scheme that assessed the 
capabilities of officers individually by means of compre-
hensive annual physical examinations. We agree that 
rationality is the proper standard by which to test whether 
compulsory retirement at age 50 violates equal protection. 
We disagree, however, with the District Court's deter-
mination that the age 50 classification is not rationally 
related to furthering a legitimate state interest. 
I 
We need state only briefly our reasons for agreeing 
that strict scrutiny is not the proper test for deter-
mining whether the mandatory retirement provision 
denies appellee equal protection. San Antonio Independ-
ent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 16 ( 1973), 
reaffirmed that equal protection analysis requires strict 
scrutiny of a legislative classification only when the classi-
fication impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a 
fundamental right 3 or operates to the peculiar disadvan-
tage of a suspect class.4 Mandatory retirement at age 50 
3 E. g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S: 113 (1973) (right of a uniquely 
private nature); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134 (1972) (right to 
vote); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969) (right of inter-
state travel); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (rights guar-
anteed by the First Amendment); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel . 
Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right to procreate) . 
4 E. g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971) (alienage); 
McLaughlin v. Ji'lorida, 379 U. S. 184 (1964) (race); Oyama Y •. 
(Jalijornia, ~3A!: U. S. W3 (1948) (ancestry). 
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under the Massachusetts statute involves neither 
situation. 
This Court's decisions give no support to the proposi-
tion that a right of governmental employment per se 
is fundamental. See San Antonio Independent School 
District Y. Rodn:guez, supra.; Lindsey v. 1Yormet, 405 U.S. 
56, 73 ( Hl72); Dandridge v. Williams, supra, at 485. Ac-
cordingly, we have expressly stated that a standard less 
than strict scrutiny "has consistently been applied to 
state legislation restricting the availability of employ-
ment opportunities." Ibid. 
Nor does the class of uniformed state police officers 
over 50 constitute a suspect class for purposes of equal 
protection analysis. Rodriguez, supra, at 28, observed 
that a suspect class is one "saddled with such disabilities, 
or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal 
treatment, or relegated to such a position of political 
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection 
from the majoritarian political process." While the 
treatment of the aged in this Nation has not been 
wholly free of discrimination , such persons, unlike, 
say, those who have been discriminated against on the 
basis of race or national origin, have not experienced a 
"history of purposeful unequal treatment" or been sub-
jected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped 
characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities. 
The class subject to the compulsory retirement feature 
of the Massachusetts statute consists of uniformed state 
police officers over the age of 50. It cannot be 
said to discriminate only against the elderly. Rather, it 
draws the line at a certain age in middle life. But even 
old age does not define a "discrete and insular" group, 
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 
152-153, n. 4 ( 1938), in need of "extraordinary protec· 
tion from the majoritarian political process." Instead, it. 
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marks a stage that each of us will reach if we live out 
our normal span. Even if the statute could be said to 
impose a penalty upon a class defined as the aged, it 
would not impose a distinction sufficiently akin to those 
classifications that we have found suspect to call for strict 
judicial scrutiny. 
Under the circumstances, it is unnecessary to subject 
the State's resolution of competing interests in this case 
to the degree of critical examination that our cases under 
the Equal Protection Clause recently have characterized 
as "strict judicial scrutiny." 
II 
We turn then to examine this state classification under 
the rational basis standard. This inquiry employs a rel-
atively relaxed standard reflecting the Court's awareness 
that the drawing of lines that create distinctions is pecu-
liarly a legislative task and an unavoidable one. Perfec-
tion in making the necessary classifications is neither 
possible nor necessary. Dandridge v. Williams, supra, 
at 485. Such action by a legislature is presumed to be 
valid." 
In this case, the Massachusetts statute clearly meets 
the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause, for the 
State's classification rationally furthers the purpose iden-
tified by the State: 6 Through mandatory retirement at 
age 50, the legislature seeks to protect the public by as-
suring physical preparedness of its uniformed police.7 
5 See, e. g., San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, supra, at 
40-41; Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U. S. 83, 88 (1940); Lindsley v. 
Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78-79 (1911) . 
6 See San Antonio School District v. Rodri(Juez, supra, at 17. 
7 A special legislative commi~sion's rrport pr<:'c<:'ding the enact-
ment of the age 50 maximum for uniformed police stated: "Th~ 
Divi:sion of St{lte 'Police, by virtue- of the nature of the work de-
.. 
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Since physical ability generally declines with age, manda~ 
tory retirement at 50 serves to remove from police service 
those whose fitness for uniformed work presumptively 
has diminished with age. This clearly is rationally re-
lated to the State's objective.8 There is no indication 
mandrd of its members, undoubtedly require::; comparative]~· young 
men of vigorous physique. The na,ture of the dutie~ to be performed 
in all weathers is nrduous in the extreme. . . . No argument is 
needed to demonstrate that men a,bove middle life arc not usually 
physically able to perform such duties." Mas~. Lrg. Doc., House 
No. 1582, at 8 (1938). With the::;e con~iderations in mind, the Statr's 
Commissioner of Public Safety argued before the commi~s1on for pro-
visions permitting retirement of State Police at 45. The commission 
observed in response that it was "not prepared to say that the 
contention of the Commissioner of Public Safety, that [State Police] 
over age forty-five should be eligible to retirement, is unsound as a 
matter of public policy." !d., at 8. The commission, however, 
· deferred the problem of setting retirement ages for the State Police 
to special study, their sole reason for not recommending age 45 
being the anticipated pension costs to the State, not the reasonable-
ness of the age with respect to job qualification. !d., at 7-9. 
Though the age 50 limitation was not specifically proposed by the 
commission, but was ultimately enacted by the legislature after 
further study, Act of Aug. 12, 1939, c. 503, § 3 (1939), Mass. Acts & 
Resolves 737-738, it is apparent that the purpose of the limitation 
was to protect the public by assuring the ability of State Police to 
respond to the demands of their jobs. See also Mass. Leg. Doc., 
House No. 5316, at 16, 17 (1967); Mass. Leg. Doc., House No. 2500, 
at 21, 23-25 (1955). This purpose is also clearly implied by the 
State's maximum-age scheme, which sets higher mandatory retire-
ment ages for l~s demanding jobs. See Mass. Gen. Law,; Ann. c. 32, 
§§ 1, 3 (2) (g), 26 (3) (a) (1966), as amended (Supp. 1975). 
8 Appellee seems to have suggested in oral argument that Mass. 
Gen. Laws Ann. c. 32, §§ 1, 3 (2) (g), 26 (3) (a), also deny equal pro-
tection through the job classification established by them. Tr. of Oral 
Arg., at 14, 17-18. Any such argument, however, is unpersuasive. 
The sections do set a maximum retirement age for uniformed state 
officers which is less than that set for other law enforcement 
personnel. It has never been seriously disputed, if at all, however, that 
the work of state tmiformed officers is more demanding than that of 
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that § 26 (3) (a) has the effect of excluding from service 
so few officers who are in fact unqualified as to render age 
50 a criterion wholly unrelated to the objective of the 
statute.9 
That the State chooses not to determine fitness 
more precisely through individualized testing after age 50 
is not to say that the objective of assuring physical fit-
ness is not. rationally furthered by a maximum age 
limitation. It is only to say that with regard to the 
interest of all concerned, the State perhaps has not 
chosen the best means to accomplish this purpose.10 
But where rationality is the test. a State "does not violate 
the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classi-
fications made by its laws are imperfect." Dandridge v. 
Williams, 397 U. S., at 485. 
We do not make light of the substantial economic and 
psychological effects premature and compulsory retire-
other state, or even municipal, law enforcement personnel. It is 
this difference in work demands that underlies the job classification. 
Mass. Leg. Doc., House No. 2500, at 21-22 ( 1955). 
9 Review of Massachusetts' maximum age limitations by state leg-
islative commissions has proceeded on the principle that "maximum 
retirement age for any group of employees should be that age at 
which the efficiency of a large majority of the employees in the 
group is such that it is in the public interest that they retire." 
Final Report of the Special Commission to Study and Revise the 
Laws Relating to Retirement Systems and Pensions, Mass. Leg. Doc., 
House No. 2500, at 7 (1955). 
10 Indeed, were it not for the existing annual individual rxamina-
tions through age 50, appellee would concede the rationality of man-
datory retirement at 50. Tr. of Oral Arg., at 22-23. The introduc-
tion of individual examinations, however, hardly defeats the 
rationality of the State's scheme. In fact, it augments ration-
ality since the legislative judgment to avoid the risk posed by even 
the healthiest fifty-year-old officers would be implemented by annual 
individual examinations between ages 40 and 50 which serve to 
eliminate those younger officers who are not at least as healthy as 
the best fifty-year-old officers. 
14-1044-PEit CURIAM 
10 MASSACHUSETTS BD. OF RETIREMENT v. MURGIA 
lllent can have on an individual; nor do we denigrate the~ 
ability of elderly citizens to continue to contribute to 
society. The problems of retirement have been well doc-
umented and are beyond serious dispute.11 But "[w]e 
do not decide today that the [Massachusetts statute] is 
wise, that it best fulfills the relevant social and economic 
objectives that [Massachusetts] might ideally espouse, 
or that a more just and humane system could not be de-
vised." !d., at 487. We decide only that the system. 
enacted by the Massachusetts Legislature does not deny 
appellee equal protection of the law. 
The judgment is reversed~. 
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